The Ethics of Microfinance by Sherratt, Lesley
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 












Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
This electronic theses or dissertation has been 
downloaded from the King’s Research Portal at 
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/  
 Author: Lesley Rowena Sherratt
The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or 
information derived from it may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk 
providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENSE AGREEMENT  
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 
Unported License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/  
You are free to: 
Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work 
Under the following conditions: 
Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in 
any way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings 
and other rights are in no way affected by the above. 
 
Title: The Ethics of Microfinance
1 
The Ethics of Microfinance 
Lesley Rowena Sherratt 
King’s College, London 







Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) now reach 200 million people, mostly women without 
access to mainstream financial services living on, below and around the poverty line, with 
offers of small loans. The vast majority have as their twin objectives to alleviate their 
borrowers’ poverty and to enhance their empowerment. 
The paradox of microfinance is that a number of the practices used to achieve its objectives 
have the unintended consequence of undermining them. The concept that links the objectives 
of MFIs and the dangers in its practices is the relationship microfinance has with a 
borrower’s autonomy. The MFI intends that the loan increase autonomy by enriching and 
empowering the borrower. Its practices, however, can easily lead to charges of exploitation, 
coercion and paternalism, although in the latter case it is also argued that in certain areas they 
are not paternalistic enough. It is argued that these latter concepts are considered wrongful, 
when they are, just because of how they relate to autonomy. The structure of the thesis is thus 
to consider the concepts of exploitation, coercion, and paternalism and then apply these 
concepts to the practices of microfinance.  
The thesis concludes with an empirical survey of how far microfinance has in fact achieved 
its objectives of poverty reduction and empowerment, in order to judge whether the 
infringements on autonomy incurred in its practice can be justified. It then considers the 
extent to which the way the benefits and burdens of microfinance fall - those whose lives do 
indeed go better or worse after engaging with microfinance, and by how much - affects our 
judgement as to whether microfinance should be supported. Finally suggestions are made as 
to changes to practices that could be made so as to keep the pursuit of the ethical objectives, 
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Chapter One: Introduction: Microfinance, Its Borrowers and Their Autonomy 
 
I. Aims of this Thesis 
Microfinance, the provision of financial services in very small units to the very poor who lack 
access to mainstream financial services provision, has become a major developmental tool 
over the past thirty years. It now reaches over 200 million of the world’s poorest people, the 
vast majority of whom are women.1 Microfinance’s claim to foster development is that its 
extension of credit to its borrowers creates a process of enrichment for them. At the same 
time, the industry makes the claim that it not only enriches its borrowers, but that it 
empowers them. It is endorsed by UN, which has made microfinance a key tool in delivering 
on a number of its Millennium Development Goals, particularly the reduction of poverty and 
the empowerment of women.2   
The industry uses many definitions of empowerment, but I shall argue that the essence of the 
industry’s idea of empowerment is that it is a process by which a borrower’s autonomy is 
increased. Microfinance can thus be seen to make a dual claim: the empirical claim that it 
enriches its borrowers and that it does so ethically by increasing their autonomy.  
This thesis aims to examine the ethical nature of the central relationship of the microfinance 
industry: that between the microfinance institution (MFI) and the borrower. I will argue that 
there is a paradox at the heart of microfinance. It aims to increase the autonomy of the 
borrower through enriching and empowering her. But it aims to do so through indebting her: 
and furthermore by doing so on a collective basis, by making her own loan conditional upon 
her taking liability for the debts of others. Credit is a dangerous tool to use to try to raise a 
person from poverty: used successfully it can indeed leverage a productive enterprise and 
enrich: used badly, it can just as easily impoverish and disempower. And lending collectively 
immediately transfers the interest of the MFI from being in the outcome for the individual 
borrower, to being in the collective outcome for the group. I shall argue that the practices of 
microfinance, the effects of how it is exercised, serve in fact to undermine the borrower’s 
                                                          
1 Jan Maes and Larry Reid, State of the Microcredit Summit Report 2012,  Washington DC:  Microcredit 
Summit Campaign p. 3 
2 These two goals are interpreted specifically as aiming to raise 100 million families above the US $ 1.25 a day 
threshold, and as achieving greater financial access for women, larger numbers of female children of 
microfinance clients attending school, and greater access to health insurance and medical services 
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autonomy. The paradox of microfinance is that the ways in which it seeks to interact with its 
borrowers compromise just what it aims to enhance: borrowers’ autonomy. 
The concept of autonomy is woven through this thesis not only because of its centrality to the 
goals of microfinance providers, but because it is how an MFI’s interactions with a borrower 
relate to her autonomy that determines whether that form of interaction is prima facie 
wrongful or not. The spectrum of ways in which these interactions can be classified ranges 
from persuasion through manipulation, paternalism, exploitation and coercion to compulsion. 
There are doubtless other shades of ways of classifying some interactions, and other shades 
of influence as well. This thesis will concentrate on exploitation, coercion and paternalism 
because these turn out to be of most relevance to the relationship between microfinance 
institutions and their borrowers. A wider study of all the ethical issues raised by microfinance 
would go further: it would consider whether some microfinance institutions wrongfully 
manipulate their donors with false claims made in marketing materials; or whether some 
funders of MFIs do not exploit their own backers by not disclosing what rates are truly being 
paid: and a full study of the ethics of the microfinance industry would consider the 
prevalence (or otherwise) of corruption in the industry. For space reasons, and because this 
thesis is principally concerned with the ethical standing of the relationship between 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) and their borrowers, these wider issues will not be discussed 
further here. 
This thesis focuses, then, on the ways in which a microfinance institution interacts with its 
borrowers and the extent to which some of these practices are exploitative, coercive and 
paternalistic. It is the relationship of each of these concepts to autonomy that defines whether 
they are prima facie wrongful or not. It is then a further question as to whether, when a prima 
facie wrongful intervention takes place, it can be justified or not. The approach of this thesis 
is a value pluralist one: a prima facie wrongful intervention can be justified if the positive 
benefit in terms of other values, including the overall welfare that flows from it, outweighs 
the wrongness identified. There is thus a tension arising throughout the thesis between the 
importance given to autonomy, which is high, and the fact that infringements upon it can 
potentially be outweighed if the outcome of the intervention is beneficial enough. It is held 
that there is no inconsistency between placing a very high value on autonomy, but yet 
allowing that it is not the only value, and that it may be possible to justify its usurpation, 
restriction, even overriding of altogether, if the consequences in the widest sense are 
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sufficiently beneficial. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this tension is at its clearest in Chapter 6, 
where paternalism is discussed, where the same tension is found in Mill. 
The spectrum of classifications of various interactions between agents, from persuasion to 
compulsion, is not rigid. The worst forms of prima facie wrongful exploitation could be 
worse than mild cases of prima facie wrongful coercion. And not all forms of one party 
influencing another are prima facie wrongful at all. Nothing much hangs on the order in 
which the different classifications of interaction and influence are presented here: what does 
matter is the assessment of whether microfinance’s interventions with its borrowers do 
amount to prima facie wrongful interactions and whether the positive consequences held to 
flow from them do outweigh their prima facie wrongfulness. 
Chapters 2 – 7 of this thesis look at whether an MFI’s relations with its borrowers involve 
exploitation, coercion and paternalism, defining each concept and then applying it to the 
practices of microfinance. Chapters 2 and 3 look at exploitation. Exploitation is defined as the 
taking advantage of an agent, or some attribute or circumstance of hers. Not all taking 
advantage of agents is held to be wrongful, and so exploitation itself is not held to be prima 
facie wrongful. It is argued that it is prima facie wrongful when the object of exploitation is 
controlled or manipulated in some way; when a benefit is derived from the exploitee which 
typically, but not always, accrues to the exploiter, and when the advantage of a person that is 
taken lies in the taking advantage of a particular sort of vulnerability – the exploitee’s low 
level of autonomy. It will be argued in Chapter 2 that that low degree of autonomy can be 
either local, in a particular instance, or global, in the sense of being the entirety of an agent’s 
circumstances; and that the exploiter does not have to have created those circumstances 
himself to wrongfully exploit, but may simply take advantage of them. Moreover, whilst an 
agent is either prima facie wrongfully exploited or not (she cannot be partially exploited), the 
degree of wrongfulness of the exploitation may be seen to be scalar to the degree of the 
lowness of the autonomy taken advantage of. 
In Chapter 3, microfinance will indeed be found to be prima facie wrongfully exploitative 
when it takes advantage of a borrower’s low global degree of autonomy: in those 
circumstances, its defenders have to make the case that the loan’s beneficial impact for the 
borrower is such that this outweighs the prima facie wrongfulness of the exploitation. It 
exploits in several respects. It often exploits through the interest rate charged. This is not a 
new criticism of microfinance, but those making it to date have been unable to lay out what a 
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‘fair’ rate would be. This thesis does so by identifying this as the rate that would not take 
advantage of a borrower’s vulnerability, when that vulnerability arises from her low degree of 
global autonomy, and specifies what that would be. It is also held that microfinance exploits 
its borrowers through its imposition of the conditions of group liability and ‘compulsory 
savings’ on borrowers. There are also particular circumstances in which the microfinance 
institution can be seen to be complicit in the use of child labour. The case for the beneficial 
impact for the borrower of microfinance (which is examined in chapters 8 and 9) has to be 
very strong to overcome the extent of the prima facie wrongful exploitation identified in 
chapter 3. 
Chapters 4 and 5 look at coercion and the extent to which it is practised in microfinance. 
Coercion is held to infringe an agent’s autonomy by imposing on the agent a limited set of 
options from which the agent is compelled to choose, a set which the coercer has chosen and 
enforces. The infringement of autonomy will typically be prima facie wrongful, but capable 
of justification if it results in much greater good or avoidance of harm to the coercee than the 
harm of his loss of autonomy. 
Within the field of microcredit, the use of the group liability model (explained in Section III 
below) for loan repayment can be seen to have an inbuilt tendency to become coercive, and in 
circumstances where the borrower has not agreed in advance to this particular sanction. It 
will be argued that this tendency toward wrongful coercion could be avoided by a move by 
all lenders to individual lending, or at least individual liability within a group lending 
practice. 
At a further extreme, the coercive pressure MFIs exert on groups of borrowers through the 
group liability model can lead some within that group to use compulsion on a defaulting 
borrower whose payment they have to meet. Compulsion is the use of brute force by one 
agent on another to oblige him to act in a particular way: it obliterates the autonomy of the 
compelled agent, making it prima facie wrongful. Chapter 5 will consider cases where the 
MFI coerces the group of borrowers to help it collect payment from a struggling borrower by 
imposing the option set: cover her payment or receive no more loans yourselves. The group 
may then themselves coerce the struggling borrower by, for example, threatening to take 
possession of her remaining assets – pots, pans, tin roof – unless she finds the repayment 
herself. Or they may move straight to compulsion and take these things for themselves, to 
compensate themselves for making the defaulting borrower’s payment for her. 
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Chapters 6 and 7 look at paternalism and the extent to which it is used (and not used where 
perhaps it should be) in microfinance. Paternalism infringes on an agent’s preferences, and 
usurps his autonomy, against that agent’s wishes, for that agent’s own good. The 
infringement is prima facie a wrong to that agent, but it can be justified, when either the 
autonomy itself that is imposed upon is only partial, or when the degree of infringement of a 
fully autonomous agent’s autonomy is very low, and the potential good achieved for the 
agent is high, such as with laws making the wearing of seat belts compulsory – a relatively 
trivial infringement of an agent’s autonomy with the potential benefit of saving his life. 
The exercise of paternalism, justified or otherwise, in the field of microcredit, turns out to be 
surprising. Some practices claimed by the lender to be examples of justifiable paternalism 
turn out not to be paternalistic at all, but are simply for the benefit of the lender. Some 
probably are examples of justifiable paternalism, such as the insistence on the borrower 
undergoing training before being given access to a loan, but the evidence base for the 
justification is weak. More controversially, I shall argue that there are some practices – such 
as the assessment of margins available on a borrower’s proposed business, transparency with 
regard to the actual interest rate charged and a cash flow analysis of the borrower - that are 
largely absent from many lenders that would not only be examples of justifiable paternalism, 
where they are imposed against the borrower’s wishes, but are in fact required by a currently 
unrecognised duty of care owed by the MFI to the borrower. 
Throughout Chapters 2 to 7, particular practices are indeed found to be prima facie wrongful 
cases of exploitation, coercion and paternalism – but these practices could yet be justified if 
microfinance does indeed, overall, enrich and empower its clients. Chapters 8 and 9 consider, 
then, the extent to which microfinance does in fact deliver on its promises, and finds evidence 
that it does so wanting. Chapter 10 then lays out what we know of how the benefits and 
burdens of microfinance fall. It is left to the different philosophical approaches of the reader 
to determine if the current distribution of those benefits and burdens, to the best that we 
understand them, is morally acceptable – but it is hard to identify any philosophical approach 
that would find them so. I end by considering what changes could be made to microfinance’s 
practices so as to increase the chances of successfully enriching borrowers and eliminating 
the worst of the disempowerment: how to practice microfinance rather more ethically with 
regard to its interactions with its borrowers than at present. I will argue that putting the 
concept of respecting the individual borrower’s autonomy back at the heart of how 
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microfinance is practised, as well as at the heart of its theoretical aims, will in fact produce 
the best overall consequences for the borrowers. 
The remaining two sections of this Introduction serve to provide the basis for the chapters 
that succeed it. The following section aims to lay out an explanation of what microfinance is 
and how it works. The final section aims to define the concept of autonomy in order to draw 
on that definition when subsequently considering exploitation, coercion and paternalism, so 
that all of these concepts can then be applied to the practices of microfinance. 
 
II: What Microfinance Is 
Microfinance, broadly, is the provision of financial services in very small units to the very 
poor, who are otherwise typically excluded from access to mainstream financial services. It 
divides into the offerings of microsavings and microcredit. Microsaving is the provision of 
savings accounts as a way of smoothing the financial flows of the unbanked. Microsaving 
itself raises few ethical issues beyond the cost of the provision and the risk of the provider 
absconding with the savings. Microcredit is the provision of very small size loans to poor 
borrowers. The vast majority of the expansion in microfinance in the last few decades has 
been in microcredit, which is frequently offered alone, as the regulatory hurdles to offer 
microsavings are typically much higher. Following industry practice, microfinance will be 
the term most commonly used here, but it should be borne in mind, and the context will 
attempt to make clear, that this generally means microcredit. 
Most of the ethical issues raised by microfinance are raised by the practice of offering 
microcredit, simply because credit – debt – is a double edged sword. Credit can both 
empower the borrower by enabling her to start a business whose profitability alleviates her 
poverty, or it can exacerbate that poverty if the business entered into with the credit fails to 
flourish and the interest rate payments become burdensome or even unmanageable. Although 
there are certainly issues of financial exclusion amongst the poorest in developed countries, 
microfinance has predominantly grown in developing countries, particularly in Asia, South 
America, Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and more recently, Africa. This is 
not to suggest that it does not exist in developed countries, but the practices discussed below 
have generally been developed in emerging economies. 
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Microcredit, then, is the provision of small size loans to poor borrowers, typically at higher 
interest rates than a traditional bank charges, but below those of a moneylender. It is typically 
offered to women, in groups, because women are seen as safer credit risks. It is made without 
collateral, but with the commitment of the group to repay the loan on behalf of an individual 
if one defaults, the so-called ‘group liability’ model. Classically, repayment levels are very 
high – 94% and above3 – but as they need to be if the model is to function either without 
further capital injection, or without still higher interest rates than those already being charged. 
This high, 94%+ number, has often been taken as indicative of the fact that microcredit must 
be working for its borrowers, or they would not be repaying and coming back for more. It 
will be seen in Chapter 3 that this is a mistake. 
There are variations between different microcredit operations. Some now offer individual 
loans without group liability, and some are able to offer savings as well as credit and so have 
a full microfinance offering. However the most widespread model is based on that of the 
Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, especially its original, simple group liability model. This is not 
least because, following Grameen’s success, others have set out to replicate its practices, and 
Grameen has been proactive in helping others to do so. It is worth briefly discussing the early 
history of Grameen, because of the inspiration it has provided to its many replicators. 
Grameen Bank had its origins in 1970s when Professor Muhammad Yunus was head of the 
economics department at Chittagong University. In 1974 Bangladesh was in the grip of 
famine, and Yunus had ‘started to dread my own lectures. What good were all my complex 
theories when people were dying of starvation on the sidewalks and porches across from my 
own lecture hall?’4  Yunus began to study poverty from the bottom up, in the rural village of 
Jobra, close to the University. The key moment for him came in 1976 when he met Sufiya 
Begum, who wove bamboo baskets for a profit of two cents a day, on which she tried to feed 
her family. The amount of money she made was determined by the paikars, the middlemen 
who supplied bamboo at its cost price of 22 cents on the condition that the completed basket 
was sold back to them at 24 cents. Begum did not have enough capital of her own to buy her 
own bamboo and believed that the cost of borrowing from the local moneylenders to do so (at 
interest rates that could vary from 10% a week to 10% per day) was even more prohibitive 
than the deal with the paikars. 
                                                          
3 See, for example Bert D’Espallier, Isabelle Guérin, Roy Mersland, ‘Women and Repayment in Microfinance: 
A Global Analysis’ (2011) World Development vol. 39, issue 5, pp. 758-772 
4 Muhammad Yunus, Banker to the Poor, (1997) New York, N.Y.: Public Affairs, Introduction p. viii 
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It was the fact that Begum could only make two cents a day that shocked Yunus.  
In my university courses, I theorized about sums in the millions of dollars, but here before my eyes the 
problems of life and death were posed in terms of pennies…I was angry, angry at myself, angry at my 
economics department and thousands of intelligent professors who had not tried to address this problem and 
solve it. It seemed to me that the economic system made it absolutely certain that Sufiya’s income would be 
kept perpetually at such a low level that she would never save a penny and would never invest in expanding 
her economic base. Her children were condemned to live a life of penury, of hand-to-mouth survival, just as 
she had lived it before them, and as her parents did before her. I had never heard anyone suffering for a lack 
of twenty-two cents…Should I reach into my pocket and hand Sufiya the pittance she needed for capital? 
That would be so simple, so easy. I resisted the urge to give Sufiya the money she needed. She was not 
asking for charity. And giving one person twenty-two cents was not addressing the problem on any 
permanent basis.5  
These comments by Yunus contain the key elements that have driven the growth of 
microfinance: the moral outrage at perpetual poverty; the belief that access to fairly-priced 
capital (undefined here) could enable a borrower to earn her own way out of it; trust in the 
borrower to repay despite an absence of collateral, and the belief that the offer of credit 
should be done on a profitable or at least sustainable (at breakeven) basis, that it should not 
be charitable; and the belief  that the borrower should, with help, be doing it for herself: that 
she can raise herself from poverty if only given the chance. 
Yunus gathered data on all those in the village who needed access to credit in the way that 
Begum did so that they could then sell their produce at full retail price rather than at a rate set 
to give them just enough to survive, but which reserved the entire margin for the middleman. 
Twenty seven dollars was enough to provide all the capital necessary for forty two people. 
His original intention was not to set up a bank himself: he went to his local bank to see if they 
would lend to the poor in their own area, and was laughed away with the objection that the 
bank could not possibly lend to the destitute: the small amounts required would not even 
cover the cost of filling in the loan documentation, the borrowers were too illiterate to fill in 
any forms, and, most of all, they had no collateral. Thus he founded Grameen Bank instead. 
For Yunus,6 an important part of the provision of micro credit has been not just for women to 
begin to move out of poverty, but that in the process of doing so for themselves, by their own 
efforts, they become empowered socially as well as economically. It was hoped that their 
own access to credit and therefore the means to make a living would strengthen their position 
in a society which had traditionally denied them this access. A further important part of this 
                                                          
5 Ibid. p. 48 
6 As it was for BRAC and, originally, ASA, two other NGOs founded in the years after Bangladesh’s 
independence to provide credit and other services. 
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model is, of course, that the capital lent is in fact repaid, and is then recycled to new 
borrowers, so that the one unit of capital lent can have multiple effects over the years in 
helping borrowers out of poverty. 
The empowerment objective of modern microfinance was just as important to its early 
creators as the enrichment objective. Examples of how the industry and the World Bank 
define empowerment are given in chapter 9, but to summarise them here, empowerment is the 
process of increasing the assets and capabilities of an individual in order for her to be able to 
make choices that can be translated in to action. Empowerment is the process of giving 
people the ability to make the choices that enable them to determine how they live their own 
lives. 
This turns out to be is a substantial part of how the requirements for autonomous agency are 
defined. An autonomous agent will be seen to require positive as well as negative freedom; to 
have some freedom of choice and access to the basic goods of life in order to be able to 
achieve self-determination. Empowerment for microfinance, then, though not usually cast in 
these terms, is very much a process through which an agent can increase the level of her 
global autonomy. 
Grameen Bank now has just over eight million borrowers, 97% of whom are women, and has 
disbursed some US $11.35bn over its lifetime with an annual disbursement of currently 
approximately $1bn.7   The growth of the bank, and Yunus’s advocacy, were important in 
2005 being declared the Year of Microcredit by the U.N. In 2006 Yunus and Grameen Bank 
were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, the Nobel Prize Committee observing that microcredit 
was ‘a liberating force in societies where women in particular have to struggle against 
repressive social and economic conditions’.8 9 
The microfinance industry as a whole has grown even more dramatically than Grameen 
Bank, particularly since the 1990s with the rise of commercial, for-profit microfinance 
institutions. To be profitable, or at any rate self-sustaining, an MFI needs to grow as large as 
possible to achieve economies of scale. From the 1990s on, then, the need for commercial 
                                                          
7 www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=26&Itemid=0, accessed 9/10/2012 
8 ‘The Nobel Peace Prize 2006 - Presentation Speech’. Nobelprize.org. 9 Oct 2012, available at 
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/presentation-speech.html 
9 Very recently, the Bangladesh government led by Sheikh Hasina has forced Yunus from office and looks set to 
effectively take control of Grameen Bank, which if it causes savers with the Bank to withdraw their savings, 
could bring on a liquidity crisis and the Bank’s failure. This could also occur if, as some speculate, it is her 
intention to forgive borrower debt in advance of the next electoral cycle. This thesis however will focus on the 
ethics of microfinance and how it is practised, and will not extend any further into the politics of it as well. 
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MFIs to be profitable and not-for-profit MFIs to be sustainable has seen something of a shift 
in focus by the industry from the impact of microfinance on the individuals lent to, to their 
own organisational growth, achieving organisational stability through volume in lending. 
Based on the Grameen model, the mission of a typical microcredit operation is to provide 
credit to poor, rural women for them to use their own energy, knowledge and skills to reduce 
their poverty and empower their life choices. It would have the following features: -  
1. Lend only to women, in groups of 5 – 20 
2. A simple, standardised loan product with regular, small repayments. The loan is often for 
three or four months, sometimes up to a year, and is renewable once repaid. The rate charged 
varies enormously around the world, from Grameen’s approximately 20% to well in excess of 
100% with all additional charges included. 
3. Basic business training in advance of loan being made. There is generally a stress on loans 
only ever being used for investment/working capital, never for consumption. In practice, 
money being fungible, this cannot be guaranteed, but nonetheless it is an important principle 
in training. 
4. Weekly or fortnightly repayment meetings where the group meet together for repayment, 
possibly training, and to raise any issues with the loan officer. 
5. The Group Liability Model. Groups take collective responsibility for loans. Classically, 
this is through explicit joint liability, where each borrower in a group undertakes to make the 
repayments of any other member of the group if she fails to. It can also work informally 
whereby no one in the group is extended a new loan after the first cycle if any one member of 
the group has defaulted during it. This is regarded as essential for high repayment rates and 
also acts as a peer screening process. It can, of course, also be seen as potentially coercive. 
Small scale collective saving and lending has existed for centuries, but contemporary 
microfinance using the group liability model and capital from outside the group itself 
emerged in the 1970s. From the outset of this modern emergence, microfinance has fused a 
poverty alleviation goal that is measured in consequentialist terms – do borrowers become 
better off, do more children of borrowers go to school – with an emphasis on the individual 
borrower as the means of bringing these goals about, empowering her in the process. 
Microfinance in Bangladesh, and through its replicators since, began with the individual 
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(usually a woman) at the centre: it was about increasing her capability to solve her problems 
for herself.  
But there is an ambiguity at the heart of microfinance. It aims to enrich and empower. But as 
noted above, the tool it uses to try to do that with, credit, is a double edged sword. Credit is, 
after all, simply debt: used well, it can start, expand and leverage a productive effort to 
generate wealth. Used unsuccessfully, it can lead to a debt spiral ending with the borrower 
worse off than she began, or in worse cases, ostracized from her society and even resorting to 
suicide. The principal charges that can be levelled against microcredit are that the offering of 
it is, or can be, exploitative; that loan collection practices are, or can be, coercive; and that the 
way in which it is typically practiced is paternalistic – although it will also be argued that in 
some instances it is not paternalistic enough. Trying to harness the creative force of credit 
whilst avoiding its worst risks when working with those in deepest poverty already, is a 
dangerous game. Perhaps it can only succeed with a very close eye kept on the different 
impacts the offer of credit has on the autonomy of the individual who is the subject of the 




The core concept of personal autonomy is of being one’s own person, of being self-directed. 
The autonomous person is one in charge of his choices, action and will. He sets his goals in 
accordance with his own, personally adopted, values, from a range of options; and has some 
possibility of achieving them. He will inevitably have been subject to some outside influence 
on both values and goals, if only through his genes and upbringing: quite how much external 
influence would be enough to undermine his autonomy will be discussed below. The 
autonomous agent has both positive as well as negative freedom. He not only has the capacity 
to form a life plan and a degree of self-awareness in choosing the values by which he does, 
but access to a range of options to be able to do so. This idealised picture of autonomy, then, 
comprises both internal and external elements; the mental capacities to be self-aware, to form 




This account of autonomy is in the tradition of theorists such as Mill and Raz for whom 
autonomy is a key ingredient in well-being, because it is necessary for the ideal of self-
creation. For Raz, ‘The ruling ideal behind the ideal of personal autonomy is that people 
should make their own lives.’10 Raz’s concept of an autonomous person is one who is ‘part 
author of his own life…A person is autonomous only if he has a variety of options available 
to him to choose from, and his life became as it is through his choice of some of these 
options.’11 Raz allows that some goals may be biologically driven, some may be drifted into, 
and some may have been deliberately chosen. What matters is that they are now an agent’s 
own goals: they play ‘a conscious role in his life.’12  
Autonomy is presented here as a key ingredient for well-being because of its necessity for the 
project of self-creation. That project is meant modestly. It does not require that the project of 
self-creation be at all times the most important thing in a person’s life. The project has a high 
value, but not a ‘trump’ value. I may not want to be the sort of person who tells lies. But there 
may be circumstances where the outcome for others is so drastically worse if I do not tell this 
particular lie that the value I place in my own self-creation is outweighed.13 
This account of autonomy will look first at the requirements for autonomous agency, and 
then the requirements for autonomous action. The key requirement for autonomous agency is 
a threshold level of rationality, which in turn requires a capacity in the agent for self-
awareness and self-reflection. The requirements for autonomous action are that one’s acts are 
self-determined, which requires rational agency sufficient to set one’s own goals, opportunity 
sufficient to be able to choose an action, and freedom of choice in choosing it. 
 
(a) The Requirements for Autonomous Agency 
There is a threshold level of rationality needed to be regarded as autonomous at all. 
Rationality is meant here as our ability to choose appropriate means to ends. To meet this 
threshold, an agent needs enough self-awareness to conceive of himself as a unique physical 
and conscious identity in the world. Without that, there would be no collection of physical 
and conscious experiences on which to reflect, interpret and envisage a future for. Raz 
                                                          
10 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom Oxford: Clarendon Press 1986, p. 369 
11 Ibid. p. 204 
12 Ibid. p. 291 
13 For example, faced with your threat to use nuclear weapons against my country, I lie that I would retaliate if 
you do, thereby preventing the attack. 
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stresses the need for a person to have awareness of himself as existing over time. The 
autonomous person uses his rationality to make choices: to choose he needs to be aware of 
his options, and, as Raz puts it, if ‘these are to include changes in pervasive aspects of one’s 
life, as they must if the person is to count as an autonomous person, then the autonomous 
person must be aware of his life as stretching over time.’14 The autonomous person is 
‘marked not by what he is, but by how he came to be what he is.’15 We have, and develop, 
these elements of autonomous agency to different degrees: but those without any rationality, 
self-awareness or ability to reflect, we will not count as autonomous. Rationality is a 
necessary condition of autonomous agency because without the ability to match means to 
ends, our attempts at self-determination could simply be self-defeating.  
 
(b) The Requirements for Autonomous Action 
For an agent to be autonomous, it is not enough that she be a rational individual. Autonomy 
must also be seen as embodied, as being practiced, as being a matter of action, in order to 
have meaning. Autonomy involves not just choosing who we want to be and how we want to 
live, but being that person and living that way. Autonomous agents have to exercise their 
capacity to determine their lives: autonomy has to be executed to have meaning.  
An autonomous agent must have negative liberty, a freedom from constraints that prevent her 
determination of her life’s course. But she also needs to have opportunities to choose from: 
genuine alternative ways to earn an income, or to find a partner and form relationships, or to 
gain an education. There may not be many alternatives, but there must be some, and a 
genuine freedom of choice amongst such as exist. Cultural norms that require her early 
marriage to a predetermined partner leave her with a very low degree of autonomy in this 
area of her life, even if she has more in others. 
For an agent to be able to act autonomously, she needs the opportunity to access the basic 
goods of life: ideally an education, food, shelter and the means to make a living. She needs 
both opportunity to access them, and the opportunity to exercise choice regarding her means 
of obtaining them. Without access to such basic goods, although an agent may possess 
                                                          
14 Ibid. p. 371  
15 Ibid. p. 391 
17 
 
rationality enough to be autonomous, her ability to act autonomously is severely 
circumscribed.  
The case for including financial resources in the positive liberties required for autonomous 
action is well made by Robert Young: ‘Suppose R to have substantial financial resources at 
his disposal and S to have much less. R is able to choose a life-plan which would involve him 
spending large sums of money on, for instance, travel, entertainment and the other desirable 
trappings of life. S is unable to choose. Whether or not R chooses thus to spend his money, he 
(unlike S) has the option. R is to that extent better able to live autonomously. Insufficient 
resources do restrict autonomy. Hence it is reasonable to accept that external negative 
constraints may diminish autonomy...A purely ‘negative’ conception (of absent constraints) 
leaves out the positive element of self-determination essential to an adequate account of 
autonomy.’16   
It seems reasonable to suggest that a person growing up in the developed world may well 
have a much greater capacity to exercise her autonomy than her counterpart growing up, 
uneducated, in rural poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. But whilst there may be highly ranging 
degrees of autonomy, is there a level at which external conditions are so bad that an 
autonomous agent cannot act autonomously at all? 
Perhaps, but this level will be very low. We would really be describing the life of a human 
workhorse, or a slave, or possibly a child solider taken from his village when young and with 
no opportunity to choose a different life before his own is over. The threshold, then, to regard 
someone as having enough external freedoms to be regarded as acting autonomously at all is 
very low – access to the barest minimum of the basic goods of life in terms of food, shelter, 
the ability to make a living. Total denial of these – prisoners held in starvation conditions – 
would fail the external threshold test for autonomous action, although of course some 
autonomous agency might still be available.  
 
(c) Autonomy in Degrees 
The implication of this account of autonomy suggests also that how much autonomy we have 
and can exercise varies not only across the different living conditions of different countries 
                                                          
16 Robert Young, Personal Autonomy: Beyond Negative and Positive Liberty (1986) London: Croom Helm p. 49 
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and continents, but within the lifespan of a single person. That seems a natural conclusion: as 
children, we have less autonomy than as young adults, for rationality has not fully developed; 
as we get older, our ability to act autonomously, having peaked, may diminish, simply 
because there will not be enough time left in life to develop all the life plans we might want 
to: and because our physical capacities decline and with it our ability to execute all the plans 
we might still be capable of forming. 
Degrees of autonomy, then, follow the natural curve of a human life, and will vary 
enormously with the social, economic and political circumstances into which that life is born. 
Of course, what is standard in terms of external living conditions and therefore capacity for 
the exercise of autonomy is much greater in some countries than in others. With the threshold 
for basic conditions set very low, most people with mental capacity and physical freedom in 
the world will meet the conditions for being minimally autonomous: those in countries of 
high education and standards of living will of course have very much more of it than those 
without. That, however, is just recognition of reality. 
We are more or less autonomous to more or less varying degrees in many different aspects of 
our lives. Gerald Dworkin observes that ‘autonomy seems intuitively to be a global rather 
than a local concept’,17  but it is, perhaps, rather both: we can consistently think of an agent 
having a high degree of autonomy of action in general, but not in one particular area (perhaps 
he is deaf); and a high degree of autonomous agency in general (he is rational, thoughtful, 
knows what he wants and how to achieve his goals in general), but not in an especial area (his 
inability to fulfil his desire to quit smoking.) We can, then, distinguish global from local 
autonomy of both action and agency. Global autonomy is the level of autonomy that reflects 
the scope of autonomous action across many areas of our lives, and a rational agency that 
enables self-determination; local autonomy reflects how a person can determine how to act 
and actually act in a particular situation. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, in their 
accounts of what positive freedoms are required for a life to flourish, look at our capabilities 
in many different areas,18 but the point here is not to provide a definitive list, as new areas 
                                                          
17 Gerald Dworkin Theory and Practice of Autonomy (1988) Cambridge: Cambridge University Press p. 16 
18 Nussbaum summarises the capabilities she regards as central in Creating Capabilities as, at a bare minimum, 
the ten Central Capabilities of Life; Bodily Health; Bodily Integrity; Senses, imagination and thought; 
Emotions; Practical reason; Affiliation; Other Species; Play; and Control over one’s environment, both political 




can be debated and added.19  Nor is the point to adopt the capability approach as a 
multilayered definition of what it is to be autonomous. It is rather to draw out that just as 
Nussbaum finds many different aspects to what enables a life to go well,20 so the capacity for 
the exercise of autonomous agency is measured in its many different capacities.  
Wolff and de Shalit describe Leah, whose life is controlled by her family, and the men who 
marry and abandon her, and her father who insists she marry for a third time to avoid 
‘shame’. She has no education. As Wolff and de Shalit put it: ‘She is humiliated by the 
community, by the men who have power over her, and by her indigence. She has no proper 
education. She cannot be autonomous.’21   
Their concept of autonomy here is control over your own life. Yet rather than conclude22  that 
Leah is not autonomous at all, we can look at what scope for exercising her autonomy she 
still has. A person may still have some autonomy even if under considerable social or cultural 
pressure: a Muslim woman who feels obliged, or simply wants to, follow the practices of 
veiling and purdah, may have some autonomy of action in her private life even when a public 
life is denied her. When we come to apply the concept of autonomy to the practices of 
microfinance, we may feel that exercising any particular mode of influence over a woman 
such as Leah might be deemed right or wrong according to whether it touches on an area of 
her life in which she has a high or low degree of autonomy. For example, I will argue that a 
borrower’s low degree of autonomy in terms of her financial inclusion will be what makes an 
exploitative interaction with her with regard to lending prima facie wrongful. Pigeon holing 
her into being ‘overall’ autonomous or non-autonomous may miss the distinctions between 
which modes of influence over her are acceptable and which are not. 
Oshana presents us with the challenging example of whether a person can be autonomous and 
voluntarily become non-autonomous.23   She imagines a woman living under the Taliban 
                                                          
19 Wolff and de Shalit convincingly argue in Disadvantage that we could add to the list a person’s prospects for 
sustaining the levels of functioning he has already achieved, and how exceptional risk and vulnerability is itself 
a disadvantage (whether or not the feared event actually occurs) that undermines one’s ability to ‘do and be’. 
Jonathan Wolff and Avner de-Shalit, Disadvantage (2010) Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nussbaum notes in 
Creating Capabilities that she is quite happy to accept revisions to her list, and this one in particular. 
20 and Wolff and de Shalit find disadvantage (the opposite – what can make a life go badly) equally plural 
21 Op. cit. note 19, p. 2 
22 And I do not mean to suggest that Wolff and de Shalit necessarily reach this conclusion. They do not state 
whether they regard Leah as having the capacity for autonomous agency and may simply assume that she does, 
and mean by stating that she cannot be autonomous only that she cannot live and act autonomously, because 
power over many important external acts for her is exercised by others. 
23 Marina Oshana ‘How Much Should we Value Autonomy?’ (2003) Social Philosophy & Policy Foundation, 
vol. 20, issue 02, pp. 99-126 
20 
 
regime in Afghanistan, previously a physician, who now embraces a subservient role and lack 
of independence expected of women by the regime, and does so voluntarily out of religious 
belief. She can now no longer practice medicine, support herself financially, dress publicly 
other than in a burqa and so on; but ‘a life of subservience is consistent with the Taliban 
woman’s spiritual and social values, provides her with a sense of worth, and satisfies her 
notion of well-being.’ For Oshana, the Taliban woman clearly ‘is not autonomous. In a 
‘local’ or occurent sense of the term, she has chosen autonomously. Nevertheless, she fails to 
be autonomous in a ‘global’ sense for the reason that the life that she chooses, and toward 
which she experiences no alienation, is a life in which she is systematically subject to the 
ultimate will of others. Although the Taliban woman is ‘master of her will’ – her original 
decision was made autonomously, she willingly renounces her rights, and she continues to 
express satisfaction with the life that she has selected for herself – she now has no practical 
authority over her situation…Although the Taliban woman does what she wants, what she 
wants frustrates the exercise of autonomy.’24  
Oshana contrasts the Taliban woman’s situation to that of a monk. The monk retains control 
over his decision to be subservient: he could leave the order; he can recall his ability to lead a 
different sort of life. One can autonomously decide to restrict one’s autonomy, but cannot 
renounce it and remain autonomous, any more than one can sell oneself into slavery. If the 
situation of the Taliban woman is so extreme as to be the equivalent of selling oneself in to 
slavery, then she has placed a higher value on religious observance than she has on autonomy 
and ceases to be autonomous. 
We may hesitate to agree with Oshana, however, that willingly submitting to the strictures of 
a Taliban regime really is quite the same as giving up control over all aspects of one’s life, so 
that we may feel that, like Leah, the Taliban woman lacks substantial amounts of autonomy, 
is perhaps only partially autonomous, but is not wholly non-autonomous. The Taliban 
woman, after all, retains the requirements of internal autonomy; she continues to reflect, and 
be happy with her choice. She has lost a great deal of autonomy of action. She is an 
autonomous agent who has little (but not no) autonomy to act: but only if she had no 
autonomy of action at all might we say she was non-autonomous.  
In Chapter 9, we meet a real example of a woman who takes out a microcredit loan in order 
to run a small microenterprise from home, just in order to be able to observe purdah. As one 
                                                          
24 Ibid. p. 104 
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of the very poorest in society, she had previously to work in the fields as a day labourer, not 
observing purdah because it was incompatible with carrying out her work. That put her in the 
lowest of social classes. The microfinance loan enables her to choose purdah and be happy in 
her choice. Do we really want to argue that she has become non-autonomous? Rather, she has 
autonomously chosen a lifestyle which restricts some autonomy of action which she values 
less than the social status associated with purdah. We may disagree with this choice, but this 
individual is not non-autonomous. 
This picture is complicated, however, by other instances of women taking out loans and then 
adopting purdah, but very much at the insistence of their husbands. In these cases (also 
examined in Chapter 9), the husbands coerce the wives in to taking out loans (the MFIs will 
not lend directly to men) and use the proceeds to both fund microenterprises and to buy the 
garments of purdah for their wives. There is little room for autonomous choice for the women 
anywhere in this particular picture, although she may be allowed greater independent 
mobility by her husband once purdah is adopted. This complex picture reflects the very many 
different degrees of autonomy an agent may have. The female entrepreneur who chooses 
purdah gives up a degree of autonomous action, but finds that compensated for by an increase 
in her social status and, presumably, greater happiness in living in a style in accordance with 
her beliefs. The woman who is forced into purdah has a low degree of autonomy indeed, not 
even being able to choose voluntarily to restrict her autonomous action. It still seems worth, 
though, when interacting with her, establishing whether the interaction takes place in an area 
where she does still have a degree of autonomy or not, however few these are. 
One is autonomous with regard to many different aspects of one’s life, then: the common 
factor is the ability to set one’s own direction, whether it be in work, play, social life etc.  If 
an individual lacks the capacity to be self-directed, she cannot be autonomous in anything. So 
whilst we disagree as to whether Leah, or Oshana’s Taliban woman, or the borrower who 
chooses purdah is autonomous, we all agree foetuses, infants, the comatose are not, because 
they lack rationality and self-reflection, the capacity for self-direction, in any area. (That is 
not to judge whether we have moral responsibility to them or not, only to say that if we do, it 
will not be on grounds of currently existing autonomy.)  
Whilst there is a threshold level of rationality for autonomous agency, there cannot be a 
threshold for autonomous action in each external aspect of our lives, because a person lacking 
freedom to act completely in one area remains an autonomous agent provided there is some 
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area of external freedom through which she can exercise her autonomous agency. Impositions 
on autonomous agency are thus more serious than any given imposition on any given 
autonomous act of an autonomous agent, because, restricted with regard to one act, an 
autonomous agent can yet exercise her autonomy through another: but an imposition on 
autonomous agency risks interfering with an agent’s ability to act autonomously at all. 
When it comes to judging what infringements of an agent’s ability to act autonomously are 
acceptable, if any, perhaps this will matter. We may, for example, be more prepared to justify 
imposing a paternalistic restriction on an individual in one area of his life when he is regarded 
as having a low degree of autonomy with regard to a particular act because his choice of 
action is based on a false belief. But these applications will take place in the chapters that 
follow.  
As has been suggested above, it is (at least in part) the relationship to an agent’s autonomy 
that makes some forms of interaction and modes of influence of one agent over another prima 
facie wrongful. Some major classifications of types of interactions and influence, how they 
relate to autonomy, and whether they are modes of influence used extensively in 
microfinance, are listed below. 
 
Persuasion 
A seeks to persuade B to act or believe differently than he previously did through providing B 
with reasons B can adopt and apply for himself. There is no impact on B’s autonomy, unless 
it is to increase it by enhancing B’s rational decision-making, and so rational persuasion 
raises no ethical issues (at least on grounds of autonomy). MFIs do try to persuade borrowers 
to take out loans, but while they stay within the realm of straightforward offer and transparent 
presentation of the terms of which the loan will be made (by no means always the case), this 
presents no difficulty. 
 
Manipulation 
A manipulates B when A persuades B to act or believe differently from previously, but alters 
something in the setup of the presentation of the facts, or works to bring about a false belief 
in B to do so. Manipulation covers a range of behaviour: when Iago manipulates Othello by 
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firing his jealousy with hints and doubts, he tells no lies but plays on Othello’s emotions to 
stir him in one direction; when he convinces Othello that Cassio has Desdemona’s 
handkerchief and could not have come by it innocently, he undermines Othello’s autonomy 
by instigating a false belief. Manipulation undercuts autonomy by perverting the way an 
agent chooses his goals or reaches a decision. There is little evidence of manipulation of 
borrowers by MFIs and for that reason manipulation as a classification will not be considered 
further here, although in a wider context, manipulation of donors’ emotional responses to 
microfinance, the disproportionate promotion of ‘success’ stories and suppression of 
‘unfortunate’ stories, do raise broader issues of manipulation. 
 
Exploitation 
The term exploitation is not used in a moralised way in this thesis, wrongful by definition, but 
is held to be prima facie wrongful when it takes advantage of a very particular sort of 
vulnerability – the exploitee’s low level of autonomy. On the face of it, microfinance would 
appear to do that, hence chapters 2 and 3 are devoted to it, with a much fuller definition of 
when exploitation is prima facie wrongful at the start of chapter 2. 
 
Coercion 
Coercion is defined in an empirical, rather than a moralised way, here as A coercing B when 
A imposes a limited set of options on B from which B must choose. Coercion clearly 
undermines autonomy, even when it can be justified for other reasons. Aspects of 
microcredit, notably loan collection, certainly could be coercive, and chapters 4 and 5 pick 
through this in detail. 
 
Compulsion 
A compels B to act in a particular way when he uses pure force on him to make him act in 
that way. Compulsion is distinguished from coercion by the absence of any choice for B at 
all, even between two undesirable options. Compulsion leaves no room for the exercise of 
any autonomy at all. In microfinance, compulsion between the MFI and the borrower is rare 
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(unlike coercion). Instances do occur (confiscation of borrowers’ savings by the MFI) but it is 
more common between the group of borrowers or their leader and the individual borrower, 




A acts paternalistically toward B when he acts against B’s preferences, usurping his 
autonomy, albeit for B’s good. The use of paternalism in the practices of microfinance is 
complicated, because whilst some interactions between MFI and borrower can be classified 
as such, and then justified or not, other interactions which are claimed by the MFI to be 
instances of justifiable paternalism are not in fact paternalistic at all. Chapters 6 and 7 work 
through this, and make the case for MFIs adopting a practice currently absent which would 
often be paternalistic if adopted: the exercise of a duty of care to their borrowers. Where this 
duty of care could only be exercised paternalistically, it will be argued that that is not only 
justified paternalism, but is required of the MFI. 
With this understanding of the concept of autonomy, then, and the central planks of how the 
microfinance model works, I turn to the relationship between the microfinance institution and 
the borrower. I consider how the offer and practices of microfinance affect and influence the 
borrower and which can be considered prima facie wrongful or not by virtue, at least in part, 
of how they relate to her autonomy. The final chapters consider whether any such prima facie 










Chapter Two: Exploitation and When it is Wrongful 
This chapter examines the concept of exploitation and when in fact it is prima facie wrongful; 
the following chapter examines whether the offer of microfinance itself, and any of its 
practices, are wrongfully exploitative. I define prima facie wrongful exploitation in the 
following way. A wrongfully exploits B when: 
(i) A takes advantage of a vulnerability of B to A;  
(ii) A manipulates B in some way; 
(iii) A, or a third party, derives a benefit from the transaction;  
(iv) A is in a position of relative power over B in the particular circumstances of the 
interaction; and  
(v) B’s vulnerability to A arises from either a low degree of autonomy in the global sense, or 
a low degree of autonomy in the particular circumstances of the interaction.  
This, then, is a ‘vulnerability’ account of exploitation, one which puts the taking advantage of 
a vulnerability at the heart of what is wrong with exploitation, when it is wrong. As such a 
‘vulnerability’ account, it departs from the perhaps dominant account of exploitation, 
Wertheimer’s ‘unfair usage’ account. The first parts of the criteria above are common to 
other vulnerability accounts: that part which links which vulnerabilities it is prima facie 
wrongful to take advantage of to an agent’s low degree of autonomy, is original to this 
account. 
This chapter will proceed, then, by laying out a broad, non-moralised, account of 
exploitation, and then analyse when it is prima facie wrongful. The ‘unfair usage’ account of 
when it is wrongful is examined but rejected. The vulnerability accounts of Goodin and 
Wood are explored and developed to explain how it is those vulnerabilities that arise from a 
low degree of autonomy, globally or in a specific instance, that are those the taking advantage 
of which count as prima facie wrongful exploitation. The chapter closes on the question of 
whether a prima facie wrongfully exploitative interaction can still be the right thing, overall, 
to do. In the following chapter I apply this theory to the practices of microcredit, to consider 




I. The Broad Concept of Exploitation 
In the broadest sense, exploitation is the making use of, or turning to your advantage of, 
someone, something, a set of circumstances or even another’s attributes, for your own 
purposes. In this broadest sense, it is not prejudicial. Exploitation is always done by a person: 
someone exploits something or someone when he takes advantage of it or him in some way: 
we exploit natural resources, wind power, and our own particular skill sets and attributes 
(brains/beauty/sports ability etc.). As Feinberg puts it:25  ‘To exploit something, in this most 
general sense, is simply to put it to one’s use, not to waste it, and there are no limits on the 
sorts of things that can be exploited. Even in this general nonpejorative sense, the exploiter is 
always a person; diseases, landslides and tropical storms have never exploited anything.’ 
Exploiting something in this morally neutral sense is distinguished from merely ‘making use’ 
of something by the fact that the exploiter manipulates or controls the object of exploitation 
in some way. So, to take an example from Woods,26 a hiker in the woods who takes a drink 
from a stream simply makes use of the stream to quench his thirst, but does not exploit it; the 
miller who builds a mill on it does. We do say that we exploit unpredictable circumstances as 
well, but only where an agent has a pre-existing plan that he takes advantage of the 
unexpected circumstance to further: otherwise, he just makes use of his good luck. 
A benefit is often derived from the exploitation by the exploiter – that is usually why he 
exploits – but it is not strictly necessary for this broad, morally neutral account of exploitation 
(derivation of a benefit, typically but not always for the exploiter himself, will be required for 
prima facie wrongful exploitation.) As Goodin observes,27 miners who extract ore from the 
ground have successfully exploited the seam (turned it to their advantage), whether or not 
they then succeed in selling that ore for a profit. But when it comes to exploiting people (and 
when exploitation is wrongful), it seems that the derivation of a benefit is required. However 
much one person or agency may manipulate or control another – such as the ‘nudge’ theorists 
who try to manipulate people in to eating more healthily by making the salads more easily 
accessible than the chips – we do not regard this as exploitation unless the theorist derives a 
personal benefit from it. (We might, of course, regard this as paternalism, see chapter 6.) For 
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Humanities Press International, p. 7 
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prima facie wrongful exploitation, the benefit usually accrues to the exploiter, but it is 
possible to prima facie wrongfully exploit on behalf of a third party. A set of ruthless parents 
who deny doting grandparents access to their child unless the grandparents put all their 
wealth in trust for that particular grandchild to inherit when aged 25, prima facie wrongfully 
exploit the grandparents’ vulnerability to their control of access, though they derive no 
personal benefit. 
Attributes or circumstances of people can be exploited whilst remaining within this neutral 
sense of exploitation. We can take advantage of our own talents and skills, train our voices or 
athletic ability to benefit from a singing or athletic career, without doing anything wrong. We 
can also exploit the attributes of other people without necessarily doing anything wrong: Alex 
Ferguson does nothing wrong in exploiting Wayne Rooney’s speed to maximise the 
efficiency of the Manchester United attack. 
Do we then say that Ferguson has exploited Rooney himself? Typically, we only hold that A 
has exploited B himself whilst exploiting an attribute of B when we deem the exploitation to 
have been wrongful. ‘Unfair usage’ accounts of exploitation look for something unfair in the 
interaction to make the exploitation wrongful, ‘vulnerability’ accounts look for a 
vulnerability of B to A (however then further specified) to make it wrongful. But both agree 
that if the unfairness or vulnerability is present when A exploits an attribute of B, then B 
himself is exploited as well. One cannot be unfair to, or take advantage of the vulnerability 
of, an attribute. Whatever it is that makes exploitation wrongful (when it is), when an 
attribute or circumstance of a person is wrongfully exploited, the person is wrongfully 
exploited as well. 
The term ‘exploitation’ is only used in a pejorative way when the exploiter takes advantage 
of, or makes use of, another person rather than a thing or an attribute of himself. And even 
then, this is only so in particular circumstances. For pejorative exploitation, it is necessary 
that the exploitation be person or persons to person: it is around the second ingredient(s) as to 
what makes some person to person exploitation morally wrongful, and some not, that much 
of the contemporary debate has occurred. 
But note here that it is not that there are two meanings of the term ‘exploitation’. There is a 
single meaning, but some uses of exploitation we find morally wrongful, and others not. As 
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Wood has argued,28 the word ‘exploitation’ operates like ‘homicide’ or ‘abortion’ rather than 
‘murder’: not wrong by definition, although it could be the case that all acts of exploitation 
are in fact morally wrong, just as some people believe that all acts of abortion are in fact 
morally wrong, without holding that that is so simply through the meaning of the word. 
Wood does in fact believe that most person to person exploitation (as opposed to person to 
thing) is in fact wrong, but insists that this needs a further justification. We can see that not 
all person to person exploitation is morally wrongful: that on the contrary, everyday 
exploitation that raises no moral issues is pervasive. I exploit the services of a taxi driver 
when I ask him to take me somewhere; he exploits me and all those like me by making his 
living out of people who sometimes want to shorten their journeys or avoid the rain. The term 
is used neutrally here because the taxi driver and I are free to reach any price for that journey 
and both have options (other fares, other taxis) if we cannot reach agreement. Neither of us is 
a monopolist or monopsonist. Not only in this transaction do we have freedom of action and 
hence valid consent, but there is nothing in the background conditions or social structure in 
which we make our deal that either of us do, or could reasonably, object to. In the different 
accounts of morally wrongful exploitation that follow, all agree as to the innocence of this 
type of exploitation, whether because where there is such freedom of manoeuvre there is no 
unfairness, or because the copious number of taxis and other potential fares means that 
neither of us is vulnerable to the other.  
To complete the ground clearance of the morally neutral, non-pejorative use of exploitation, 
we should consider if there are any instances of person to non-person exploitation where the 
term is used pejoratively. The case of animals will fall in the middle here depending on one’s 
view of the moral status of non-human sentient beings, so here I shall just discuss non-
sentient objects. I would suggest that when we speak of exploiting minerals and other natural 
resources, the term is typically not used pejoratively. There has become a tendency for a 
moral edge to come in to the use where the exploitation of the object ultimately has harmful 
consequences for other people. So the miner exploiting the coal seam is described neutrally 
up until the point where his over mining becomes unsustainable, at which point the term 
‘exploitation’ begins to carry an additional moral edge. Where what is exploited has no 
interests of its own, that edge is seldom present: where it is being exploited unsustainably, it 
is perhaps the interests of future generations who will no longer be able to exploit it 
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themselves, that give it that edge. It could be argued that the moral edge here is not that the 
exploitation is now being seen pejoratively as such, but that its consequences are. But if one 
did wish to hold that the term is used as morally wrongful per se here, it is worth noting that 
the reason would appear to be because of the vulnerability of future generations, who cannot 
protect themselves against the loss of future resources they would otherwise have access to, 
that seems to be the justification for doing so. 
All exploitation, then, morally wrongful or not, involves a person taking advantage of 
something or someone. All prima facie morally wrongful exploitation seems to be person to 
person with the possible caveat of person to object exploitation where the interests of other, 
possibly future, people are involved, and leaving to one side the question of the exploitation 
of animals, which would vary with the moral status that we accord them. But not all person to 
person exploitation is prima facie morally wrongful. What then are the characteristics of 
those types of person to person exploitation that make it so, when it is? 
 
 
II. Distinguishing Wrongful Exploitation from Morally Neutral Exploitation 
There are two major accounts of what makes exploitation wrongful (when it is) in 
contemporary philosophy. The first centres around the idea that a wrongful exploitation must 
take advantage of a person in some unfair way. The second is that wrongful exploitation takes 
advantage of vulnerability in a person, it being the taking advantage of a vulnerability that is 
wrong. The vulnerability account then splits down two lines: rooting the importance of why it 
is wrongful to take advantage of another’s vulnerability either in a general duty of the strong 
to protect the weak (Robert Goodin) or in the nature of a respect that we all owe each other 
by virtue of our humanity (Allen Wood). I shall argue a slightly different line: that it is the 
taking advantage of those vulnerabilities that arise from a low degree of autonomy (globally 
or, in specific instances, in the local sense of autonomy) – and only those – that makes for 
prima facie wrongful, as opposed to neutral, exploitation. 
I shall examine first what is the predominant view of exploitation, that of Alan Wertheimer, 
that exploitation is one person taking advantage of another in an unfair way. Note, of course, 
that if what was specified as being unfair in this account were itself the taking advantage of 
another’s vulnerability, then Wertheimer’s account would just dissolve in to a vulnerability 
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account. I shall indeed argue that Wertheimer does not produce a single common feature of 
unfairness other than taking advantage of a vulnerability: he successfully dismisses other 
candidates, but his attempt to dismiss vulnerability itself fails, leaving it as in fact the only 
remaining common account of what makes some exploitation prima facie wrongful.  
 
(a) The Unfair Usage Account of Exploitation  
Wertheimer defines exploitation, at its most general level, as ‘A exploits B when A takes 
unfair advantage of B’29. But he immediately concedes Arneson’s point that such a broad 
account means that there will ‘be as many competing accounts of exploitation as theories of 
what persons owe to each other by way of fair treatment.’30 So Wertheimer needs to narrow 
down where the unfairness lies: he states that this could be either in the outcome of the 
transaction, or the process. 
With regard to the outcome, he deems a benefit necessary to A, but this alone is not enough 
as it covers morally innocent transactions as well as morally wrongful ones. With regard to 
harm to B, he concludes that it is not necessary, because exploited parties can benefit more 
from an exploitative transaction than exploiters do. ‘It is precisely because A generally stands 
to gain less utility than B from what might appear to be a fair transaction that A can drive 
what appears to be a hard bargain.’31 This is indeed so. The poorly paid sweatshop worker 
nonetheless prefers that job to subsistence farming, and he both consents to the exploitation 
and has a higher marginal utility than if he did not take the job, so it is hard to say that he is 
harmed by it.  
Wertheimer recognises that distinguishing what makes a mutually beneficial transaction 
unfair is difficult ‘because there is no non-problematic account of unfair transactions’.32 It 
would not seem to be because the transaction is in an ‘incommensurable’ good because it is 
not clear which goods are incommensurable, nor why exchanging incommensurable goods is 
necessarily unfair. And as we saw above, it seems not to be necessary that the distribution of 
the gain is unfair, that A gains more than B because ‘if we measure the parties’ gain in terms 
                                                          
29 Alan Wertheimer, ‘Exploitation’ The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. 
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of marginal utility from the no transaction baseline, the exploitee often gains more than the 
exploiter’.33 
The most promising line in Wertheimer’s view is that we evaluate the fairness of a 
transaction against ‘a normative baseline as to how much the parties ought to gain’ but 
recognises at once ‘that baseline is not easy to specify.’ His best hope is for a ‘hypothetical 
competitive market’, but the problem here is that many of the exploitation issues that worry 
us most come about precisely where the market has failed or simply does not exist. We shall 
see that the interest rates on microcredit are, in absolute terms, very high: but the hypothetical 
rate is not what banks do charge, but what banks would charge if they supported a branch 
network out to the areas the very poor live in. As they do not we only have a poor idea of 
what this rate would be.  
On top of the problems of a lack of a competitive benchmark by which to measure if 
exploitation is occurring in some important instances, Jonathan Wolff argues that the concept 
of trying to use such a benchmark is mistaken in the first place.34 He challenges David 
Miller’s claim that ‘It is generally speaking a necessary condition of A’s exploiting B that, in 
exchange between them, A does better and B does worse than each would under equilibrium 
prices.’35 As Wolff argues, this account makes two assumptions: that (i) the competitive 
market in equilibrium sets the appropriate norm as a benchmark for judging whether 
exploitation takes place; and (ii) that competitive markets (or many of them), in the long run, 
reach equilibrium.  
Wolff challenges both claims. Whilst classical economics teaches that competitive economies 
tend to equilibrium, Wolff quotes Joan Robinson36 as arguing that Marx’s main point of 
difference from classic economists and perhaps his most important insight ‘is the claim that 
there is no long-run tendency to equilibrium because whenever we get close, the capitalist 
turns to labour-saving devices to cut costs, and therefore demand for labour.’ Innovation and 
‘shocks’ mean that we are always moving toward, or away from, some fleeting moment of 
equilibrium: it only ever arrives briefly or if we assume that technology is for ever fixed. 
Having denied the second claim, that competitive markets have a long run tendency to 
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equilibrium, without which the first claim fails (if we can never know what competitive 
equilibrium is, using it as a measure for exploitation will be fruitless), Wolff then denies the 
first, major, claim anyway. He does so on the grounds that no form of market can 
discriminate morally pertinent from morally arbitrary determinants of price. The price of 
labour is set by the supply of it, the demand for it, and the care and productive effort by 
which it is applied. All these factors are on a par if the market price for labour is 
automatically the fair and just price for labour. Wolff finds this implausible.  He does not 
believe that the arbitrary factors of any given level of supply and demand can tell us what is 
normatively fair as opposed to market price-determined fair. If this is so, Wertheimer (and 
Miller’s) attempts to use a competitive market equilibrium benchmark to measure 
exploitation cannot work. We are back to something else being required to tell us when 
exploitation is ‘fair’, or not. 
In trying to locate the unfairness that distinguishes morally wrongful exploitation, 
Wertheimer considered that it had to lie in either the outcome of the exploitation (benefit to A 
or effect on B), or the process. With regard to outcome, he argues successfully that some 
benefit to A is necessary, even if it is just the advancement of A’s altruistic goal. He rejects 
the wrongness lying in harm to B, however, because he regards mutually advantageous 
exploitation as possible. This leaves him process, that there is some defect in the process by 
which an exploitative transaction comes about. The major candidate for a defect in the 
process is that it is less than fully consensual on B’s part: B is perhaps coerced or 
manipulated or defrauded in some way. But Wertheimer does not permit himself this route 
either, stating: ‘By contrast with cases of coercion and fraud, there are at least some cases of 
alleged exploitation in which B’s consent is not defective in either of these ways. In many 
cases of alleged exploitation, A gets B to agree to a mutually advantageous transaction to 
which B would not have agreed under better or perhaps more just background conditions, 
where A played no direct casual role in creating those circumstances, where A has no special 
obligation to repair those conditions, and where B is fully informed as to the consequences of 
various choices. Although B might prefer to have a different range of options available to 
him, she can make a perfectly rational choice amongst the various options.’37 Wertheimer 
leaves us hanging, then, as to where the unfairness lies. He seems to want to find it in some 
version of a disparity of value account that is measured by a hypothetical market baseline, but 
recognises that he has not yet found one.  
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Wertheimer’s dilemma would be resolved if he were to accept that the unfairness of morally 
wrongful exploitation lies in its taking advantage of our vulnerabilities, however 
distinguished further in some way. He does not accept this however. He argues that the 
unfairness must reside in something other than B’s vulnerability to A. It is not that he does 
not accept that B will often be vulnerable to A in cases of wrongful exploitation, but he 
argues that this is not enough. He argues that if A makes a reasonable proposal to B that B 
must accept, given that in B’s vulnerable situation B would accept anything, then the 
reasonableness of the proposal removes the question of unfairness and means that A does not 
exploit B. Wertheimer imagines a classic case of exploitation, where A, a seller of snow 
shovels in a remote area with no close competitors, drastically raises his prices in a blizzard. 
B, in need of a snow shovel, still wants to buy from A even at the higher price but is 
exploited if it is ‘too’ high a price. If, instead, A simply sold B a shovel at the regular price, 
then there would be no unfairness, so A would not exploit B.  
On the basis of this, Wertheimer argues that B being vulnerable to A is not itself enough to 
establish wrongful exploitation. But in fact this only shows that vulnerability is not sufficient 
for wrongful exploitation, not that it is not necessary for it. It could be, and the vulnerability 
accounts discussed later argue that it is, necessary for wrongful exploitation but further 
distinguishing features in addition to vulnerability are required for sufficiency. A 
vulnerability account would agree with Wertheimer that selling the snowbound driver the 
shovel at the regular price does not wrongfully exploit him: here, the driver is indeed 
vulnerable to the shovel seller, but the seller refrains from taking advantage of it. We need to 
know more – do any vulnerabilities count? How is the taking advantage of specified? – but as 
a move to dismiss vulnerability as a necessary component in an account of exploitation, this 
fails. 
As Wertheimer does not succeed in locating the unfairness in wrongful exploitation other 
than in the taking advantage of a vulnerability, however further specified, let us turn to 







(b) Vulnerability Accounts of Exploitation 
(i) Goodin’s account 
The first contemporary vulnerability account of exploitation is Robert Goodin’s, which 
predates the accounts of both Wertheimer and Wood. He locates the moral wrongness of 
exploitation in the taking advantage of vulnerability. ‘Using people is…a necessary condition 
of exploiting them. But this is not a sufficient condition. What more is required in order to 
make it sufficient is not the presence of harm, or the absence of consent, or the presence of 
coercion, or the absence of reciprocity, or some specification of the ways in which people are 
being used…The analysis of exploitation thus reduces to an analysis of why, and in what 
respect, it is wrong (unfair, exploitative) to use certain attributes of people and their situations 
in certain ways.’38 
Force or coercion are not enough because, although compelling in economic circumstances, 
they operate weakly elsewhere. ‘When exploiting friends or lovers, we are not forcing them 
to do anything whatsoever.’39  The disparity of value, the notion of ‘unequal exchange’ is 
also strong in the economic sphere, but not outside it (and is also subject to all the problems 
discussed above in any event.) Manipulation is also dismissed, because although deception, 
as an element of manipulation, is often present in exploitation, this need not be so – as 
Goodin observes, OPEC tried to deceive nobody when openly using their near oligopoly on 
the supply of oil to achieve a high price for it in the 1970s. 
Morally neutral exploitation, for Goodin, is the taking advantage of something, or some 
circumstance, distinguished from merely making use of by taking advantage of it in unusual 
circumstances, or in a very particular way. Exploiting a person is a special case of exploiting 
a situation, and occurs where one person is in a strong position of power relative to another, 
making the exploitee vulnerable to the exploiter. It is that power/vulnerability relationship 
that defines what counts as exploitation of a person, and it is exactly the same feature that 
makes all person to person exploitation morally wrongful for Goodin, because it breaches 
what he regards as the moral norm of a duty to protect the vulnerable. At this point Goodin’s 
account of what it is to exploit a person becomes moralized (unlike exploiting things) because 
what marks out one person’s exploiting another (as opposed to merely making use of him) is 
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the vulnerability of one to the other: and he holds that it is always morally wrong to take 
advantage of that. 
So for Goodin, what makes exploitation wrongful, when it is, is just the same as why it is 
wrongful. He notes: ‘Occasions for exploitation arise when one party is in an especially 
strong position vis-à-vis another. These same circumstances impose upon the stronger party a 
heavy moral duty to protect the weaker…just as the analysis of the notion of adultery is 
parasitic upon an analysis of the duty of marital fidelity, so too is the analysis of exploitation 
parasitic upon an analysis of this duty to protect the vulnerable.’40 
Establishing a positive duty on the strong to help or protect the weak, as opposed to the 
negative duty not to harm, is problematic however. There is no generally established 
obligation on people to help those who are dependent on them: typically, we only recognise 
such an obligation when an agent has done something voluntarily to incur it. We regard 
parents as being obliged to take care of their children because they are the result of their 
voluntary actions, rather than because children are dependent on their parents per se. If 
dependency were all, a patient awaiting a life-saving kidney transplant operation would have 
the right to demand a kidney from the rare match, whoever that match was, for the patient is 
certainly dependent upon that rare match 
What Goodin does here is to try to ground a concept on which we have a strong intuition 
(exploitation) on one in which intuitions are weaker (the nature and extent of positive duties.) 
But Wood has a simpler objection to Goodin’s position: that it is vulnerable to a 
counterexample being found where exploitation is wrongful, but no ‘obligation to help’ is 
violated. Wood provides one such: ‘If I am a private detective hired by your wife to spy on 
you, I owe you no ‘obligation to help’ making it incumbent on me not to tell her about your 
cheating – on the contrary, I owe her the obligation to inform on you. But I do clearly exploit 
you in a morally objectionable manner if I blackmail you by threatening to tell her.’41  So 
here, the blackmailing detective wrongfully exploits the husband, and the cheating husband is 
certainly vulnerable to him, but the detective owes him no duty of protection. 
(ii) Wood’s account 
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Although Wood rejects the rooting of an account of wrongful exploitation in a duty of the 
strong to the weak, or a duty to help, he believes strongly that a vulnerability account is the 
correct one. But it should be rooted in different grounds. Wood summarizes his account of 
exploitation as follows: ‘To exploit someone or something is to make use of him, her, or it for 
your own ends by playing on some weakness or vulnerability in the object of your 
exploitation.’42 The taking advantage of someone’s vulnerability to achieve our goal Wood 
calls ‘a-exploitation’. This is the foundation of ‘benefit’ or ‘b-exploitation’ which is the use 
made. (So, in Wood’s example, the charming spy a-exploits the government official’s need 
for affection to b-exploit his official position to get access to a state secret.)43 
What distinguishes morally wrongful exploitation for Wood, then, is taking advantage of the 
vulnerability of another to advance our own goals, and this is wrong because it violates 
proper respect for others. For Wood, ‘Proper respect for others is violated when we treat their 
vulnerabilities as opportunities to advance our own interests or projects. It is degrading to 
have your weaknesses taken advantage of, and dishonourable to use the weaknesses of others 
for your ends. This moral belief, I submit, is widely shared, and it is why the term 
“exploitation” seems to us to refer to something bad, unfair, or unethical. This has nothing to 
do with the meaning of the word itself, but reflects a positive moral conviction which most of 
us hold.’44  
 Wood distinguishes ‘innocent’ exploitation from morally wrongful exploitation in two ways. 
First, the vulnerability has to ‘count’, it has to be significant enough. Secondly, taking 
advantage of another’s vulnerability can be morally innocent when ‘our use of another’s 
vulnerability will not be degrading to the other (or if it is, it is deserved or at any rate morally 
acceptable.)’  So we have no moral objection to ‘innocent’ exploitation – for example, chess 
players taking advantage of each other’s weaknesses. One would not play the game unless 
one expected one’s opponent to try to do that. As Wood puts it:  
‘One would not enter the game with good sportsmanship if one did not expect (or even want) 
one’s opponent to use one’s weaknesses whenever possible, and competitive play remains 
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morally innocent only as long as this sort of exploitation does not take a form which degrade 
the competitors’45  
Wood, then, needs to show us what vulnerabilities ‘count’, if only some do, and what 
amounts to ‘degradation’ if that is a critical distinguishing factor. 
Wood argues that B is vulnerable to A when in order for B to achieve some goal G, A is in a 
position to exercise influence over some (possibly other) aspect, or course of action of B. 
Wood rejects a similar, but simpler, definition of vulnerability – that vulnerability gives A 
some control over B – with the example of a servant pilfering from a master: he exploits his 
master’s naïve trustingfulness, but has gained no control over him. The suggested definition 
avoids this problem; the master’s goal is to be able to keep some money in his coat pocket 
without locking it in a safe every night; the servant’s access to his clothes makes him 
vulnerable to the servant in that regard, without any overall change in the balance of control 
being required. 
But Wood does not tell us what it is to degrade another. Is it feeling degraded, or being 
degraded that matters? At this point, we need a fuller account of degradation, but Wood does 
not supply this. We need it, however, for there are several relationships at play. A can treat B 
in a degrading manner; B may or may not feel degraded: and whether he does or not, B may 
or may not actually be degraded. What we are interested in is the last aspect: but this 
highlights that the principle that we must respect people and not degrade them does not of 
itself tell us what actions count as degradation. Is a high class prostitute/courtesan like Zola’s 
Nana degraded by her profession when she exploits as much as she is exploited, if not more? 
Or consider the degradation relationships that run like poison through the veins of 
‘Wuthering Heights’: Hindley degrades Heathcliff by treating him as a servant rather than a 
family member; Catherine disastrously believes that as a result marrying Heathcliff would 
degrade her; Heathcliff takes his revenge by degrading Hareton, Hindley’s son through 
depriving him of education and so on. Some of these characters feel degraded when the 
reader might say that in fact they are not: others become actually degraded through their 
actions. Feeling degraded will reflect a person’s psychological makeup, culture and the 
society and time he lives in.  
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Wood argues that exploitation is wrongful when it takes advantage of a vulnerability in an 
agent in a way that degrades that agent. So the chess players are not a case of wrongful 
exploitation, even though they take advantage of each other’s vulnerabilities, because they do 
not degrade. But, aside from the difficulties noted above of knowing what it is to be 
degraded, I am not clear that this is the factor that picks out the wrongful cases of taking 
advantage of a vulnerability. It would seem possible to wrongfully take advantage of a 
vulnerability without degrading. Is the sweatshop worker degraded by working in a 
sweatshop? Relevantly for this thesis, when a borrower borrows from an MFI at an 
equivalent annual rate of 195%46 to set up some small business, there will be many who feel 
that she must be wrongfully exploited, but without any suggestion that she is degraded by 
taking out the loan, setting up the business and attempting to repay it. The next chapter 
considers levels of interest rates in exploitation in microfinance in depth: the point here to 
establish is that if they are wrongfully exploitative, it is not because they degrade borrowers. 
What we began searching for was the distinguishing factor that made some (at least person to 
person) exploitation (seen as taking advantage of a vulnerability) morally wrongful rather 
than innocent. Goodin argues that one person taking advantage of the vulnerability of another 
to him is always wrongful because of the duty of the strong to protect those vulnerable to 
them: if such a duty is not clearly established, however, a different principle to establish 
which, or all, vulnerability it is wrongful to exploit is required. Wood suggests degradation, 
but does not provide a full account of what it is to be degraded, or indeed the (presumably 
important) differences between feeling degraded and being degraded. I develop the idea that 
it is when a vulnerability arises from a low degree of autonomy (in a global or local sense) 
that it is wrongful to take advantage of it, below. 
 
III. Autonomy and Exploitation 
On my account, then, prima facie A wrongfully exploits B when A takes advantage of a 
vulnerability of B to A, benefit is derived from B, and B’s vulnerability arises from either a 
low degree of autonomy in its global sense, or a low local autonomy in a particular situation. 
This account follows other vulnerability accounts of wrongful exploitation by requiring that 
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for A to wrongfully exploit B, A manipulate B in some way, is in a position of relative power 
with regard to B47  and that a benefit arises from the interaction. A need not intend to benefit 
himself from the interaction to make it wrongfully exploitative – he may only intend to 
interact with B for B’s own good – but if he does in fact derive a benefit from it, or if a third 
party of A’s choosing derives a benefit from it, then, prima facie A wrongfully exploits. A 
pure benefactor, who neither intends nor receives benefit himself from his interaction, even 
when it involves taking advantage of a vulnerability of one with a low level of autonomy 
does not wrongfully exploit: but in practice he may need to take very great care that no 
benefit to him does in fact arise. 
Not all taking advantage of vulnerabilities counts as prima facie wrongful exploitation. 
Whether it is wrongful to take advantage of a vulnerability depends on how that vulnerability 
relates to an agent’s autonomy, either at a global or a local level. 
(a) Taking Advantage of a Low Degree of Global Autonomy 
At a global level, when the vulnerability arises from a low level of global autonomy, it is 
prima facie wrongful to take advantage of it, even if the exploiter did nothing to create the 
circumstances of the exploitee’s low level of autonomy. It is prima facie wrongful, but could 
of course still conceivably be the best thing, overall, to do. What is a low enough level of 
global autonomy to count? The ability to act autonomously was defined in the previous 
chapter as having a minimum threshold of not only negative liberty, but sufficient positive 
liberties to access the basic goods of life: education, food, shelter, the means to make a living. 
A person has a low degree of global autonomy, then, when in the area being considered, he 
lacks, or only has a few of, the freedoms necessary to live a fulfilled life in this area.48  
Whilst we can define a level of lowness of global autonomy for the taking advantage of it to 
count as prima facie wrongful exploitation, of course it remains the case, as argued earlier, 
that autonomy is something we hold to different degrees in different aspects of our lives. One 
is wrongfully exploited or one is not: one cannot be partially exploited. But perhaps the lower 
the degree of global autonomy, the worse the prima facie wrongfulness of the wrongful 
exploitation. 
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The classic case of the taking advantage of a low degree of global autonomy is that of the 
sweatshop worker. The sweatshop worker has rational agency, and can voluntarily choose the 
low-paid sweatshop job as the only alternative to the even less remunerative subsidence 
farming: but that (let us suppose) is his only other option, and when the sweatshop owner 
takes advantage of this lack of ability to act autonomously and choose another job, to 
maximize his profit by paying the lowest possible wage, the sweatshop owner wrongfully 
exploits. As noted earlier, this is so even though the contract is mutually beneficial: indeed, 
the worker may derive more benefit from it than the sweatshop owner, to whom the marginal 
extra profit from this extra low paid worker may be very small, whereas to the worker the 
extra, however tiny, amount of income may be a matter of life and death. 
When advantage is taken of a low level of global autonomy, the act can be prima facie 
wrongfully exploitative but still be the right thing to do anyway. Other factors can outweigh 
the prima facie wrongfulness of the exploitation. If the only terms on which the exploiter can 
mutually beneficially interact with the exploitee are prima facie wrongfully exploitative, but 
it is the right thing to do anyway, because the positive consequences outweigh the negative 
consequences – let us suppose here that the sweatshop worker would otherwise starve - then 
we would have a case of justified exploitation.49 
How does the sweatshop owner here minimise the wrongfulness of his prima facie wrongful 
exploitation? To eliminate it completely, he would need to not take advantage of the low 
global level of autonomy of the worker. To specify this, we can imagine what salary the 
worker might receive in another factory if there were free movement of labour and he could 
migrate to work there. This would be the salary level the sweatshop owner should pay to 
avoid the charge of wrongful exploitation, for it would be the salary level that did not take 
advantage of the worker’s low degree of global autonomy.50 
                                                          
49 It would be harsh to say that the sweatshop that operates at breakeven, but still pays below the level required 
not to take advantage of the worker’s low level of autonomy, wrongfully exploits. It can, after all, do no more 
than operate at breakeven. In that case, if it really is deriving no benefit from the operation, the lack of benefit 
would meant that it does not wrongfully exploit. But benefit is not only defined in terms of profitability: all the 
benefits derived from the business by the owner would count, such as, for example, his own salary, or the status 
he receives from being the local factory owner. 
50 That rate would not quite be what unskilled labourers in factories in developed countries are paid in a world 
where movement of labour is heavily restricted. If there were free movement of labour, the price for unskilled 
labour in developed countries would presumably fall as supply increased and that would be the rate – higher 
than the sweatshop worker who cannot migrate receives, somewhat lower than unskilled labour in developed 
markets receives today – that would not be taking advantage of the sweatshop worker’s low level of autonomy 
and would therefore not exploit him. 
41 
 
In the next chapter, when it comes to examining the practices of microcredit, this approach of 
looking at what it would take for an act or practice not to be prima facie wrongfully 
exploitative from the exploitee’s point of view, in terms of what would not take advantage of 
his low level of global autonomy, rather than from the point of view of what the exploiter, 
what he can or cannot afford to do, is developed in the context of the interest rate that a 
borrower pays on a loan. 
(b) Taking Advantage of a Low Degree of Local Autonomy 
It is the taking advantage of a low degree of global autonomy that will have the most 
relevance when it comes to contemplating the practices of microcredit. Nonetheless, the 
relationship of a vulnerability of a generally highly autonomous agent to their local 
autonomy, to the particular circumstances of an individual case, can still help identify when 
taking advantage of those vulnerabilities is prima facie wrongful or not. 
An agent can have a high degree of global autonomy, but a low degree of local autonomy 
with regard to a particular situation. This could be a low level of ability to exercise rational 
agency in a particular case, or a low level of ability to act autonomously in particular 
circumstances. 
Pretty much any need or desire can make us vulnerable to others. But not all taking advantage 
of such vulnerabilities is wrongful. We distinguish those needs and desires over which the 
agent has no or low rational control, from those over which he has high control. Prima facie 
the drug dealer wrongfully exploits the drug addict, for the latter has lost the power to 
exercise rational agency over his desire for drugs, even if he had it once. Whims, desires and 
preferences over which the agent possesses rational control are not, prima facie, wrongfully 
exploited when taken advantage of. Taking advantage of vulnerabilities arising from mental 
health disorders, addictions, extremities of emotional pain where rational agency has ceased 
to be capable of being exercised, is. 
An otherwise highly globally autonomous agent can also have a low level of ability to act 
autonomously in particular circumstances, and where that is so, taking advantage of the 
vulnerability in those circumstances would also count as wrongful exploitation. So the high 
powered legal trainee with a two year training contract with her firm, whose boss threatens to 
block her subsequent full-time appointment unless she sleeps with him has a high global 
autonomy, but a low level of local autonomy in these circumstances – she cannot leave the 
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traineeship and is vulnerable to her boss’s power over her appointment. This lack of options 
in these circumstances mean that she is wrongfully exploited. Similarly, the boatman who 
demands vast sums from Nozick’s drowning millionaire51 to save him wrongfully exploits 
the millionaire’s vulnerability to him and lack of alternatives in the circumstances. And 
Wertheimer’s52 lecherous millionaire, who proposes to pay for expensive surgery the state 
will not provide to save B’s child if B agrees to become his mistress, wrongfully exploits her 
lack of scope of autonomous action to circumvent her vulnerability in any other way. That 
these are exploitative rather than coercive is discussed in chapter 4; for here, what makes 
them wrongfully exploitative is the advantage the exploiter takes of the vulnerability that 
arises from a very limited scope for autonomous action for the exploitee in the particular 
circumstances that apply. 
Exploitation is prima facie wrongful, then, when it takes advantage of a vulnerability of an 
agent, with benefit, usually but not necessarily accruing to the exploiter, and that 
vulnerability arises from either an agent’s low degree of global autonomy, or a low degree of 
local autonomy in the  particular circumstances that prevail. Taking advantage of a 
vulnerability arising from a low degree of autonomy, local or global, picks out which taking 
advantage of vulnerabilities are prima facie wrongfully exploitative, and which are not. Why 
we hold that taking advantage of a low degree of autonomy is wrongful could be accounted 
for by a number of different theories. Autonomy is dear to all of us, so to that extent common 
sense suggests it. A consequentialist may hold that autonomy is so instrumental to our 
achieving our preferences, or maximising our welfare, that the taking advantage of a 
vulnerability that arises from a lack of it is always highly likely to lead to worse outcomes. A 
Kantian might well hold that in order to treat others as ends in themselves, we do not take 
advantage of their vulnerabilities, the most especially when that vulnerability arises from a 
low degree of autonomy. Whichever normative justification of why it is wrongful to take 
advantage of a vulnerability arising from a low degree of local or global autonomy, this 
definition does seem to pick out when exploitation is prima facie wrongful. The next step is 
to apply that analysis to the practices of microcredit. 
 
                                                          
51 Robert Nozick, ‘Coercion’ in Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes and Morton White (eds.) Philosophy, 
Science, and Method: Essays in Honor of Ernest Nagel (1969) pp. 440-472 New York: St Martin’s Press 
52 Wertheimer ‘Exploitation in Clinical Research’ in Jennifer Hawkins & Ezekiel Emmanuel (2008), The Ethics 
of Clinical Research, Princeton N.J.; Oxford: Princeton University Press, p65 
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Chapter 3: Exploitation in the practice of microcredit 
The previous chapter concluded that exploitation is prima facie wrongful when it takes 
advantage of a vulnerability in an agent, with benefit derived from the exploitee, and that 
vulnerability arises from either an agent’s low degree of global autonomy, or a low degree of 
local autonomy in the particular circumstances that prevail. This chapter will examine the 
extent to which this definition of wrongful exploitation applies to the offer and practices of 
microcredit. 
As described earlier, microcredit is offering small amounts of credit to the poor, who are 
effectively excluded from the formal banking sector, at rates of interest which are typically 
substantially higher than those offered by formal banks but lower than those available from 
non-bank moneylenders. The borrower is vulnerable to the microcredit lender because of her 
lack of choice. If she is lucky she may have a choice between two equally high-charging 
microcredit firms, but she has no access to the lower rates in the formal sector. Her choice is 
also constrained in another way: living in rural poverty, she may have no options for raising 
herself from poverty other than borrowing capital to start a micro enterprise. There simply 
may not be an employment sector from which she can seek work. She is more than capable of 
autonomous choice from the point of view of meeting the minimum thresholds of rationality 
and self-consciousness for internal autonomy, but her global, external autonomy is 
constrained by a lack of options resulting from the poverty into which she is born. 
Microfinance borrowers are, typically, vulnerable in the sense of having a low global 
autonomy. 
So which of the practices of microfinance might be thought to exploit her? Might even the 
very offer itself constitute wrongful exploitation? 
The offer of microcredit makes use of – exploits in its neutral sense – the desire for credit. So 
too does the offer of a VISA card to the affluent in developed countries, where the desire for 
convenient forms of payment is also made use of. So far, so uninteresting: this is exploitation 
in its broadest, and not morally pejorative, sense. 
For the offer of microcredit to be wrongfully exploitative, it must make use of a vulnerability 
that arises from a low degree of global autonomy (and benefit the provider.) Is the 
microcredit borrower’s need for credit a vulnerability stemming from a low degree of 
autonomy, then, in a way my desire for a VISA card is not? It would seem so. I want a credit 
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card for convenience; but if I cannot get one, I can save, I can use my regular account, I can 
draw on an overdraft – I have tools available to me that the microcredit borrower does not. 
The classic microcredit borrower lacks access to financial services that would enable day-to-
day money management, the building of savings, ordinary loans or overdraft facilities. As 
Collins et al53 put it, not having enough money is bad enough; not being able to manage 
whatever money you have is worse. Her lack of access to formal financial services makes her 
vulnerable to small, unexpected financial needs becoming large-scale disasters: and thus 
when she turns to microcredit, she is in a very poor negotiating position with regard to the 
terms and conditions on which she takes a loan. 
Most MFIs would argue that their intervention is at least mutually beneficial, and therefore 
that there can be no (wrongful) exploitation. We have seen that a transaction being mutually 
beneficial does not prevent it from being prima facie wrongfully exploitative even if, overall, 
possibly still the right thing to do. What are the terms, then, on which microfinance could be 
offered, that would not be prima facie wrongfully exploitative? That just make use of the 
desire for credit (as with my VISA card), but do not take advantage of a vulnerability that 
arises from low global autonomy? 
What makes the microcredit borrower vulnerable to the MFI and the moneylender where I am 
not vulnerable to the VISA card company, is the microcredit borrower’s exclusion from 
formal financial services. Her exclusion is partly because of her lack of collateral, partly 
because the small unit size of her requirements make her too expensive on a unit cost basis 
for regular banks to serve, and partly because rural areas are much more expensive to service 
than urban. But excluded she is. The terms on which microcredit needs to be offered to her, 
then, that would not be prima facie wrongfully exploitative would be those offered to the 
financially included in her country: the cost of a regular bank account and savings account, an 
overdraft. 
This chapter examines the terms on which microcredit is actually offered and whether it 
comes close to these levels. The level of interest rates at which microcredit is offered is 
considered first, and then other terms and conditions of the loan, notably group liability and 
compulsory savings. The bulk of this chapter is thus focused on whether the MFI wrongfully 
exploits borrowers in the rate charged for a loan, and other terms and conditions attached to 
                                                          
53 Daryl Collins, Jonathan Morduch, Stuart Rutherford and Orlanda Ruthuen,  Portfolios of the Poor: How the 
World’s Poor Live on $2 a Day (2010),Princeton N.J.; Oxford:  Princeton University Press p. 184 
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it; but the final section will consider whether there are parties other than the MFI who also 
wrongfully exploit borrowers, and indeed other parties than the borrowers themselves who 
are also exploited. 
 
I. What Interest Rates Are 
Setting out what interest rates are charged around the world ought to be straightforward: 
unfortunately, it is not. The rate that MFIs state that they lend to borrowers at are only seldom 
those which are actually charged. An MFI might state that it charges 5% per month for a 
twelve month loan, and tell donors that that equates to 60% per annum, but omit to mention 
that this is on a ‘flat’ rather than a ‘declining’ basis (so that although some of the capital is 
repaid each month, interest is still charged on the whole of the original sum lent, not the 
smaller amount that is left outstanding after each month’s capital repayment). The effect of 
this is to push that 60% rate up to 111% on the average loan balance that the borrower 
actually receives, and that is before we consider whether we should be using compound 
interest here. These complications are more fully discussed in chapter 8. For the purposes of 
this chapter, in trying to look at what MFIs charge globally, rather than using what MFIs state 
they charge, rates as calculated by the Microfinance Information Exchange (MIX) are used.  
MIX is a database of some 2100 MFIs accounting for 58m borrowers in 98 countries.  Not all 
MFIs report to MIX, but it is a reasonable sample. It calculates a ‘portfolio yield’ for each 
MFI, which is used widely in the industry as representing the price of loans, and is the best 
proxy available for MFIs’ interest rates. This is the actual interest and fee income received 
over a year by an MFI divided by its average outstanding loan book over the same period. 
This is indeed a much more accurate reflection of what is charged than the MFI’s stated 
interest rates, but in some cases will still substantially understate. This is because a large 
number of MFIs only disburse eighty or ninety per cent of the stated loan size to borrowers, 
holding the remainder back as ‘savings’, effectively as collateral. Interest is charged on the 
whole sum however. This would mean that the apparent 60% loan above that would show up 
under the portfolio yield measure as 111% would in fact, if compulsory savings were 20%, be 
245% on the average loan balance actually received. MIX does not make this adjustment 
however, because not all MFIs disclose that they make this deduction, hence their figures 
used below will understate what is charged to a possibly large degree.  
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It is also the case that portfolio yield will understate what actual borrowers pay because it 
nets off defaults: so that if a borrower has failed to make interest repayments, that will lower 
the portfolio yield. Those who have repaid, then, will have paid a higher rate than the 
portfolio yield shown. 
MicroFinance Transparency is an organization dedicated to bringing some transparency in to 
microcredit interest rates. Using MIX Market data, it analyses interest rates charged by 
country on an Annual Percentage Rate (APR) basis, allowing for fees and any compulsory 
insurance, but not compulsory savings. A sample of interest rates charged in 2010 around the 
world is given below. 
 
Table One: Examples of Microfinance Interest Rates for Small and Large Loans, 2010 
(approx.) 
 Small Loans  Larger Loans 
 Average Rate Range  Average Rate Range 
      
Bolivia 36% 30-70%  20% 10-36% 
Bosnia & 
Herzegovina 
28% 10-54%  22% 8-31% 
India 34% 20-46%  32% 22-40% 
Kenya 40% 10-70%  32% 22-40% 
Malawi 60% 16-133%  45% 10-120% 
Source: MF Transparency, Live Country Data, 2010 accessed 2012. 
 
How do these rates compare to other forms of credit? Using 2004 data and unfortunately 
excluding sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe, but translating rates in to a common APR, 




Table Two: A Comparison of interest rates in developing countries54 




Informal Sources e.g. 
moneylenders (APR) 
Indonesia 18% 28-63% 120-720% 
Cambodia 18% ~45% 120-180% 
Nepal 11.5-18% 18-24% 60-120% 
India 12-15% 20-40% 120% 
Philippines 24-29% 60-80% ~120% 
Bangladesh 10-13% 20-35% 180-240% 
 
This bears out the common belief that microfinance rates sit between the rates in the formal 
sector of commercial banks, and wholly informal sources such as moneylenders. It should be 
borne in mind however that once compulsory savings are taken into account, in some regions 
microfinance rates will sit rather closer to those of moneylenders than between them and 
commercial banks. 
We need to bear one further factor in mind when considering portfolio yields before 
considering whether these rates are wrongfully exploitative or not. This is that the rates 
normally quoted are averages. On 2006 data, Rosenberg et al55 report that the average 
portfolio yield for sustainable (not subsidized) MFIs in MIX (weighted by gross loan 
portfolio) was 28.4%: but the range was from 15% at the fifth percentile (that is, the lowest 
portfolio yields) to 50% at the ninety-fifth (highest portfolio yields): and in Latin America it 
was 15% to 70%. The annualized rate of Compartamos, the Mexican MFI that had floated on 
Mexico’s Stock Exchange that year, was over 85%, not including a 15% tax paid by clients. 
Chuck Waterfield56 of MF Transparency has tried to unpick some of the average portfolio 
yields by correlating the portfolio yield data to the average outstanding loans balances of the 
MFIs. He finds that those MFIs with the highest portfolio yields have the smallest average 
loan balances. In one example of 59 MFIs in the Philippines, the average rate of 33% hid a 
                                                          
54 Joakim Sandberg, ‘Mega-Interest on Microcredit: Are Lenders Exploiting the Poor?’ (2012) Journal of 
Applied Philosophy, vol. 29 issue 3 p.170 
55 Richard Rosenberg, Adrian Gonzalez and Sushma Narain, ‘The New Moneylenders: Are the Poor Being 
exploited by High Microcredit Interest Rates?’ (2009) CGAP Occasional Paper no. 15 
56 Chuck Waterfield, ‘Is Transparency Enough? What is Fair and Ethical When it comes to Prices in 




range of 14% to 72% with the highest rates applying to the smaller loan size. The same 
pattern is seen in Table One above, derived from MF Transparency’s data, except in India, 
where there is much greater flatness. Given that loan size is widely taken as indicative of the 
poverty of a client (the poorer the client, the smaller loan size she can both make use of and 
be allowed by the MFI on risk grounds), it seems that the poorer a client, the higher the 
interest rate she is charged. We need to consider the wrongful exploitiveness or otherwise, 
then, not only of the rates paid on average by borrowers, but the fact that in the very wide 
ranging spread that makes up that average, it is the poorest who pay the most. 
 
II. Why Interest Rates are Where They Are 
Why, then, are interest rates, especially outside South Asia, so high, particularly for the 
poorest, when the industry aims at least on the face of it at poverty reduction? Despite 
outliers such as the for-profit Compartamos, where profit margin is an atypically large 
component of the interest rate charged, it is cost structures that determine the high and 
varying levels of interest rates that MFIs charge. The key, according to work carried out by 
Morduch et al57 and quoting that of Gonzales,58 is loan size. Clearly lenders need to reach a 
critical mass of clients, and Gonzales found that scale economies disappear after about 2,000 
customers (others are higher.) After that, margins are increased by larger loan sizes and cross-
selling other services (selling a borrower more than one service, which is hard for many 
microlenders who limit themselves to one product.) The larger loans made by banks, and 
additional products they cross-sell to clients, translate into lower costs per dollar lent for the 
bank as opposed to the MFI. The median bank spends 12c per $ lent on operating costs, the 
median NGO 26c.  
This is so despite the average operating cost per borrower being $156 for the median NGO 
and $299 for the median bank. The NGOs keep costs down by spending less on staff, 
premises etc. – but it is not enough to compensate for the diseconomies of transacting small 
loans. Mordoch shows that it is operating costs, rather than capital costs or loan loss 
provisions, that drive the differences in total costs between different kinds of MFIs. Those 
MFIs that make the smallest loans on average (usually a sign of reaching the poorest) also 
                                                          
57 Robert Cull, Asli Demirgu-Kent, Jonathan Mordoch, ‘Microfinance Meets the Market’ (2009) Journal of 
Economic Perspectives vol. 23 no. 1. 
58 Adrian Gonzalez, ‘Efficiency Drivers of Microfinance Institutions (MFIs): The Case of Operating Costs’, 
(2007) Microbanking Bulletin 15 pp. 34-42, Microfinance Information Exchange, Inc. 
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face the highest cost per unit lent. The institutions with the highest cost per unit also charge 
the most to their customers. MFIs charge more on small loans to the poorest, then, compared 
to somewhat larger loans to the not-so-poor, because their lending rate reflects the higher cost 
of making these very small loans. 
An MFI’s interest rate reflects four major components: its own costs of funds, its loan loss 
expenses, any profits it makes, and operating expenses.59 Of these, operating expenses are the 
largest component: expressed as a percentage of the loan portfolio, they are 30% in sub-
Saharan Africa,60 17% in South Asia61 and 19% in Latin America and the Caribbean.62 
Operating expenses are personnel and administrative costs such as salaries, depreciation, 
transport for loan officers etc. Personnel costs vary widely. In sub-Saharan Africa they 
represent 14% of the loan portfolio;63 in South Asia 6%64  and in Latin America and the 
Caribbean 11%.65  The number of borrowers each loan officer serves tend to be fairly 
constant (around 250): the difference comes in the salary of loan officers. In Sub-Saharan 
Africa the average salary of employees of MFIs expressed as a percentage of gross national 
income is 918%66; in South Asia 280%67 and in Latin America and the Caribbean 270%.68 
The likely difference for the relatively expensive salaries in Africa is the lack of a large 
enough educated pool in the population from which to draw, leading to the salaries of those 
who have completed formal education being bid up. The percentage of the population 
educated to secondary school level for the three areas above is, respectively, 36%, 55% and 
89%.69  
Bar outliers such as Compartamos, profits are not the main driver of the level of interest rates. 
Rosenberg et al70 have calculated that if the median MFI foreswore all profits, it would 
reduce the interest rate by only about one sixth. The profiteering of a few is not representative 
                                                          
59 Operating expenses are all expenses related to operations i.e. personnel expense, depreciation, amortization 
and administration expense. 
60 Sub-Saharan Africa Microfinance Analysis and Benchmarking Report 2010, MixMarket, Microfinance 
Information Exchange, Inc.  
61 Asia Microfinance Analysis and Benchmark Report, 2009, MixMarket, Microfinance Information Exchange 
Inc. 
62 North America & Caribbean Benchmarks Table 2009, MixMarket, Microfinance Information Exchange, Inc. 
63 Op. cit. note 60 
64 Op. cit. note 61 
65 Op. cit. note 62 
66 Op. cit. note 60 
67 Op. cit. note 61 
68 Op. cit. note 62 
69 Gross enrolment ratio is the ratio of total enrolment, regardless of age, to the population of the age group that 
officially corresponds to the level of education shown (need more on this ref!) 
70 Op. cit. note 55 
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of the whole. This does not, of itself, determine the question of wrongful exploitation – to 
begin with, operations may be unnecessarily inefficient – but it is worth noting, as Rosenberg 
et al put it, ‘For the median MFI, the extreme and unrealistic scenario of complete 
elimination of all profit would cause its interest rate to drop by only about one sixth. Such an 
interest reduction would not be insignificant, but it would still leave microcredit rates at 
levels that might look abusive to politicians and the public, neither of whom usually 
understand the high costs that tiny lending inevitably entails.’71  
Unfortunately, it is very hard to tell from the level of top-down statistics whether MFIs are 
reasonably efficient, or whether their operating expenses include avoidable ‘fat’. Operating 
costs are affected by loan size primarily, but also client location and density, transport 
infrastructure, salary levels, type of loan provided. We have seen that on average MFIs have 
to pay much higher relative amounts to employ loan officers in Africa than Asia; and they 
also face much higher transportation costs there, where the population density is 36 people 
per km² compared to 331 in South Asia and therefore for an African loan officer to service 
roughly the same number of clients as a South Asian loan officer, he really does need the 
expensive motorbike as opposed to a pedal bike to get around to client meetings. 
MIX does categorise MFIs into various peer groups for rough comparison purposes, but, as 
Rosenberg et al again put it:  ‘each peer group contains so wide a range of circumstances that 
one cannot confidently judge an MFI’s efficiency just by comparing its indicators with those 
of a peer group, let alone judge whether the peer group as a whole is reasonably efficient.’72  
A very high administration expense ratio here could be reflective of the problems outlined in 
Morduch above, that reaching the very poorest goes hand in hand with small loan size and 
sometimes very high transport costs. But it could also be reflective of a bloated 
administration base. There are, after all, many different ways in which borrowers can be 
exploited: it could be for profit, but it could also be a comfortable job creation scheme for a 
not for profit NGO. It is hard to generalize here; the circumstances of an MFI would need to 
be examined individually. 
To sum up the position of most MFIs and the rates they charge, then: typically, the average 
rate an MFI charges lies between rates in the formal banking sector and those of 
moneylenders. Rates are at their lowest in Asia, where high population densities and a large 
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pool of educated from which to draw loan officers keep operating costs down. Interest rates 
as stated by MixMarket, the best we have available, will understate what is truly charged, 
possibly by a considerable degree, because they exclude ‘compulsory savings’. The average 
rates themselves do not on the face of it look too bad: but they hide a dispersion where the 
highest rates are very high indeed, and are being paid by the poorest clients. The main driver 
of these high rates, however, is not profit, but the cost of transacting in very small units – 
essentially because it costs as much to administer and monitor a $50 loan as it does a $500 
loan. 
 
III  Are These Rates Wrongfully Exploitative? 
On the account of exploitation that I am defending, microfinance borrowers are made 
vulnerable to MFIs by their low level of global autonomy, reflected in their limited options in 
terms of ways to earn a living, with borrowing capital to start a small business being one of 
the few ways open. When an MFI takes advantage of that vulnerability in a borrower’s need 
for credit by charging a rate much higher than that which would be charged in the formal 
sector from which she is excluded, it prima facie wrongfully exploits her. 
One important line of objection MFIs may make in response to this is that they do not exploit 
borrowers where their aims are wholly altruistic, for then they do not derive a benefit from 
the transaction, and in Chapter 2 it was noted that one of the necessary conditions for 
exploitation to be wrongful, was that a benefit had to be derived from the interaction with the 
exploitee. Clearly, commercialized, for-profit MFIs do extract a benefit in of the form of their 
profit, so this particular line of defence is not open to them. But what of not-for-profit MFIs? 
The fact is that not-for-profit MFIs derive the same benefit from the borrower as the 
commercial MFIs: that is, the interest rate charged. Prima facie A wrongfully exploits B 
when A takes advantage of a vulnerability in B that reflects B’s low level of local or global 
autonomy, and A benefits from the interchange. For commercial or not-for-profit MFIs, the 
advantage taken is the charging of an interest rate higher than it would be if the borrower’s 
low global autonomy did not make her vulnerable to the MFI (i.e. than if she could get the 
‘urban’ or possibly the ‘formal’ rate.) The benefit received is that interest payment. The 
commercial MFI then translates that interest payment in to a profit; the not-for-profit uses it 
52 
 
as a contribution to its ongoing operations, and needs to top up this revenue stream from 
elsewhere to keep going: but it still benefits from it. 
The not-for-profit MFI cannot make an offer of microfinance to borrowers if it has no staff at 
all. On the other hand, if it were giving local staff salaries and benefits that compared well 
with what they might earn elsewhere, and the head office staff are awarding themselves 
higher salaries and pension benefits on the basis of the number and geographical spread of 
the people in their employ, all paid for by the interest rate charged to the borrower, then we 
might be tempted to think that the MFI’s employees are deriving at least some benefit from 
the interaction. Benefit can be derived from the terms and conditions of employment, 
especially where these go beyond what a similarly skilled employee might earn elsewhere, as 
well as through profits. The not-for-profit MFI exists, of course, to fulfil the charitable 
purpose laid out in its trust deed and it is the case that it is the employees who are deriving 
the benefit here, rather than the MFI as an institution. But the MFI’s directors have a duty to 
ensure that they are fulfilling that trust deed, and not overseeing mission creep whereby the 
de facto focus of directors and staff has become using the interest payments received for the 
expansion and enhancement of numbers and terms for staff, rather than, for example, paying 
the bare minimum necessary and reducing the interest rate charged. 
A difficulty for the not-for-profit MFI is that the source of its benefit, in terms of salary and 
employment, shifts over the life-cycle of the MFI if or when it grows. When the not-for-profit 
MFI starts up, its funding is usually provided by governments or aid agencies, private 
donation and founder capital. Before it starts charging interest to vulnerable borrowers, the 
bulk of the benefit of employment and salary is paid for by its donors/funders. In this start-up 
phase, the not-for-profit MFI is similar to a doctor working for the NHS in the UK. The 
ultimate point of interaction of both is with the vulnerable – poor borrowers, the sick – but at 
the point of service provision all that is being exploited by the doctor/MFI employee is the 
desire of the donors/NHS to provide a service to potentially vulnerable people. This is the 
innocent, neutral use of exploitation discussed earlier. It is possible that the MFI might 
wrongfully exploit here – if it took advantage of the donor’s overenthusiasm to fund an MFI 
and ignorance as to what costs should be to set an expenses level far above what was 
necessary – but if it did, it would be wrongfully exploiting the donor, not the intended 
borrower, at this early, start-up point. 
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However, the position of the start-up not-for-profit MFI begins to change from the moment 
the not-for-profit MFI starts charging interest in excess of what we might call the ‘non-
vulnerable’ rate to its vulnerable borrowers. At that point, some part (initially, a tiny part) of 
the benefit in employment derived from the offer of credit comes from the vulnerable people 
served. When the initial, external, source of funding has been used up, even the not-for-profit 
MFI becomes prima facie wrongfully exploitative. 
The MFI’s position contrasts to that of the UK government when in 1861 Gladstone, as 
Chancellor, set up the ‘Post Office Savings Bank’ to provide basic savings facilities to the 
then financially excluded working class poor of the UK. At a time when fifteen counties and 
a number of large towns had no savings banks and those that did exist were not open hours 
when the working classes could visit them,73 Gladstone utilized the country’s 2000-3000 Post 
Offices to reach the working classes with a simple savings account. The point is that the 
government paid the extra for these savings accounts to be provided to the working classes, 
not the savers themselves. If there was any ‘fat’ in the subsequent provision of these services, 
it was the Government that was exploited, not the working class. 
The second way in which even a not-for-profit MFI might derive a benefit from its 
interaction with its borrowers may be more controversial: does its simple pursuit of its 
altruistic goal of helping the borrower alleviate his poverty count as such a benefit? 
Here, the problem is that the relationship between an MFI and its borrowers is more complex 
than the relatively straightforward relationship between a benefactor and beneficiary. A 
charity which, for example, raises funds to pay school fees for girls from impoverished 
households stays in the benefactor/beneficiary relationship: there will be employment 
benefits to the benefactor charity here, but none of them are paid for by the beneficiary. The 
pure benefactor/beneficiary relationship may raise questions of paternalism, but does not 
raise any of exploitation.  
The MFI aiming to use microfinance as a tool of poverty alleviation, however, aims to 
become sustainable (operationally profitable) in one district/region/country before expanding 
on into another. When an MFI becomes sustainable in an area, that does not mean that it has 
hit a point of perpetual breakeven; it means that it has now reached a degree of scale where 
its operations are no longer loss-making, but have turned profitable. It then has the option of 
                                                          
73 Hansard HC Debate 08 February 1861, vol. 161  cols. 262-267 
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reducing its interest rates to stay at breakeven as further scale in its now operationally 
efficient area is added: or letting profits build up to fund expansion elsewhere. At this point, 
through its use of profits generated through the use of an interest rate in excess of the ‘non-
vulnerable’ - formal -  rate in Country A to fund expansion in Country B, the MFI is 
exploiting Country A borrowers to benefit Country B borrowers. Or, perhaps, it could be 
argued that the MFI is allowing itself to be the vehicle through which Country B borrowers 
exploit Country A borrowers. At any rate, the MFI cannot claim that it is not exploiting 
Country A borrowers because it is not taking advantage of them on the grounds that it derives 
no benefit from them. It does: the profits on its operations in Country A. It may then use that 
benefit for a third party, but that is not of relevance to Country A borrowers unless they have 
explicitly signed up to help Country B themselves. 
With regard to exploitation, then, the not-for-profit MFI that aims to fund its geographic 
expansion through funnelling profits generated in one area in to the start-up costs of another 
(rather than, for example, reducing the level of interest in the profitable country) is to some 
extent in the same boat as the commercial MFI. A benefit to both MFIs is derived from the 
offer of microfinance, and although the assumption will be that that is going to be greater for 
the commercial MFI rather than the not-for-profit, it need not necessarily be so, if the 
commercial MFI is especially efficient in its operations and takes only a small profit, and the 
not-for-profit carries an especially fat expense base.  
Does this mean that in practice it is almost impossible to offer microfinance ethically? No, it 
means that it is difficult to offer microfinance to very poor borrowers without, at least prima 
facie, wrongfully exploiting them. Offering credit may still be the right thing to do overall. 
Depending on whether microfinance actually satisfies its proponents’ claims to raise 
borrowers out of poverty, it may indeed still be right, overall, to do.  
On my definition of wrongful exploitation being the taking advantage of a vulnerability that 
reflects a low level of autonomy, the typical microcredit borrower is fairly clearly, prima 
facie wrongfully exploited, especially the poorest borrowers who end up paying rates far 
above the reported averages,74 and much closer to (or even in excess of) moneylender rates 
                                                          
74 Other accounts of exploitation might take the rate of interest charged and assume that because it is absolutely 
high, it is exploitative. The point of the financial analysis above is that it can break down how much the MFI 
must charge to lend and break even at all, and how much more that is than would be available from the formal 
sector, were the borrower not excluded from it. My definition of exploitation does not turn on the precise 
interest rate charged, which is an advantage because varying inflation rates in different countries would make 
putting an absolute number on this meaningless; but it does need this analysis to show the degree to which the 
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rather than those of the formal sector. What follows from this, however? Let us assume, for 
now, that despite the transaction being exploitative it is beneficial, all things considered, to 
the borrower. It is (in Wertheimer’s terms) mutually beneficial and consensual. An 
examination of the actual empirical evidence that microcredit does succeed in alleviating 
poverty will have to wait for Chapter 8. But for the moment, I argue that, assuming that 
microcredit is, net, beneficial to the borrower, then extending it is the right course of action 
regardless, on the straightforwardly consequentialist grounds that it is so when the benefits 
outweigh the wrongfulness of taking advantage of a low level of autonomy. Hence the 
empirical evidence of later chapters, summarizing actual benefits and bringing together actual 
harms, will be key. How, though, might other accounts of exploitation treat microcredit? 
 
IV  How Other Accounts of Exploitation would treat Microfinance 
How would other accounts of exploitation treat the relationship of the MFI and the borrower? 
I have split the descriptions of the various exploitation accounts that I have given into ‘unfair 
usage’ and ‘vulnerability’ accounts. In a recent article,75 Snyder splits them into ‘fairness’ 
accounts and ‘mere use’ accounts, and then also splits the ‘fairness’ group into two sub-
groups: (i) those who focus on micro fairness: ‘those that do not include concerns about 
structural justice in the standard of fairness’ and (ii) macro fairness: ‘those that do incorporate 
concerns about structural justice when assessing fairness.’76  
Wertheimer’s account of exploitation is the classic micro fairness account: appeals to 
background justice or macro reasons why one party may be disadvantaged relative to the 
transacting partner (on my account, has a low degree of global autonomy) are strictly limited. 
What is fair is simply what a hypothetical fair market would produce: ‘Taking advantage of 
another person in a pervasive way, as when structural injustice creates systemic, background 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
borrower is taken advantage of, and thus to measure if one MFI is truly worse than another, whatever the 
headline rate. 
75 Jeremy Snyder ‘Exploitation and Sweatshop Labor: Perspectives and Issues’, (2010) Business Ethics 
Quarterly, 20:2. I do not discuss what Snyder categorises as ‘mere use’ accounts here. These are accounts of 
exploitation as commoditisation: arguments that certain goods are of a nature that makes their trade morally 
repugnant or even incoherent, as Sandel argues of friendship. I prefer to call these arguments commoditisation 
debates, but the word exploitation is sometimes used to cover both these and ‘taking advantage of’ accounts. To 
the extent that these commoditisation debates are considered exploitation, this account does not attempt to cover 
them at all: my account might indeed also find that a father selling a kidney to pay for his son’s education was 
wrongfully exploited, but it would be for coincident reasons, that his low level of global autonomy gave him no 
other way of raising the money, rather than because it was an intrinsic wrong to make use of his body in this 
way. 
76 Ibid. p. 189 
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disadvantage, will not count as exploitation on this view.’ In the case of microfinance, if the 
transaction between borrower and lender is competitive (or hypothetically so, the high rate 
being what any microcredit lender would charge, given the high costs of delivery) and 
consensual, then the global constraints on the borrower are irrelevant and microfinance would 
not be deemed exploitative. 
In his defence of sweatshops, Zwolinski77 focuses on the importance of the concept of 
autonomy in the sense of making choices. He argues that if a choice displays even some 
exercise of autonomy, then there is a prima facie argument against interfering with it. The 
worker might prefer a wider  choice of work, but once he has chosen a sweatshop as superior 
to the other, limited, alternatives, then to ignore his choice is to show him disrespect (on top 
of any disrespect shown him by the limitation of his choices in the first place.) Zwolinski 
maintains ‘all else being equal, it is wrong to take away the option of sweatshop labor from 
workers who would otherwise engage in it.’78 Since Zwolinski follows Wertheimer in using 
‘exploitation’ in a moralized way, if no wrong is done in a consensual contract of labour, no 
exploitation can have taken place. Although he addresses sweatshops rather than microcredit, 
his position would likely to be the same (i.e. neither are exploitative). This is because he 
holds that there must be a rights violation for there to be exploitation, and as he holds that 
there is no right to a living wage, the sweatshop owner does not exploit the worker. I take it 
that establishing a right to credit at a reasonable price will be even harder than establishing 
the right to a living wage, and if Zwolinski rejects the latter, he would likely also reject the 
former, and therefore not find microcredit exploitative. 
As Snyder summarises with regard to the microfairness approach to payday loans,79 ‘the 
microfairness standard of exploitation will have a hard time pinpointing any wrongdoing.’ 
Sweatshops, payday lending and microcredit, even at rates as penal as those in payday 
lending, and for the poorest micro borrowers, are just not going to count as exploitative for 
                                                          
77 Zwolinski, ‘Sweatshops, Choice and Exploitation’, (2007) Business Ethics Quarterly 17 (4): 689-727 
78 Ibid. p. 695 
79 Payday loans are an advance on a person’s salary: in the US, they take the form of a short term loan issued in 
exchange for a post-dated cheque, typically dated for the borrower’s next pay day. The interest rate for the few 
weeks the loan is given for can be 20%, on top of which fees are charged, which can give rise to an annualized 
interest rate (APR) of hundreds, even a thousand of per cent (see Faisal’s presentation for UK also.) 
These rates are (well) in excess of those charged by the formal banking system or credit system, just because 
these are loans to borrowers who fall outside the formal system (which may be because of past credit problems, 
or may be because of lack of comfort of the borrower with the culture of the formal system – in the UK a large 
number of borrowers using payday loans are minority immigrant communities such as Bangladeshis in East 
London (cite!) In the US African-American borrowers have been found to be disproportionately reliant on 
payday lenders for credit needs (Snyder quotes Stegman & Faris ‘Payday Lending: A Business Model that 
Encourages Chronic Borrowing’ (2003) Economic Development Quarterly 17 (1): 8-32 
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micro-fairness accounts, and so these accounts, in asserting the moral permissibility of them, 
have nothing to add about any conditions that then may attach going ahead. 
There is a different outcome from what Snyder calls the ‘macro-fairness’ accounts of 
exploitation. This alternative standard for judging the fairness of a transaction attempts to 
allow for structural injustice. Sample, for example, (echoing Wood) bases her account80 on 
taking advantage of vulnerabilities in ways that degrade people, and that includes a failure of 
respect someone by taking advantage of an injustice done to him: ‘it is the action of taking 
advantage of the unfairness caused by injustice that constitutes a failure of respect.’ 
Specifically, she argues of globalization that it ‘exploits the degree to which background 
injustices experienced by vulnerable nations work to the advantage of their stronger 
interactors’.81 Persons privileged through the process of globalization, she argues, can 
unfairly take advantage of the socioeconomic inequality and injustice brought on by trade 
liberalization. 
As Snyder notes, it is not clear from Sample exactly what injustices create the opportunity for 
exploitation, or how one can avoid taking advantage of them. Mayer,82 however, attempts to 
classify these by arguing that macro fairness exploitation can be tied to the failure of 
international institutions to protect human rights, including the right to a living wage. Thus he 
can argue that the price for regularly traded coffee is exploitative, but that for fair trade coffee 
is not. This is because he posits that everyone has the right to a living wage. Just looking at 
coffee trades from a micro perspective cannot find them exploitative on a fairness account, 
because they are mutually beneficial, consensual and competitive. But from a macro 
perspective, the just price is one an agent with a secure standard of living would accept. The 
‘fair trade’ coffee price is fair because it is reached through a hypothetical bargain between 
persons that have a decent standard of living, or living wage. Snyder notes:83 ‘Both the micro 
and macro standard of fairness imagine a hypothetical exchange between parties in order to 
establish a baseline against which fairness can be measured. Only the macro standard, 
however, allows broad background factors like a right to a living wage to factor in to the 
calculation.’ 
                                                          
80 Ruth Sample, Exploitation: What it is and Why It’s Wrong, (2003) Lenham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield  
81 Ibid. p165 
82 Robert Mayer ‘Sweatshops, Exploitation and Moral Responsibility’ (2007) Journal of Social Philosophy 
38(4): p. 60 
83 Op. cit. note 75 p. 192 
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The macro fairness account might, then, find microcredit exploitative if it was held that either 
there is a right to credit at some reasonable level, or if there was perhaps something 
particularly racist or sexist in the exclusion of the poorest from the formal banking sector. Or 
for those who argue for a right to a living wage, then in areas of rural poverty where there is 
no salaried employment sector, a right to credit might exist where otherwise it would not, as 
the only way to facilitate making a living. These accounts, then, might hold microcredit 
exploitative and their remedy would presumably be to put the onus on the formal banking 
sector in countries where microcredit is prevalent, to extend its reach down and into the 
poorest communities. 
It may be held an advantage of my account of exploitation that it does allow the taking into 
account of macro factors without the controversy of whether there is a right to a living wage 
or not. By linking the vulnerabilities that count to a low level of global autonomy, we can all 
agree that factors such as poverty, disability, remoteness, customs restricting free movement 
of women, reduce autonomy without having to argue that there are rights not to be poor, or to 
be compensated for disability. It is not that I do not, or might not, believe that the macro 
conditions that impair autonomy are not also unjust. That may well be so. But I do not want 
the account of exploitation I am offering to turn on a particular concept of justice and rights 
claims: rather, I want it to turn on a much more commonly accepted conception of autonomy. 
Once we see wrongful exploitation as the taking advantage of a vulnerability that reflects a 
low degree of global autonomy (in the case of microfinance) then the remedy to it – even if it 
is somewhat hypothetical – becomes clearer. This is to stop trying to assess any absolute level 
of interest rates as too high, or a maximum level of expenses or profits for the financial 
provider – all of which look at what is or is not exploitative from the point of view of the 
exploiter – and look at the issues instead from the other end of the telescope, from the point 
of view of the exploited. What would be the rate of interest the borrower would pay if she, 
individually, were not vulnerable, if she was not excluded from mainstream financial 
services, whether that be by dint of gender, culture, distance or lack of formal collateral? 
What is the rate that would not exploit her by taking advantage of these vulnerabilities? This 
then becomes the rate – those of formal financial services in her country – at which she 
would not be wrongfully exploited, whether that be 10%, 20% or 50%.  
Other attempts at trying to provide a sense of what is a ‘fair’ rate for a borrower to pay – the 
market rate, or costs plus a margin – fail to find a rate because they either fall foul of 
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assuming that the market can set a normative rate at all, or they focus on what is fair, in the 
sense of affordable, to the MFI, some rate at which he can at least break even. This account 
instead looks at what is fair from the borrower’s point of view by considering what 
conditions would not exploit her through taking advantage of her low degree of global 
autonomy. This is not the rate that she might like (we would all like to borrow as cheaply as 
possible), but the rate that does not take advantage of her vulnerability: which will roughly 
equate to the formal level of interest rates in her economy. 
Identifying a rate that would not be wrongfully exploitative does not, of course, mean that 
many – or any – MFIs can provide it. We return to the point that, if the transaction is in the 
best interest of the borrower even at the higher non-formal rates, then wrongful exploitation 
can still be the right thing, overall, to do. Is, though, the rate of interest charged the only 
instance of prima facie wrongful exploitation in the practices of microcredit? 
 
V  Other Forms of Exploitation in the Practices of Microcredit 
This chapter has focused on whether, and to what extent, the interest rate charged by MFIs to 
their borrowers is exploitative or not. It has been argued that it is the borrower’s low level of 
global autonomy that makes her vulnerable to MFIs through her lack of choice of other 
means of making a living and lack of access to the better, lower, rates of the formal sector. 
The rate charged would not be exploitative if it did not take advantage of these vulnerabilities 
– if it were in this case, in line with the rates in the formal sector in the borrower’s country. 
Whilst the interest rate has been the main point at issue in the discussion of exploitation in the 
literature, it is worth also briefly reviewing whether there are not also other terms and 
conditions attaching to the loan that taking advantage of the borrowers’ vulnerability: that 
would not be applied if the borrower had access to the formal sector. 
There are two principal such terms and conditions, explored in greater depth in later chapters, 
but notable as being (at the least) prima facie wrongfully exploitative here. 
The first is the imposition of group liability on borrowers. This is the condition that loans are 
extended to borrowers in groups, and that if one in the group defaults on an interest payment 
or the capital, others in the group must make good the payment for her. Such a condition 
would be regarded as outrageous in the developed world, or for that matter in the formal 
sector of developing countries. In Chapter 5 we shall see that the practice of group liability 
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goes beyond mere wrongful exploitation and can be seen to lead to coercion. But it is still 
worth noting that its imposition is wrongfully exploitative. Surveys of borrowers’ attitudes84 
suggest that whilst they sometimes see merit in group lending, loans being extended to 
groups in villages who may provide support to each other, none have shown support for 
group liability, the guaranteeing of each others’ loans. This is resented, but accepted as the 
only way to achieve access to the loan. 
The imposition of group liability exploits, then, because the MFI takes advantage of the 
borrower’s vulnerability, her need for credit and lack of alternatives in terms of either price or 
terms and conditions, to impose this unwanted condition, the benefit to the MFI being of 
course the greater security of repayment it now has. 
A similar argument applies to enforced ‘compulsory savings’, discussed earlier, the use of 
which makes the interest rate very much less than transparent and leads to the borrower 
paying a very much higher rate of interest than she may be aware of. Again, the borrower has 
no choice but to accept this condition as a term of her loan, and her need for credit means she 
accepts it: but it exploits her. She is vulnerable to the MFI because of her need for credit and 
lack of choice; she is especially vulnerable to being charged more than she anticipates 
because the effects on the effective interest rate paid of compulsory savings are not spelt out 
to her and working them out without some financial literacy training and a calculator is far 
from easy, the benefit to the MFI of course being a higher effective interest rate achieved on 
the loan than the declared ‘flat’ rate. Neither group liability, nor compulsory savings are of 
course practiced in the formal sector. 
 
VI. Is Anyone Else Exploited/Does Anyone Else Exploit? 
As well as focusing on the interest rate charged by the microfinance institution to the 
borrower, this chapter has also focused solely on that MFI – borrower relationship. That is 
the primary relationship in which wrongful exploitation in the practice of microfinance can 
occur: but it is also necessary to give a wider context to this relationship, for there are two 
other sources of potential exploitation within the microfinance industry. One is whether MFIs 
exploit anyone else other than their borrowers in the practice of microfinance; the other is 
                                                          
84 See, e.g. Malcolm Harper ‘What’s Wrong with Groups?’ in eds. Thomas Dichter and Malcolm Harper What’s 
Wrong with Microfinance? (2007) Rugby: Practical Action Publishing  pp. 35-49 
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whether there are others, as well as the MFIs themselves, complicit in the exploitation of 
borrowers by the MFIs. 
 
(a) Possible Exploitation of parties other than borrowers 
One of the oft repeated claims of MFIs is that their clients use, or intend to use, the profits 
from their enterprises to send their children to school. There is no need to doubt the honest 
intent of that: but, as shall be seen throughout this thesis, the impact of microfinance can be 
very different from its practitioners’ intent. In particular circumstances, it turns out that 
microfinance can lead to an increase in children being taken out of school, either to work in 
the microenterprise, or to substitute for the domestic labour of the female microentrepeneur. 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) regards child labour as ‘simply the single most 
important source of child exploitation in the world today.’85 It reduces the child’s current 
welfare and, through loss of schooling, future welfare. According to estimates by the ILO, 
there were 215m child labourers in 2008,86 with the highest child labour force participation 
rates being in sub-Saharan Africa, even in countries where it is technically illegal.87 The aim 
here is to examine the marginal impact of microfinance on the attendance of borrowers’ 
children at school: it is not suggested that microfinance is a major cause of child labour itself. 
In countries where those under 14 are around half the total population (typically, where the 
adult population has been badly reduced by AIDs), child labour will inevitably be higher. 
A number of impact studies have been conducted attempting to measure the effect of 
microfinance on schooling rates and child labour amongst borrowers’ children. The strengths 
and weaknesses of such impact studies are discussed in Chapter 8. We can note here, 
however, that they are divided somewhat evenly between those that observed reduction in 
child labour, and those that found an increase. 
According to the ILO, children are frequently taken out of school in order to boost family 
income when the family meets with an unexpected negative income shock, such as the male 
                                                          
85 ‘Child Labour: Targeting the Intolerable’, 86th Session, International Labour Conference, Geneva: 
International Labour Office 1998 
86 ‘Accelerating Action Against Child Labour, Global Report under the follow-up to the ILOP Declaration on 
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work’ (2010) ILO, Geneva. 
87 For example, in 2005 in Malawi, where laws prohibit child labour under the age of 14,  there were 3.2m 
children working (Malawi Ministry of Economic Planning and Development) out of a total population of 13.5m, 
6.1m of whom were aged 14 and under (US Census Bureau, International Database) 
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head of household becoming unemployed; ‘child labour is used as a buffer against economic 
shocks.’88 As the authors point out, however, unfortunately once a child is taken out of school 
and integrated into the labour market, they tend to stay there; transition back to school is 
difficult. 
Microcredit can be an aid to solving this problem if a short term loan can cover the 
immediate shock without the child having to be taken out of school and a return can be made 
with the capital. It adds to the problem where the enterprise undertaken is a labour intensive 
one which is only just profitable, certainly not profitable enough to cover the cost of another 
full time employee: here, it may make most economic sense for the family to employ the 
child at no cost to increase productivity and thus profit. Further, if it is the microentrepeneur 
who is temporarily unable to work, the need to keep up the discipline of making the weekly 
repayment of interest may make taking the child out of school to keep the enterprise going 
the obvious first solution. 
In some situations, microcredit leading to an increase in child labour is fairly predictable. 
Hazarika and Sarangi89 found that access to credit raised borrowers’ children’s’ propensity to 
work in rural Malawi during the peak harvest season. Essentially, in a country heavily 
dominated by subsidence farming, if a woman takes out a loan to run an enterprise, for much 
of the year she will juggle that and completing the household domestic work to keep the 
household going: but at harvest time she cannot do all three – help bring in the harvest (which 
will be the urgent priority), run the household and run the enterprise (where the weekly 
repayments will also demand priority). Children are then taken out of school to fulfil one of 
these functions in her place, usually that of domestic household work. 
It can of course be argued here that it is the parents who exploit their children here, rather 
than the MFI. And indeed it is the parents who are taking advantage of their children’s 
vulnerability to them and lack of autonomous power over the use of their own time. It is not, 
after all, as if the MFI is making the loan to the children. All this is true, but yet the role of 
the MFI in child labour is clear here, even if it is not technically the exploiter. It is the MFI’s 
demand for consistent loan repayment when a family either endures a negative income shock, 
or needs to temporarily cease the micro activity whilst the harvest is brought in, that adds an 
                                                          
88 Jonas Blume and Julika Bieyer ‘Microfinance and Child Labour’, (2011) Employment Working Paper no 89, 
ILO. 
89 Gautam Hazarika and Sudipta Sarangi, ‘Household Access to Microcredit and Child Work in Rural Malawi’ 
(2008) World Development vol. 36 issue 5 pp. 843-859.  
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extra incentive to take the borrower’s child out of school to act as economic buffer. It is not 
argued here that the net impact of microcredit overall on borrowers’ children’s’ school 
attendance is negative – that is not clear – but that, in the particular circumstances of negative 
economic shocks and harvest season in rural, subsistence farming economies, the impact of 
microcredit can predictably be to exacerbate an existing tendency for households to use child 
labour to solve the problem. 
Whilst the MFI is not the exploiter here, it is complicit in the exploitation by the parents 
where it has been on the ground long enough to understand this mechanism, and makes the 
loans anyway. Loan officers are incentivised to have clients keep rolling over their loans, 
because that way the MFI derives the maximum number of interest payments from the 
borrower. If the MFI keeps pushing a client to roll over her loan during the harvest season 
when it knows that doing so increases the propensity of the borrower to take a child out of 
school to labour to support the repayment, then the MFI is at least somewhat complicit in the 
child’s exploitation. 
The MFI also, of course, has the most power to prevent that exploitation occurring. Allowing 
deferral of interest payments on a loan for a grace period whilst a client recovers from an 
economic shock,90 or allowing the borrower to ‘rest’ – not take out a loan – during harvest 
season in rural, subsistence economies, without penalising her by lending a smaller amount or 
at a higher rate when she returns, would be steps MFIs could take to minimise the risk of 
credit pressurising parents into using their children as labour. Most straightforwardly, of 
course, they could decline to extend loans to borrowers who use child labour to conduct their 
enterprises with, or to let it be known that loans will not be renewed to those who decide to 
use child labour. Such a lending policy is very rare, however. 
 
(b) Possible Exploitation of borrowers by parties other than the MFI 
MFIs need to raise capital – be it donations, equity or loan capital – from somewhere, and 
care needs to be taken by those who provide it to examine whether they are themselves 
complicit in wrongful exploitation. 
                                                          
90 As, in fairness, some MFIs do, notably Grameen Bank 
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The origin of financing for modern microfinance institutions was the type of funding 
classically available to NGOs – government subsidy, aid agencies, large foundations such as 
the Ford Foundation. The original funders of the expansion of Grameen Bank, for example, 
were the Ford Foundation, the UN International Fund for Agricultural Development and the 
governments of Bangladesh, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden.91 The aim may have been 
for the NGO to ultimately become self-supporting and not require further subsidy, but there 
was originally, in what has been called the ‘Bangladesh model’, little pressure for a return on 
the donors’ capital as such. 
This changed as microfinance became commercialized in the 90s and 00s. In the 1980s 
microfinance had become one of the international development community’s programmes of 
choice in tackling poverty. It was seen as a considerable improvement as a way of achieving 
financial inclusion for the poor, certainly compared to what were seen as failure of 
government rural credit assistance schemes to reach low-income households. Most providers 
were not-for-profit and subsidized, and used a model similar to that of Grameen Bank. But 
the Grameen Bank model was not obviously sustainable. It had been promoted on the basis of 
its viability – with high repayment rates and low costs – but in the 1990s it transpired that 
repayments were being overstated and that it needed subsidies. Morduch noted: ‘Grameen’s 
repayment rates have never been as good as they claimed (but) because Grameen has been so 
well-known, nobody has wanted to risk undermining the reputation of the idea.’92    
If this was true for Grameen, then it was true for most, for Grameen had much larger scale, 
density of population and lower unit costs relative to most providers. Although Grameen 
aimed to be sustainable in the long term, many microfinance NGOs in the 80s did not: they 
believed a constant subsidy drip was justified as the price of keeping the interest rates that 
they charged down. 
In the 90s, the attitude of donors to constantly providing subsidies changed. The development 
community moved toward the view that whilst microfinance might be better than corrupt 
government agricultural subsidy, development subsidy to microfinance should not itself be 
indefinite. MFIs should aim, firstly, for breakeven (‘sustainability’), and in due course 
straight commercial profitability began to be seen as acceptable. The goal was now large-
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scale outreach without the need for subsidization and if high salaries and bonuses were 
necessary to achieve that goal, that was acceptable. Some observers believed that this shift 
was disastrous. Bateman, for example,93 argues that unethical profiteering, greed, 
irresponsible risk-taking, peculation and microfinance bubbles followed: that microfinance 
ceased to be about poverty reduction. 
As microfinance moved in to the twenty-first century, commercial funding became available 
to microfinance: Leleux and Constantiou suggest some $30bn of it.94 Microfinance’s lack of 
correlation to other forms of investment and apparently safe returns made it an attractive 
portfolio diversification for investors. Capital flooded in from philanthropists, the 
international development community, private equity and venture capitalists. High points 
were reached with the stock market flotation of the most successful MFIs, notoriously 
Compartamos in 2007, whose prospectus demonstrated to the world that it was charging poor 
women borrowers rates sometimes in excess of 100%.  
The question now becomes whether those investing in microfinance institutions with the aim 
of making a profit – or at least the ‘double bottom line’ of a socially responsible investment 
policy (of poverty reduction through microfinance) and a small profit – are complicit in any 
wrongful exploitation by MFIs that they invest in. This is the position of those such as Blue 
Orchard, Deutsche Bank, Citibank or Triple Jump, who run for-profit funds in this area, when 
they demand a return on their equity or loan investments in microfinance institutions.  It 
would seem that the funds that channel capital to the MFIs to lend on to the poor cannot 
evade the charge of sharing in the wrongful exploitation of the poor if part of the MFI’s 
motivation for charging high rates is to earn enough to pay interest on its loan from such a 
fund, or a dividend to an equity investor.  As we have seen, there are limits on how efficient 
the making of tiny loans can be. Once an MFI is as efficient as it can be, barring 
technological developments, pressure for profitability means pressure to maximize the 
interest rate charged. 
In examining wrongful exploitation in the practices of microcredit, then, those who need to 
examine carefully whether it is, even if prima facie wrongful exploitation, the right thing to 
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do anyway are not just the immediate providers, the MFIs, but those who make their activity 





Chapter 4: The Concept of Coercion 
I have argued that microfinance is prima facie exploitative, though possibly the best thing to 
do anyway, depending on whether it actually meets is claims to sustainably raise women 
from poverty. But could the offer and practices of microfinance go beyond exploitation, and 
be coercive? This chapter aims to set out what we mean by coercion; the next chapter applies 
this definition to the offer and practices of microfinance. 
There are two main strands of thinking on how we define coercion: moralised accounts and 
empirical accounts. Moralised accounts, of which the principle one is Alan Wertheimer’s,95 
hold that the truth conditions of coercion claims rest on prior moral claims. We determine if 
Q has been coerced by P into doing act A by determining if P had a right to make his 
proposal to Q, and whether Q had any obligation to resist it. Empirical accounts of coercion – 
starting with Nozick’s seminal ‘Coercion’ article96 and developed by Frankfurt, Gorr, 
Feinberg and more recently Zimmerman and Anderson, hold that the truth conditions of 
coercion claims are empirical. If various conditions are met by P’s proposal to Q, then it 
simply is coercive, although further questions then arise as to what coerced acts are then 
acceptable in a society.  
Most empirical accounts of coercion are what Anderson calls ‘pressure’ accounts, which 
identify coercion with the way one agent can put pressure on the will of another agent by 
means of threats. The account I shall give will be an empirical account that does not deny the 
importance of the pressure that the agent feels, but requires an explicit identification of where 
force comes in to play as well: and that is in the forcing by the coercer of a limited number of 
options (classically, two) on the coercee, from which he must choose. The crux of coercion is 
thus the coercer impinging on the coercee’s autonomy by establishing the set of options from 
which the coercee must choose, and preventing him from rejecting the entire set, rather than 
on the unattractiveness or otherwise of those options, as is more typical in pressure accounts.  
This chapter, then, will proceed by looking first at Wertheimer’s moralised account of 
coercion, and why empirical accounts are to be preferred; consider the major empirical 
accounts, and offer my interpretation of those; before in the following chapter applying this 
account to both the offer and practices of microfinance to examine if either or both should 
count as coercive and what should follow from that if so. 
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I. Wertheimer’s account of coercion 
Wertheimer offers a ‘two-pronged’ account of what proposals are coercive. A proposal is 
coercive if: 
(1) the proposal, if carried out, makes the recipient worse off that she had a right to be; 
and  
(2) the recipient must be ‘entitled to succumb’ to the proposal.97   
If the proposer has a right to make his proposal to the recipient, even if it is a threatening 
proposal, then it is not coercive: it is his right to make it, and the recipient’s right to agree to 
it, that distinguishes coercion from other mere threats. ‘If A has a right to make the proposal, 
he does not coerce B, even if the proposal puts B under great psychic pressure and even if B 
has no reasonable alternative but to agree.’98  
Threats can coerce but offers never do. ‘A makes a threat when B will be worse off in 
relation to some relevant baseline if B does not accept A’s proposal, but…A makes an offer 
when B will be better off in relation to some relevant baseline position if B accepts A’s 
proposal.’99  
The key then is to determine B’s baseline. This could be done empirically, or by using a 
moral test, and Wertheimer opts for the latter (hence, his account is a moralised one.) 
Comparing the classic gunman situation (‘your money or your life’) and an unemployed B 
choosing between a wonderful job and a merely good one, Wertheimer notes: ‘Because the 
gunman A has no right to make his proposal, he proposes to make B worse off than B would 
be in the relevant baseline position, that is, B’s situation prior to A’s proposal. On the other 
hand, because employer A has a right to propose to give B a salary only if B agrees to work 
for A, A proposes to make B better off than B would be in the relevant baseline position, that 
is, where B is unemployed.’ 
The second prong of Wertheimer’s account is that B must be entitled to succumb to A’s 
proposal. If A makes a threatening proposal to B that fulfils the criteria above, but offers a 
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relatively trivial penalty unless B does a drastic act – for example A threatens to break B’s 
arm unless B kills C – then if B does kill C, he was not coerced, ‘because B should refuse to 
kill C, even at the risk of having his arm broken.’ So a coercion claim requires two principles: 
(i) moral principles which allow us to set B’s baseline so as to establish if A’s proposal is 
coercive, and (ii) moral principles which will enable us to determine when B is entitled to 
succumb to A’s coercive proposal.’100  
Both prongs of Wertheimer’s moralised account are open to objection. With regard to the 
first prong, the essence of coercion does not seem to be expressed by whether or not A has a 
right to threaten B, but by the fact that he is threatening him in the first place. Certainly, not 
all threats coerce: but what distinguishes coercion from ordinary threatening may be better 
found in further, empirical, facts, than in what rights A and B possess. Wertheimer’s view 
commits him to finding a criminal gang’s proposal to take away your car unless you pay over 
large sums of money coercive, but not the police impounding your car until you pay your 
road tax. Structurally, these are the same, with the latter simply being coercion which we 
regard as justified. Most of us are happy to think that we should pay our taxes, that taxes are 
justified, and yet allow that the collection of taxes is coercive (because we’re threatened with 
jail if we don’t pay them.) Presumably a moralised account of coercion has to say that the 
state is not coercive, as, for example, Edmundson does in ‘Three Fallacies’. But it seems 
more realistic to acknowledge that of course that state, and the law, is coercive: perhaps 
paradigmatically. Nor does it just have to be the state that can exercise justified coercion. We 
might consider a parent preventing a child running across a road without waiting for the 
lights to change by issuing threats of the absence of tea, etc., as coercive, but justified: or a 
Clint Eastwood gunslinger who, happening upon the highwayman holding up a stage coach, 
demands he drop his weapon on penalty of death, as also being coercive, but not acting 
wrongfully as a moralised account would seem to require101.  
With regard to the second prong of Wertheimer’s account, it seems extraordinary to say that 
B is not coerced by A when A threatens to break his arm unless he kills C. Rather, he surely 
was coerced, but the coercion was not sufficient to relieve him of all his moral responsibility 
for his act, and not sufficient to justify murder. Coercion may relieve an agent of some, 
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sometimes all, responsibility for his act: but how much depends on the moral balance of the 
choice he had to make. A coerced choice remains voluntary: this apparent paradox will be 
developed below in the account I offer. But note for now that what is not voluntary in the 
highwayman case is not the choice of your money or your life, but being involuntarily forced 
to choose between those two options (and no others) at all. 
As Arnold puts it:102 ‘To analyse coercion primarily in terms of rights and obligations (or 
other moral considerations such as utility maximization) does not adequately highlight the 
fact that coercion constrains individual freedom and undermines individual autonomy. For 
these reasons it is necessary to provide an empirical rather than a moralised account of 
coercion.’ 
Let us move on, then, to the empirical accounts of coercion. 
 
II. An Empirical Account of Coercion 
Empirical accounts of coercion, then, hold that we can determine if an act is coerced or not 
by looking at non-normative criteria. (Of course, normative criteria will re-enter the picture 
when we then decide, as a society, what coerced acts we want to allow. No society exists 
without any legal acts of coercion.) Nozick’s account in his 1969 article ‘Coercion’103  set a 
framework within which subsequent empirical accounts have responded or adapted. To 
summarise his conclusions, P coerces Q into not doing act A if and only if: 
 
1. P threatens to do something unpleasant to Q’s interests if Q does A, and Q knows that 
this is a threat; 
2. The threatened consequences make act A less attractive to Q; 
3. P intends that Q not do A; 
4. Q does not do A; 
5. Part (at least) of Q’s reason for not doing A is to avoid the consequences of P’s threat; 
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6. Q does in fact know and understand P’s threat (i.e. he does not mistake it for a 
‘friendly warning’). 
Note that this is a wholly empirical account. The facts about the structure of the proposal P 
makes Q determine if it is coercive or not. Moral questions may well still arise over the 
justification or otherwise of the coercion) and over the severity of the coercive threat, 
whether it was sufficient to absolve Q from some or all of his responsibility for his act. But 
the concept of whose rights are at stake is not raised in this account. By the time Nozick 
writes Anarchy, State and Utopia104, this has changed, and a moralised account is given: 
there, when an agent has a choice between working or starving, his choice is only coerced if 
all the other individuals who have taken better jobs prior to this agent, did not act within their 
rights in doing so. If they all did act within their rights, then this agent’s choice was not 
coerced. This is open to the same objections as the moralised theories above: it is not that this 
may or may not be a correct description of whether the starving agent’s act is coerced or not, 
but rather that if it is, it is for coincident reasons. It is not the rights of others whom we may 
not even be able to track that determine if this agent is coerced or not, but facts about the 
limits on his freedom and autonomy. 
But the 1969 ‘Coercion’ article is not moralised. When P moves Q from a ‘preproposal 
situation’, before the threat is made, to the proposal situation, to which Q must respond, it is 
only coercion if the above six conditions are met and Q’s pre-proposal situation was either 
the ‘normally expected’ or ‘morally required’ course of events. As Zimmerman points out,105 
this multiple baseline account is ultimately non-moralised, because when the ‘normally 
expected’ and ‘morally required’ baselines are different, Q’s own preferences resolve the tie. 
Thus whether Q’s compliance with P’s proposal is coerced or not comes down to which state 
he, Q, would rather be in (pre-proposal or proposal), which can be determined non-
normatively: the need for ‘morally required’ evaporates. 
Most accounts of coercion acknowledge the influence of Nozick’s structuring of the concept 
of coercion. One recent account, however, Scott Anderson’s,106 criticises modern accounts – 
especially Wertheimer’s, but starting with Nozick – for placing too much emphasis on the 
psychological state of the coercee, to the extent that he suggests the existence of the coercer 
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almost drops out of the picture. He suggests that Nozick ends up treating the power implied 
by the coercer’s threat – the basis of its credibility – as a kind of unanalysed given. 
For Anderson, Nozick’s account places too much reliance on whether the coercee finds the 
coercer’s threat is credible or not, and that this obscures the broader power relations between 
coercer and coercee. This leads Anderson to distinguish two ‘significantly different ways of 
theorizing about coercion.’107 
The first way is what he calls the ‘enforcement approach’, which ‘focuses on the ability of 
the coercer to inhibit actions by the coercee through techniques such as force, violence, and 
like powers, or threats based on such powers.’ The other approach, the ‘pressure approach’, 
‘restricts coercion to cases where coercion manipulates the will of the coercee, though widens 
it to include any threat that puts pressure on the coercee’s will and alters the coercee’s 
intentional choice of action.’ 
It is true that in emphasizing what it is like to feel coerced, pressure accounts can have 
difficulty distinguishing what causes that feeling, which can be subjective to the coercee, and 
being coerced, of which the attempt is to give an objective empirical account. But it may be 
that Anderson goes too far in merging a coercion account into one of brute, physical force. 
The importance of the coercer in setting the conditions of coercion is indeed not to be 
underestimated: but a Nozick-esque account can perhaps be stated that gives that its proper 
emphasis, without having to lose important distinctions between compulsion and coercion. 
The latter two concepts are on slightly different parts of the spectrum of ways in which one 
agent can influence the acts of another: compulsion obliterates autonomy, coercion severely 
restricts the realm of autonomous choice to the coercer’s choice set. The distinction seems 
worth preserving. 
Nozick, for example, is right to deny that all infliction of violence constitutes coercion: 
rather, it is the future threat of it that does so. ‘If a drunken group comes upon a stranger and 
beats him up or even kills him, this need not be coercion. For there need have been no 
implicit threat of further violence if the person doesn’t comply with their wishes, and it would 
indeed be difficult for this to be the case if they just came upon him and killed him.’108  
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Arnold109 distinguishes three types of activity that different accounts of coercion have 
sometimes included under that name: 
1. Physical compulsion – brute force: manacling, kidnapping, imprisoning – these 
activities are what are, for Anderson, paradigmatically coercive; 
2. Psychological compulsion – where the psychological state induced in the victim by 
the proposal is so extreme, he becomes incapable of rational choice at all, but wholly 
identifies with a desire to do what the coercer asks of him: e.g. the overwhelming fear of the 
knife at the neck, of being pushed from a building, Winston’s fear of rats in his face in Room 
101. 
3. Rational compulsion – where, you deliberate the highwayman’s proposal and decide, 
after more or less reflection, to prefer your life to your money. 
Of course on some occasions these different types of coercion can run together. But it is 
worth distinguishing rational compulsion as what we mean by coercion, distinguishing it by 
the fact that whilst autonomy is impaired by the coercer, some autonomy, enough to make a 
critical choice, is left with the agent: and that is important when it comes to ascribing any 
quantity of moral responsibility to the agent for his act. 
The account of coercion that I wish to present focuses on the third category above, rational 
compulsion, and would not count either of the first two as coercion, but as different forms of 
pure compulsion. 
Force and coercion need to be distinguished from each other, for as Hayek notes, when one is 
coerced, one still acts. ‘It is not that the coerced does not choose at all; if that were the case, 
we would not speak of his ‘acting’…Although coerced, it is still I who decide which is the 
least evil in the circumstances.’110 Compulsion offers the victim no choice at all. If I stop you 
from jumping in front of a train, I have forced you, not coerced you. Under force you have no 
alternatives to what those forcing you want: under coercion, you have alternatives, but the 
range of these has been fixed by the coercer. 
Compulsion, then, removes autonomy altogether: one does not act at all, but is acted upon. 
Coercion infringes autonomy by presenting a forced choice amongst options the coercer has 
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limited: but some autonomy remains to the victim of coercion that his choice between options 
is still a choice. With exploitation, as we have seen, it is a vulnerability that stems from a low 
degree of autonomy that the exploiter takes advantage of: in coercion, the coercer first 
impairs the autonomy by limiting choice to his chosen set of alternatives for the coercee to 
choose amongst; and then hopes to exploit the coercee’s choice. 
 
III.  This Account of Coercion 
At the centre of coercion is the constrained choice: an agent is obliged to make a decision 
from a set of alternatives that he has not chosen voluntarily. His autonomy has been limited 
by the setting of two or more alternatives on him by another agent, but he does still retain 
enough autonomy to then make a voluntary choice between those imposed options. The 
coerced act is both free and unfree: the decision whether to choose your money or your life is 
made freely and autonomously; the setting of an agent’s options to being only his money or 
his life (not: both) is wholly involuntary. At the heart of coercion is what happens to an 
agent’s freedom and autonomy. It is impaired through the limitation of choice to the coercer’s 
set of options, but the choice between that set of options remains to be made. 
If we accept this account of a coerced act as a forcibly constrained choice, we can see why in 
fact we do not absolve agents wholly from legal or moral responsibility for coerced acts. An 
act being coerced mitigates against an agent being responsible for it: it may mitigate entirely, 
but not necessarily, depending on the scale of the threat and the penalty offered, what the 
agent had to choose between. 
The empirical account of coercion that I am putting forward is in the Nozick tradition, but 
emphasises the importance of the constrained choice that the coercee makes. The emphasis is 
less on the unattractiveness of the options that P presents to Q, but on the fact that P has 
forced this, and only this, set of options on to Q. 
The account can be put in Nozickean terms as follows: - 
P coerces Q where 
1. P imposes on Q a choice of a or b (or a – n) and makes the pre ante status quo 
impossible: in particular, Q can no longer have a and b.  
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2. Each of the options made in the proposal to Q is significantly less attractive than his 
pre-proposal position. 
3.  P intends that Q choose one of the options he offers.  
4. Q accepts one of the choices. 
5. Q would not have chosen the course of action he does if he had not been obliged by P 
to make a choice between these particular options. 
In (3), there is a case for saying, as Nozick does,  that P intend that Q choose his, P’s 
preferred option for Q: the highwayman wants Q’s money, he is not imagined to be 
indifferent between being made rich by Q or killing him – he wants to be made rich. But 
whilst it would seem natural to say this, it would mean saying that if Q chooses P’s non-
preferred option, then he is not coerced. And that would be odd. The tortured rebellion leader 
who chooses a slow, painful death over revealing the secrets of his revolutionary friends’ 
whereabouts has still been coerced. He is coerced by being forced to make the choice 
between painful death or betrayal, not by what he chooses. 
Some will say that the rebel leader was subjected to coercive pressure, but since he did not 
choose the torturer’s option, he was not ultimately coerced. I do accept that coercion is a 
‘success’ word; the question is whether to measure success by P’s obtaining the choice of Q’s 
that he preferred, or whether to measure it by Q having to make one of the limited set of 
choices imposed on him (so failure here would be the rebel leader escaping and neither dying 
nor betraying his colleagues.)  
If I hold that rebel leader is coerced here, even when he chooses death, then I will need to 
differentiate this type of case from seemingly trivial ones where P does impose a choice on 
Q, but a silly one. Imagine P threatens Q: ‘Give me a million pounds or I’ll cry ‘Boo!’’ to 
which Q replies, ‘Well, cry ‘Boo!’ then!’ Q has taken one of the alternatives offered to him, 
which would suggest that I would have to say that he is coerced here. The reason I need not 
hold that Q is coerced here is by appealing to clause (2) above. This requires that each and 
every of the options that P forces Q to choose amongst puts Q in a significantly worse 
position than he was pre-proposal. P crying ‘Boo!’ is not less significantly attractive than Q’s 
pre-proposal situation of before P came along and annoyed him, because Q may be assumed 
to be pretty indifferent as to whether P goes around crying ‘Boo!’ or not. (If Q suffers from 
some sort of extraordinary Boo-phobia, perhaps this would be different.) To put it generally, 
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trivial threats do not coerce because the trivial threat option does not significantly worsen the 
potential coercee from pre-proposal to proposal situation.  
A different type of modestly threatening proposal that needs distinguishing from coercion is 
the simple one of such everyday practices as a shopkeeper raising his prices. The shopkeeper 
does indeed say ‘An increased price must be paid or you can’t buy from me’, but he can do 
nothing to stop the purchaser just rejecting his set of options and walking out of his shop. He 
does not coerce because whilst he offers the purchaser a limited set of options, he cannot 
prevent the purchaser from just rejecting the whole set. As O’Neill puts it, what marks out 
coercion is that there is no ‘no deal’ option available to the coercee. He has to take one of the 
alternatives. ‘The mark of coercion is the unrefusable ‘offer’, not the unrefusable ‘option’.111  
The focus in this account of coercion, then, moves from the nastiness or otherwise of the 
options offered, to the enforcing of a constrained choice on an agent. Is imposing a 
constrained choice on someone prima facie wrong? Both Kantians and utilitarians will think 
so. As Zimmerman notes, for the utilitarian desire frustration per se is prima facie wrong, ‘so 
it is prima facie wrong for P to change Q’s situation in a way that makes it impossible for him 
to satisfy his desire to remain in the preproposal situation. The Kantian response is not so 
much that desire frustration per se makes coercion wrong, but ‘rather the failure to 
acknowledge the victim’s full status as a rational being…when one human being coerces 
another there is an aspect of the other’s rationality which he fails to acknowledge, namely the 
other’s capacity to set his own ends and to consider reasons for actions which go beyond the 
most immediate sanctions imposed in the threat situation. Instead, one who coerces uses the 
victim’s preference structure as a mere means for the attainment of his own ends.’112  
The account given here, which allows for plurality of values but certainly puts autonomy high 
amongst them, would then find coercion prima facie wrongful as it always constrains an 
agent’s autonomy, but does not use the term in its moralised sense, as it is held quite possible 
that coercion can be justified (as with some state coercion) and thus coercion is not wrongful 
by definition. We need next then to look at the extent to which coercion is in fact practiced in 
microfinance, and whether those who use it within the microfinance industry are ever 
justified in doing so. 
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Chapter 5: Coercion in the Practice of Microcredit 
Coercion could arise in the field of microcredit in two ways. The very offer of microcredit 
itself might be claimed to be coercive: and the practices used in the exercise of microcredit 
could involve coercion. Let us look at these in turn. 
I.  The offer of microfinance 
The whole idea of there possibly being coercive offers may seem paradoxical, since an offer 
increases choice and if a genuine offer (rather than a concealed threat) can be refused. The 
standard example of an alleged coercive offer is Wertheimer’s, of the lecherous millionaire. 
B’s child will die unless her child receives expensive surgery that she cannot afford: A 
proposes to pay for it if, but only if, B will sleep with him.113 The millionaire’s proposal is 
clearly an offer: is it coercive? From B’s point of view, the offer is just as coercive as the 
gunman’s threat ‘your money or your life’: it is ‘sleep with me or your child dies.’ There is a 
similar example in Nozick114 where a boatman come upon a drowning man and offers to 
rescue him from certain death if paid $10,000 upon reaching shore. 
Zimmerman’s115 response to this is to label the lecherous millionaire not a coercer, but an 
exploiter. For him to coerce B, he must have deliberately created the situation in which B is 
helpless. He uses his island example to illustrate this: here, A kidnaps Q and brings Q to A’s 
island, where A’s factory is. A then offers Q work, which is Q’s only alternative to starvation. 
Zimmerman regards this as a coercive offer. But if B, who also has a factory on the island, 
offers Q work first, even though Q’s choice is still work or starve, then this offer is not 
coercive, because B did not bring about Q’s predicament: he simply exploits it. The accounts 
I have given on coercion and exploitation would also treat B and the lecherous millionaire as 
exploiters rather than coercers. The crucial point is that neither has done anything to bring the 
situation about: they happen upon it, and take advantage. Of course, on Zimmerman island, if 
A then goes on holiday and Q begins to build a boat with which to escape, and B then 
smashes it up to ensure Q carries on working for him, then B would move from being an 
exploiter to a coercer, because it is now he who is enforcing the limited set of options on Q. 
There is a sense though in which the lecherous millionaire and the boatman’s offer to the 
drowning man do seem like coercion, and that is because they share an unusual feature. In 
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regular coercion, the coercer sets about limiting the coercee’s choices to the alternatives he, 
the coercer, sets. In each of these particular cases, before the intervention of the 
coercer/exploiter, the victim has no choices at all – the child will die, Nozick’s swimmer will 
drown. The exploiter/coercer then comes along and, assessing the situation, creates a limited 
set choice with the pre-existing disaster situation as one of his limited set choices. He, as it 
were, takes over the pre-existing situation and shapes it into a constrained choice situation 
which looks just like a classic case of coercion, except that instead of forcing each of the 
alternatives himself, he incorporates the status quo in to his newly offered set. The key 
element I identified in Chapter 5 above in coercion is that the coercee must choose within the 
range offered: he cannot just walk away, the set cannot be refused.  
Where the pre-existing situation that the exploiter/coercer incorporates is the coercee’s death, 
it is hard to argue that he can in any sense walk away from the offer. The classically coerced 
agent has his ability to act severely constrained by the coercer. What distinguishes the cases 
we are considering here is that the agent has virtually no ability to act in the matter critical to 
him before the exploiter/coercer comes along anyway. He really does only have two options 
and although the coercer/exploiter has only brought one, not both, about, he has adopted them 
both as his own set. 
If we think that a potential coercer can, as well as limit the coercee’s options to the 
alternatives he brings about, also take a pre-existing situation  and use it as his own in the 
offered set, then Nozick’s drowning man is indeed coerced. The drowning man cannot reject 
the set of choices ‘promise $10,000 or die’ without fulfilling one of them i.e. drowning. Q on 
P’s island cannot reject the set of choices: ‘work in my factory or starve’: he will starve.  
Even if we allow, however, for the type of coercive offer exemplified by the drowning man 
and the starving kidnap victim on Zimmerman Island to exist, however, the offer of 
microfinance is not going to be such an offer. Certainly the situation of those in receipt of a 
microfinance offer is often desperate enough. But although the alternatives to microfinance 
are grim, they do exist. The offeree can return to subsistence farming. She can go instead to a 
moneylender or loan shark, even if at even more egregiously high rates. It would be rare that 
it really is a case of accept an offer of microfinance or die. When, then, the MFI takes 
advantage of the low degree of autonomy of the borrower to offer microcredit at interest rates 
well above those in the formal sector that the borrower is excluded from, the MFI exploits 
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rather than coerces, because firstly the MFI did nothing to bring about the borrowers’ low 
level of global autonomy; and secondly the borrower can reject the offer. 
Outside of microfinance, though, it may not be entirely impossible to imagine an offer that 
could be called coercive as defined above. Those carrying out clinical trials in developing 
countries in order, for example, to find a cure for AIDS, will come up against a population 
with AIDS for whom participation in the trial may indeed be their only chance of escaping an 
early death. Here the trialist is acting like the demander of $10,000 for rescue from drowning. 
As O’Neill observes, to avoid becoming a coercer, one has to take into account the ‘particular 
vulnerabilities and the actual limits of others’ capacity to choose.’116 Coercers and those 
wishing to avoid becoming one, have to figure out what is really unacceptable to the group 
they propose to interact with, engage with the potential coercee, and ensure the consequences 
of their offer either does or does not touch on that vulnerability according to whether they 
wish to coerce or not. ‘Particularly in dealing with others who are weaker or dependant a lack 
of imagination or restraint may lead would-be no coercers to propose ‘offers’ that, despite 
their benign intentions, are actually unrefusable by those others.’117 
Whilst the offeror of microfinance certainly needs to take that sort of care – after all, we have 
already determined that he is going to be exploiting, and that need not be much better than 
coercing – overall, it would be too strong to claim that the offer of microfinance itself was, 
typically, coercive. But that still leaves the question of some of the practices of microfinance 
within that offer, and I turn to that now. 
 
II. The practice of microfinance  
Many MFIs are joint liability: when a borrower takes a loan, she does so as part of a small 
group, and each borrower commits to repay the loan of any one borrower in her group who 
defaults on her loan. This has its roots in how microfinance groups were first set up by 
BRAC118 and Grameen, with the borrowers’ groups intended to be mutually supportive, 
helping each other out in difficult times: but once the group becomes responsible for 
individual borrowers’ loans, the borrowing group have in one respect effectively become the 
                                                          
116 Op. cit. note 111, p. 187 
117 Op. cit. note 111, p. 187-8 
118 BRAC originally stood for ‘Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee’, but it is now used as a name, 
not an acronym as it has expanded in to urban as well as rural areas, and to other countries than Bangladesh. 
Microfinance is one of its major development tools, but it also offers health and education programmes. 
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MFI’s loan collection officers, and given their own poverty and lack of ability to absorb any 
extra costs themselves, their loan collection practices can be severe. 
Unsurprisingly, the type of practices that can very easily become coercive within 
microfinance revolve around debt collection. These practices are rarely discussed, but do 
emerge when periodic large scale repayment crisis hit. A survey of 130 borrowers in the 
Krishna district of Andhra Pradesh, long regarded as a mecca of microfinance and where 
today five of India’s largest MFIs are headquartered, conducted after the repayment crisis 
there in 2006, found that allegedly coercive collection practices led borrowers to ‘abscond’, 
migrate out of the village, or even commit suicide.119 The principal reasons for flight or even 
suicide given to the survey were: (i) joint liability (ii) compulsory attendance at meetings (iii) 
fines (iv) keeping all members waiting until repayments are made.  
Crisis in Andhra Pradesh re-emerged in 2010,120 where the extension of microcredit had 
exploded from 40 billion rupees to 8 million borrowers in 2007 to 225 billion rupees to 25 
million borrowers in 2010. This expansion was fuelled firstly by a government programme to 
provide cheaper finance to borrowers and secondly by commercial MFI expansion, which in 
its rush led to a loss of credit discipline from lenders and clients talking on multiple loans and 
becoming overindebted. Fresh reports of suicides amongst those unable to service all the debt 
prompted Andhra Pradesh’s chief minister to pass an Ordinance imposing new conditions on 
loan collection (less frequently and from locations near to local government premises) which 
prompted a collapse in loan repayments and threatened the future viability of some MFIs. 
One set of authors and industry practitioners, observing that the 2010 crisis was on a different 
scale from previous crisis, concluded rather comprehensively: ‘The causes were complex and 
involved MFI management’s pressure for growth at all costs, promoters’ and investors’ 
greed, bankers’ folly, clients’ overborrowing, journalists’ frenzy, bureaucrats’ inertia and 
politicians’ irresponsibility.’121  
                                                          
119 Prabhu Ghata ‘Learning from the Andhra Pradesh Crisis’, in Thomas Dichter and Malcolm Harper (eds.) 
What’s Wrong with Microfinance? (2007) Rugby: Practical Action Publishing p. 169. Note thought that whilst 
suicides certainly occurred, there is no concrete evidence that suicides amongst microfinance borrowers were 
any higher than the 14 per 100,000 in the population as a whole. 
120 See Abhijit Bannerjee, Pranab Bardhanm Esther Duflo, Erica Field, Dean Karlan, Asim Khwaja, Dilip 
Mookherjee, Rohini Pande, Raghuram Rajan, ‘Help Microfinance, Don’t Kill It’ (2010) The Indian Express, 
November 26 2010, online at http://www.indianexpress.com/story-print/716105, or ‘Andhra Pradesh 2010: 
Global Implications of the Crisis in Indian Microfinance.’ (2010) CGAP Focus Note 67, Washington, D.C. 
121 Malcolm Harper, Lalitha Iyer, Jane Rosser, Whose Sustainability Counts? BASIX’s Long March from 
Microfinance to Livelihoods (2011) Sterling VA: Kumarian Press p. 37-8  
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There is at least a case, then, for considering whether some of the practices by which 
microfinance is carried out – in particular, the group liability model – are coercive. This latest 
crisis in Indian microfinance prompted one rural practitioner, Ramesh Arunachalam, to begin 
blogging on what clients are reporting to him in Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Kamataka, 
Orissa, and West Bengal. Arunachalam reports the following strategies as being used by 
some (not all) MFIs to achieve loan repayment when clients are struggling: 
Strategy # 1 - Life/Work Obstruction: Field workers, agents, centre leaders and/or group leaders may hinder 
and obstruct the normal life and work of clients and/or their families and thereby, force them to repay, using 
several means (borrowing from money lenders, take over assets etc.) that may not necessarily be in the 
clients’ interest and one which could cause undue hardship to them 
Strategy # 2 – Threats: Collection agents/field workers could threaten the clients that they would resort to 
violence and/or physical abuse if money is not repaid; they may also carry the threat out, if money is not 
forthcoming from clients; 
Strategy # 3 – Verbal Abuse: Field workers/agents may (verbally) insult, abuse and/or intimidate the 
borrowers and their family members and get the repayment 
Strategy # 4 – Following the Client and Pestering: Field workers/agents could continually follow the 
borrowers and their family members from place to place and pester them for repayment and keep on 
embarrassing them, until the money is paid; 
Strategy # 5 – Repossession and Sale of Property: Sometimes, the centre leaders and/or group leaders/other 
members may even take over property owned or used by clients and sell that and take the repayment 
Strategy # 6 – Satyagraha Outside Client’s House/Place of Work: Field workers/collection agents could sit 
outside the house or places of work (like fields/shops) for hours and hours and keep on harassing for 
payment and leave only after they get it 
Strategy # 7 – Embarrassment Strategy: Field workers/collection agents may sometimes even talk to 
business customers and/or guests of the clients and embarrass clients and thereby get them to repay 
Strategy # 8 – Physically Take Over Assets/Documentation as Collateral: The centre leaders, group leaders 
and/or members could forcibly remove assets/documents of the borrower (like ration card etc..) and not 
return it until repayment is made by the client 
Strategy # 9 – Physical Intimidation: Field workers/collection agents may physically intimidate the clients 
and get local toughs to rough them up once or twice, so that repayment is forthcoming thereafter. 122 
Part of what is striking in Arunachalam’s depiction of loan collection practices is that it is not 
just the loan officer of the MFI owed the repayment who is involved. In many cases MFIs are 
hiring third party agents to do their collection for them: although this is just an extension of 
the MFI, it is hardly unheard of for third parties to be less scrupulous than the original lender 
in collecting loans, as they do not have a ‘brand’ to defend in the lending marketplace. 
Alongside the agents, however, are the group members themselves, collecting on behalf of 
                                                          
122 http://microfinance-in-india.blogspot.co.uk/search/label/Coercive%20Repayment  
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the MFI in order to avoid having their own savings confiscated. These instances in Andhra 
Pradesh are not isolated. Extreme coercion was reported back in the late 90s; one of BRAC’s 
own research studies, quoted by Richard Montgomery123 reports a conversation with BRAC 
women in which ‘they told…with pride that they had pulled down a member’s house because 
she did not pay back her housing loan.’124 Montgomery suggests that such violent action may 
not be common, but ‘examples of “forced” acquisition of household utensils, small livestock, 
or other assets of defaulting members were mentioned.’ 
Lamia Karim, an assistant professor of cultural anthropology at the University of Oregon-
Eugene who spent eighteen months studying the microfinance industry in Bangladesh, argues 
that the fusion of the collective responsibility for loan repayments, and the cultural norms of 
kin obligations in Bangladesh ‘are toxically synergistic, and coupled together they work to 
operate within an economy of shame’.125 She adds: ‘In analyzing the reasons why rural men 
allowed their women to become NGO members even though it brought their women in 
contact with non-kin men, one noticed a deep level of complicity between NGOs and rural 
men. Despite rural codes of honor/shame that dictated that women should not come in contact 
with non-kin men (and most NGOs, especially Grameen Bank, have male officers), rural men 
found it useful to allow their women to join NGOs because they (rural men) work during the 
day. Poor men who lack physical collateral ‘give’ their women in membership to NGOs as 
economic reassurance. In reality, the collateral that Grameen women and all other NGOs 
extract from the poor is the Bangladeshi rural woman’s honor and shame. The poor give 
their honor embodied in their women to the NGOs in exchange for loans.’126  
Yet even the issue of shame is complicated – it does not always result in the infliction of 
violence on women by men, though Rahmen records this.127 The husband may also feel 
intense shame if his wife is humiliated in such ways and he is not able to protect her. After 
the 2010 Andhra Pradesh crisis, press reports focused on the reported suicides of women 
borrowers, which were certainly tragic enough, but there were also male suicides. Indeed, a 
                                                          
123  Richard Montgomery ‘Disciplining or Protecting the Poor? Avoiding the Social Costs of Peer Pressure in 
Micro-Credit Schemes’, (1996) Journal of International Development, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 289-305 
124 The report cited was Ken & Stewart, ‘Institution Building and Development in Three Women’s Village 
Organisations: Participation, Ownership and Autonomy.’ Dhaka: BRAC Research and Evaluation Division, 
unpublished paper. 
125 Lamia Karim ‘Demystifying Micro-Credit; The Grameen Bank, NGOs, and Neoliberalism in Bangladesh’, 
(2008) Cultural Dynamics 20 (1): 5-29, p.15 
126 Ibid. p16, emphasis in original 
127 Aminur Rahman Women and Credit in Rural Bangladesh: Anthropological Study of Rhetoric and Practices 
of Grameen Bank Lending (1999)  Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, esp. pp. 120-124 
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recent report finds that whilst a rise in all suicides seems to accompany microfinance growth 
and penetration, this is especially so of male suicides.128    
During her research, Karim observed routine credit related strife amongst members and their 
families. This ranged from scolding, removing a woman’s gold nose-ring (a symbol of 
marital status, symbolically divorcing/widowing her), and taking a woman’s family’s food 
supply, leaving them with none. NGO officers did not participate, but oversaw, and 
threatened to withhold future loans unless the defaulted money was recovered. In the worst 
cases, where the default was large enough that everything already was repossessed, members 
would sell off the defaulting member’s house. This is known as house-breaking (ghar bhanga) and has a 
long history in rural society. It is considered the ultimate shame of dishonour in rural society. In other words, 
serious defaults led to homelessness of the families concerned. In my research area, house-breaking occurred 
several (six to seven) times, whereas smaller forms of public shaming occurred every week. There were 
several instances of suicide committed by men who had been shamed by their inability to protect the honor 
of their families. But those instances were rare, and were often the result of multiple causes, such as flooding 
in low-lying areas. What is important to note though is how the pre-existing coercive norms, of house-
breaking for example, have become institutionalized as part of the NGO technologies of loan recovery.129 
Karim reports that the NGOs also use the apparatus of the state, the police, to have defaulting 
women arrested until a loan is repaid. She met a number of women who had then been 
divorced by their husbands because they had ‘disgraced’ their family by going to jail.130 She 
reports the NGOs as fully aware of the consequences on borrowers of their, or the fellow 
borrowers’, efforts to achieve loan repayment. But the perception is strong amongst MFIs 
that default rates would be higher on individual loans than group loans, and certainly the 
costs of collection would be very much higher for the MFI, since the lending group are 
essentially acting as its loan collection officers, unpaid. 
Lastly, in her tale of Jahanara Begum, Karim describes a practice on the ground of 
microfinance about as far removed from every public image of the practice as it is possible to 
get. Jahanara is a very successful microfinance client. She borrows from multiple MFIs, and 
uses the money to lend on at higher interest rates; she runs a very successful classic 
                                                          
128 Arvind Ashta, Saleh Khan, Philipp Otto ‘Does Microfinance Cause or Reduce Suicides? Policy 
Recommendations for Reducing Borrower Stress (March 3, 2011). Available at SSRN: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1715442 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1715442  
129 Op. cit. note 125, p. 19 
130 David Hulme reported a similar instance in 1997. For a woman to leave home without familial male 
company breaks the rules of purdah, and where she is arrested for failure to repay debt (not that the police are 
entitled to do so on an uncollateralised debt) and held overnight at the police station, she faces divorce on her 
return home.  These issues are rarely reported: the case Hulme reports on came to light only because a police 
vehicle carrying such debtors crashed and all were killed. Quoted in ‘Is Microdebt Good for Poor People?’ 
(2007) in eds. Thomas Dichter and Malcolm Harper What’s Wrong with Microfinance? Rugby: Practical Action 
Publishing, p. 20 
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moneylending business, funded by Grameen and other NGOs. Karim accompanied her as she 
went in pursuit of a fellow Grameen borrower who was behind on her repayments. 
On the way to Kashai Bou’s house, Jahanara proudly told us that she had broken many houses when 
members could not pay. “We know when they cannot pay, so we take a carpenter with us to break the 
house.” I asked Jahanara, “Why do you break the houses of kin?”  
Jahanara became indignant at first. Her comment was “Why should we not? They have breached their trust 
with us. If they cannot pay, then we will have to pay. Why should I pay for them?” Then she became quiet 
and said after a while added, “It is not good to break someone’s house, but we are forced to do it. This is 
how we get loans from Grameen Bank and other NGOs. They put pressure on us to recover the money, then 
we all get together and force the defaulting member to give us money. ” 131 
I have not argued that the offer of microfinance is coercive. But the effect of making group 
liability a condition of that offer would seem to foreseeably create the circumstances where 
coercion is used for loan collection in practice. At the heart of the practices described from 
the field, it is the basic, central plank of microfinance, the group liability model itself, that 
creates the pressure that results in coercive loan practices being used. It is a requirement of a 
borrower taking a loan, that she guarantee the repayment of the others in her lending group as 
well. There is no choice in this: it is a condition of taking out the loan. Her position is already 
one of poverty: when a fellow borrower does get into trouble, then, her ability to cover that 
debt may be limited and she may very well resent the sacrifice it will impose on her. 
Furthermore, it is reasonably standard practice of MFIs that fresh loans are not extended to a 
group when they are due to rollover, until all in the group have repaid. This means that for 
those borrowers for whom the microcredit is the lifeline that keeps them and their business 
going, the MFI threatens to cut that off unless they either cover the repayment of the 
defaulting borrower, or find a way to force her to repay it. Their behaviour, as chronicled 
above, can then indeed become fiercely coercive. This is a far cry from the idea of ‘self-help’ 
that the group lending model is supposed to generate in the microfinance literature. 
Stepping back, then, there are a number of relationships in the practice of microcredit that can 
become coercive. Are any of them instances of justified coercion? 
The coercion of the borrower by the loan officer, his agent, the group itself or the group’s 
leader, where these parties variously harass, threaten and even break the house of the 
borrower, is not justified coercion. The borrower has not given collateral on the loan, she has 
                                                          
131 Lamia Karim Microfinance and Its Discontents: Women in Debt in Bangladesh (2011) Minneapolis, Minn.: 
University of Minnesota Press pp. 110-11 
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not agreed in advance to these sanctions: they are an ugly side of microcredit, and are not 
justified. 
When the MFI coerces the group of borrowers, however, threatening to dip in to their savings 
that it holds to make good the default on an interest payment by one member of the group, it 
is justified in doing so. This is the only sanction that has been consented to in advance, and 
the MFI is entitled to use it. 
In practice, MFIs often prefer not to, at least at first, but rather to threaten to withhold new 
loans to the group unless they ensure the repayment of the defaulting borrower. This is 
preferred because otherwise the MFIs stand to lose the good business of the rest of the group 
going forward. But this is not a sanction that has been agreed to in advance by the group – it 
is not a part of the terms and conditions of their loan that future loans to them are dependent 
on the repayment by others in the group. This form of coercion, then, is not justified. 
There has to be one major caveat to even the one form of coercion that can be seen as 
justified, the MFI withholding the savings of group members to cover the default of one. The 
examples above show that though this coercion may be justified, it can lead to the group 
itself, driven by its own relative desperation, issuing and enforcing cruelly coercive threats to 
the defaulting member, or indeed using straight compulsion to steal her remaining assets in 
compensation for the payments made for her. 
It could be argued that if a woman knows that those are the conditions of the loan, and has 
perhaps heard about the poor experience of others, then she is deemed to have given valid 
consent to the coercive practices that then follow. One can voluntarily give consent to future 
coercion or compulsion and thereby legitimate it, as one would if one consented to, for 
example, being hypnotized as a way of giving up smoking. Perhaps as Mill argued it is not 
possible to sell oneself in to slavery, but the contract imagined here is nothing like as extreme 
as that. 
Perhaps this line of thinking is a mistake however. The borrower consents to the offer of 
microfinance and the group liability model that comes with it. But even though she may 
know that group liability often or sometimes results in fellow borrowers imposing coercion 
and compulsion on their defaulting sisters, that knowledge does not mean that she consents to 
the use of that coercion. The coercion itself remains illegitimate: the loan is, after all, not 
collateralized. The fellow borrowers have a contractual agreement to repay her loan for her if 
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she cannot (and vice versa): the fact that some then use extreme methods to try to escape that 
liability does not legitimize their doing so, and how common or otherwise that is does not 
carry with it the signing up borrower’s consent to the practice. 
The MFI cannot stand back and claim that it does not carry out coercive loan collection 
practices itself, that only the women borrowers (unfortunately, sometimes) do. For the 
women only act to recover back some of their costs in covering the defaulter’s debt because 
the MFI would refuse to extend their future loans if they did not cover this debt. When the 
MFI has insisted upon the use of group liability, and knows from experience that as a result 
practices such as house breaking occur, it cannot claim to be innocent of them when they do. 
It bears the indirect responsibility for actions that are, in legal terms, the ‘reasonably 
foreseeable’ result of its threat to the borrowing group. 
 
III. Conclusion 
What shall we conclude, then, of the relationship between microfinance and coercion? 
The offer of microfinance, itself, is not coercive. In general, where one agent takes advantage 
of the extremely difficult circumstances, of the low level of global autonomy of another to 
make an offer on terms that would not be accepted in happier circumstances, they exploit 
rather than coerce. Perhaps there can be even more extreme circumstances where the 
exploited or coerced agent actually has no options at all – she is facing death, already – and 
by adding one other option to that situation, the exploiter/coercer does coerce, because he has 
made an offer of a set of choices where the set itself cannot be rejected. The offer does 
increase the choice available, and so is an offer, but is made by including within it in a set of 
offers which as a whole, cannot be rejected, which is coercive. The offer of microfinance, 
however, does not fall within this definition of a coercive offer, because the set (loan on these 
terms, or no loan) can be rejected – there are other life options available, and even other 
finance offers, however unattractive. 
But the central plank of the offer of microfinance, the group liability model, which is a 
condition of taking the loan, does lead to coercive loan collection practices in at least some 
cases.  As Karim puts it, this is not incidental to microfinance, but (at least in Bangladesh) 
central to it – it is an ‘economy of shame’ where the culturally crucial notion of shame is used 
to replace the collateral women do not have to take out loans. 
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It has been shown that coercion is not, in most instances, justified by the prior consent of the 
borrower to the sanction: where the coercion is from the MFI to the group, expropriating their 
savings to make good a default, it can be, but all the other forms – coercion of 
MFI/agent/group against the borrower is not so justified by consent. 
Can it be justified by the consequences of the use of microcredit being so beneficial, in 
raising borrowers out of poverty, that a bit of coercion along the way is offset? Given the 
extent of some of these coercive practices, that seems unlikely: and it seems even more 
unlikely that even if the consequences were positive overall, that they were, individually, for 
the borrower who has had her house broken and is now homeless. But these issues will be 
discussed in full in the final three chapters. 
What is going unchallenged here is to what extent the group liability model is truly essential 
to the offer of microfinance. Practitioners certainly typically assume that without group 
liability, defaults would rise sharply and they would become either unprofitable or 
unsustainable and have to reduce or cease business. But this has not been evidenced, because 
few have tried extending microfinance on an individual lending model basis. One study, 
however, claiming to be ‘the first rigorous global study of the relation between MFI gender 
focus and repayment performance, using a data set spanning 350 MFIs in 70 countries over 
11 years’132 found that (amongst other things) ‘when women are offered individual tailor-
made loans, repayment is enhanced, compared to group-lending methods.’133 
If microfinance as an industry wants to clean itself from the coercive claims that begin to be 
heard against it, abandoning the group liability model, despite it being its traditional (but not 
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133 Op. cit. note 3 p768 
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Chapter 6: Paternalism and its Justification 
Whether and which interactions between the MFI and borrower are paternalistic, and whether 
that is prima facie wrongful or can be justified is a complicated question and unpicked in the 
following chapter. This chapter examines what we mean by paternalism, when it is justified 
and when indeed it may be required. This chapter is structured as follows: 
I. Definition of Paternalism 
II. When Paternalism can be Justified 
  (a) When autonomy is partial 
(b) When beneficial consequences significantly outweigh a trivial 
infringement to autonomy 
III. When Paternalism is not merely Justified, but Required 
 
I. Definition of the Concept of Paternalism 
One acts paternalistically towards another when one acts against another’s preferences, in a 
way which undermines or infringes upon her autonomy, for that person’s own good, or for 
the prevention of harm to her. The infringement is prima facie a wrong to her, but I will argue 
can be justified: either when the autonomy that is infringed upon is only partial, or limited in 
some way; or when the degree of infringement to a fully autonomous agent’s autonomy is 
low, and the potential good achieved for the agent/harm avoided very high. This second form 
of justification, essentially consequentialist, is more controversial than the first. Both will be 
argued for. 
The definition I give of paternalism follows that used by Gerald Dworkin, and has a lineage 
back to Mill, although Mill of course expresses his principle in terms of liberty rather than 
autonomy. 
Gerald Dworkin’s formal definition of paternalism is:  
P acts paternalistically toward Q if and only if 
(a) P acts with the intent of averting some harm or promoting some benefit to Q. 
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(b) P acts contrary to the current preferences, desires or dispositions of Q. 
(c) P’s act is a limitation on Q’s autonomy.134  
‘Paternalism’ is not used here in a moralised way – like ‘exploitation’ earlier, it is not wrong 
by definition, as with ‘murder’ as opposed to ‘homicide’. Dworkin notes that his definition is 
‘evaluatively neutral in that it does not beg any questions with respect to the legitimacy or 
illegitimately of paternalistic actions. It makes clear that while the action has a benevolent 
intent there are normative questions raised by clauses (b) and (c).’135 
It is the infringement, overriding or undermining of a person’s autonomy (albeit for their 
benefit) that is at the heart of paternalism and makes it prima facie wrongful albeit, like 
coercion, capable of justification. And, Dworkin argues, it is the infringement of a person’s 
autonomy, not their freedom, because it is possible for an act to be paternalistic without 
infringing on a person’s liberty of action at all. Dworkin suggests the case of a husband who 
hides his own sleeping pills from his suicidally depressed wife: he does not impinge on her 
freedom, or for that matter violate any moral rule, or any right of hers: yet this seems a 
paradigm case of paternalism. Dworkin concludes:  
‘There must be a violation of a person’s autonomy (which I conceive of as a distinct notion 
from that of liberty) for one to treat another paternalistically. There must be a usurpation of 
decision-making, either by preventing people from doing what they have decided, or by 
interfering with the way they arrive at their decisions.’ So a wide range of acts can be 
paternalistic, and they need not involve the use of brute force. ‘What we must ascertain in 
each case is whether the act in question constitutes an attempt to substitute one person’s 
judgement for another’s, to promote the latter’s benefit.’136  It is this substitution of the 
paternaliser’s judgement for that of the paternalised that undermines the paternalised agent’s 
autonomy and makes paternalism prima facie wrongful, even if capable of justification 
through other considerations. 
It is the rationale behind a policy that determines whether it is paternalistic or not. A 
government ban on smoking in public places introduced solely to protect non-smokers from 
the harm of others’ smoke is not paternalistic. Of course many projects have mixed 
                                                          
134 Gerald Dworkin in Lawrence C Becker & Charlotte B Becker (eds.) Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd edition 
(2001) Routledge NY & London p. 1282 
135 Ibid. 
136 Gerald Dworkin, ‘Paternalism, Some Second Thoughts’ in Rolf Sartorius (ed.) Paternalism (1984) 
Minneapolis: University of  Minnesota Press, p. 107 
90 
 
rationales, and it will be seen below that this is certainly true in microcredit. If the 
government ban on smoking in shared places is not only for the sake of non-smokers, but for 
the good of smokers as well, then it is to that extent paternalistic. 
Paternalism can be applied both individually and to groups. When applied to groups, we need 
to distinguish what Dworkin calls ‘pure’ from ‘impure’ paternalism.137 In pure paternalism 
the class of people whose autonomy is restricted is identical with the class of people whose 
good is aimed at. An example of pure paternalism is the making compulsory of the wearing 
of seat belts: everyone who is required to wear a seat belt is a potential beneficiary in the 
event of a car crash. With ‘impure’ paternalism, the autonomy of people who will not benefit 
from the policy is also restricted against their will. Illegalising the production and sale of 
marijuana, for instance, may be done for the benefit of those for whom it is the first step on 
the road to serious drug addiction, or possibly a cause of schizophrenia. But there is also a 
class of people for whom smoking marijuana is harmless and indeed a smaller class of people 
for whom it is an effective and highly desirable pain relief. The policy of making marijuana 
illegal then would be impure paternalism because it is, of necessity, imposed on all, but only 
for the benefit of a subset within that. 
We will see in the following chapter that paternalistic practices, or practices that at any rate 
pass for being paternalistic, are rife in the field of microcredit. So in what sort of 
circumstances might paternalism be justified, given the importance given here to autonomy, 
especially respecting the desire of individuals to be their own self-creators, to lead their own 
lives? 
 
II. When Paternalism can be Justified 
It is argued here that paternalism can be justified in two ways. Firstly, it can be justified 
where autonomy is already impaired or absent and cannot be exercised by the agent in the 
sphere to which the paternalism applies. In such cases, the paternaliser does substitute his 
judgement for that of the paternalised agent, but only where the paternalised agent is unable 
to come to a fully autonomously reached judgement himself. Secondly, more arguably, 
paternalism can be justified when the beneficial consequences to/harm avoided by the subject 
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of the paternalism are sufficiently known to the paternaliser and significantly outweigh the 
infringement of the subject’s autonomy. The epistemological point about the true confidence 
that the paternaliser can have in the outcome is not a small caveat. Merely being of the 
opinion that a significant benefit will accrue to an unwilling subject from the paternal 
intervention is not enough, on this account, to justify it: the paternaliser has to really know it 
is highly likely to. 
The second part of this defence of some paternalism is more clearly a consequentialist one. 
Consequentialists, including utilitarians, will be able to justify paternalism when it results in 
more pleasure or happiness or superior consequences for the welfare of the person whose 
autonomy has been usurped, all things considered. Nonetheless, consequentialists will rule 
out quite a lot of paternalism on the grounds that it often will not actually end up benefiting 
the person whose good is at stake, because he knows his own prudential interest best, 
certainly better than ‘we’, outsiders or the state, can, or because the cost of the interference 
weighs heavily with him. Side-effects on the rest of society may also be taken in to 
consideration. 
The defence of some forms of paternalism presented here incorporates both possible 
justifications: when autonomy is only partial, or there is a defect in it, and a more 
consequentialist approach. Despite the central importance given to autonomy here, the 
position that paternalism should be treated as taboo except in cases of defective autonomy, is 
not defended. It will be argued that this principled anti-paternalism is too strong. There can 
be cases where a fully rational, autonomous agent’s will may be overridden, where the 
benefit to him is genuinely known to be great, or the harm avoided very large, and the 
infringement to his autonomy trivial. Although they may not be extensive, it will be argued 
that some cases of what Joel Feinberg defines as ‘hard’ paternalism can be justified. And 
though they may be even fewer, it will be argued in Section III that there are some rare cases 
where hard paternalism can actually be required. It will then be argued in Chapter 7 that 
microcredit provides instances both of where apparently justified paternalism is claimed but 





We can start with cases where the position defended here overlaps with the antipaternalistic 
position: cases of what Feinberg calls ‘soft’ or ‘weak’ paternalism.138 
 
(a) Justification of Paternalism I: When autonomy is partial  
Hard paternalism, as defined by Feinberg139 is the interference with a fully voluntary choice 
of a competent adult, against his will, for his own good. Soft paternalism is interference when 
the choice is less than fully voluntary. Although on the account given here it is interferences 
with choices that are autonomous that makes paternalism prima facie wrongful, there will 
clearly be much overlap with when a choice is less than fully voluntary, and when it is less 
than fully autonomous. 
Although I will defend occasional use of hard paternalism, it is important to justify the use of 
even soft paternalism, even where there is something less than ideal in the autonomy of the 
agent making the decision. We do not want to allow interference in all and any less than fully 
autonomous decisions: a serious harm or loss of benefit to the agent has to be at stake, to 
begin with. And as Mill makes clear in his passionate defence of those ‘in the maturity of 
their faculties’ to decide what is best for themselves provided it harms no others, we need to 
allow people to make bad choices (especially where the consequences of doing so are not 
irrevocable or excessively harmful): people need to learn from their mistakes to develop a full 
autonomy. As outlined in chapter 2, the highest value of autonomy lies in our using it to 
develop and evolve in to the people we want to be and become. That, however unconsciously, 
is a constant process of iteration, so any interference with our autonomy, even a trivial one, 
interferes with that valuable process. That is not to say that such an interference cannot be 
justified, but that the harm avoided/benefit gained must itself be more than trivial, must be 
much more than someone else’s preference for how we should live, to justify the interference.  
Soft paternalism then is distinguished from hard paternalism by the infringement to autonomy 
or freedom being imposed on an agent whose decision-making ability is already impaired in 
some way. He either does not possess a full, rational autonomy (children, the mentally 
disabled) or his decision-making ability in this particular instance is impaired in some way 
(he is ignorant of the facts crucial to his choice, or he is subject to some type of coercive 
                                                          
138 Joel Feinberg Harm to Self, vol. 3 of The Moral Limits of the Criminal Law (1986) New York: Oxford 
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139 Ibid. p12 
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influence.) Soft paternalism is interfering with the agent when his own decision-making is 
judged in some way substantially non-voluntary, or non-autonomous, whether that be 
because the agent has a diminished autonomy, or because his situation has diminished his 
autonomy. It is the fact that autonomy is not undermined by paternalism here – because in 
this instance it is absent or only partial – that justifies the soft paternalism. Of course, on this 
justification, the degree of paternalism used must be proportionate to the degree of autonomy 
absent, and in the relevant area. 
As was discussed in the opening chapter, autonomy is something we hold in degrees – both 
our autonomous agency and our ability to act autonomously in any given sphere. Our 
autonomy of action is limited by various external factors or physical incapacities of our own. 
Our autonomous agency is also held in degrees: one person can have a greater capacity to 
think rationally and reflect coolly, giving him a greater degree of agency than another. 
Importantly here are the range of cases where the ability to act rationally and self-reflectively 
is only partial: from the child developing her ability to be rational, to the patient in a 
persistent vegetative state (PVS) who has no capacity for autonomy at all. A paternalistic 
policy imposed on a fully autonomous agent is a prima facie wrong to her, though possibly 
capable of justification. A paternalistic policy imposed on a partially autonomous agent (a 
child, one suffering from mental illness) is a case of potentially prima facie justifiable 
paternalism, provided it is in the area where her agency is only partial and not, for example, 
over an area where she can make rational decisions. We might be justified in withholding 
alcohol from a recovering alcoholic who has voluntarily sought treatment in a clinic, but 
whose illness is now overcoming his previous desire to recover and is now demanding a 
drink, but we would not be justified in insisting he eats all the vegetables that come with his 
meals if he hates them. 
The paradigm case of paternalism, the parent and child, is paternalistic because the child has 
partial autonomy, has some rational capacity and is gaining more, and the parent has 
constantly to adapt as the child develops to recognise the growing autonomy, and cease forms 
of parenting that were perhaps justifiable paternalism at one stage of development but are not 
at another. When rational agency has altogether gone, respecting autonomous preferences 
becomes impossible. The best that can be done for the PVS patient is to ask, as O’Neill puts 
it,140 ‘What would this patient have chosen in this situation?’, trying to respect the decisions 
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the patient is likely to have made ‘as he or she was in former times’ – but ‘respect for absent 
autonomy can at best be vestigal.’ 
Soft paternalism, then, can be justified by the very absence of autonomous judgement that it 
substitutes for. Such a justification is limited to the extent to which autonomy is partial, and 
indeed this justification is more restricted than that. Where a parent interacts with a child 
paternalistically all the time, the child may hardly have a chance to develop his autonomy. In 
such a case, where otherwise possibly justifiable paternalism is in fact hampering the growth 
of autonomy, the restriction would be to fewer cases: the child needs to be allowed to learn 
from making a few bad choices (provided no great harm results.) This latter case then bridges 
the two justifications of paternalism: the justification of it when autonomy is only partial, and 
the justification of it where the consequences are sufficiently known and beneficial. 
 
(b) Justification of Paternalism II: When the beneficial consequences significantly 
outweigh a trivial infringement to autonomy 
The second justification of some forms of paternalism that I shall defend, is where autonomy 
is not all absent or partial, but fully present, but the compounding of the size (i.e. small) of 
infringement to it with the benefits to the paternalised agent arising from it (i.e. high) provide 
a consequentialist justification. Feinberg does not believe that the second of these 
justifications is possible. He argues141 ‘There is no such thing as a ‘trivial interference’ with 
personal sovereignty; nor is it simply another value to be weighed in a cost-benefit 
comparison. In this respect, if not others, a trivial interference with sovereignty is like a 
minor invasion of virginity: the logic of each concept is such that a value is respected in its 
entirety or not at all.’ 
Yet surely here, for all the importance given to autonomy here, in this Feinberg goes too far. 
He is arguing against Gerald Dworkin’s claim that some interferences with autonomy – such 
as requiring motorcyclists to wear helmets, or passengers in cars to wear seat-belts – are 
relatively trivial, and outweighed by the possible prevention of great harm that not wearing 
them risks. That leaves Feinberg in the awkward position of later justifying such apparent 
cases of hard paternalism by claiming that they are not paternalistic at all, but driven by the 
desire of society not to bear the costs of accidents after these safety measures have been 
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ignored, or alternatively the desire of society not to suffer pangs of conscience watching the 
wretched lives of those involved in such accidents, where society declines to pick up the cost 
and the individual cannot bear it himself. Thus he justifies enforcing the wearing of brightly 
coloured clothes on those walking in woods during the hunting season as being for the 
avoidance of the harm caused to hunters through their feelings of guilt after they accidentally 
shoot walkers, rather than (paternalistically) for the protection of the walkers themselves. But 
whilst he might justify such an intervention that way, it seems likely those writing the 
regulations followed a more natural, if paternal, instinct. 
The root of what generates this problem for Feinberg is his belief that personal sovereignty is 
inviolable. Yet is it really the case that autonomy is all-or-none, that there cannot be minor 
breaches of it? In our earlier discussion of autonomy, we considered the thresholds for 
autonomous agency and autonomous actions. It was argued that agents have a wide range of 
autonomy: from only-just threshold competent (in some areas) mentally impaired adults, to 
one blessed with every capacity to develop his own conception of what represents the good 
life to him and endowed with resources to pursue that conception. Autonomy, it was argued, 
is actually held in degrees, but the heart of it was held to be our rational capacities to 
determine our own lives, to pursue our own conception of the best life for ourselves, 
whatever that may be and however circumstances may have limited it. 
Feinberg, then, tries to stop his sliding scale justification of soft paternalism slipping in to 
justification of some hard paternalism at the far end of his scales where the consequences 
weigh heaviest, by relying on an inviolability of personal sovereignty that seems to stretch 
the notion too far. The argument I present places high value on autonomy, but does not hold 
it inviolable. Its value could be outweighed by other values. Thus this account accepts that 
there is no cut-off point that can stop soft paternalism at the very extremes sliding in to hard 
paternalism where the balance between minor infringement to autonomy and severity of 
consequences is heavy enough. 
Given this thesis’ emphasis on the value of autonomy, allowing for the possibility of hard 
paternalism will be controversial. The most ringing condemnation of hard paternalism is of 
course Mill’s in On Liberty: 
The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of 
action of any of their member, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
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exercised over any member of a civilised community, against their will, is to prevent harm to others. His 
own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.142 
Even with Mill, however, there are exceptions, such as children and those ‘in a state to 
require their being taken care of by others’.143  And his bridge example suggests that 
presumed ignorance may also justify soft paternalism (at least while the ignorance is being 
repaired.) He famously states: ‘if either a public officer or anyone else saw a person 
attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there was no time 
to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back.’144 But they may do so 
only because he is acting in ignorance as to the safety of the bridge. His true interest is simply 
in crossing the river: at least we are assuming that that is what he aims to do, rather than 
plunging in to the river when the bridge collapses. If he is warned, but being of suicidal bent 
decided to cross anyway, then he must be allowed to. 
Young145 notes that Mill’s opposition to paternalism stems from his commitment to liberty as 
the means by which we can best develop our capacities. He distinguishes four grounds on 
which Mill argues against paternalism: 
1. Competent people know their own interests better than others (especially 
governments) do146; 
2. Paternalistic interferences (especially by governments) are prone to error because they 
rely on general presumptions, not direct knowledge of the individual147; 
3. Paternalistic interference fails to show respect for individual liberty, which is vital to 
treating people as equals148; 
4. Since exercising liberty is instrumental to developing our own characters, we need to 
be able to make mistakes to do so.149 
The fourth of these arguments seems the strongest. With regard to the first, certainly people 
generally know their own interest best: but, as seen above, Mill allowed that this 
                                                          
142 John Stuart Mill, Collected Works XVIII, Essays on Politics and Society (On Liberty) (1977) Toronto: 
Buffalo: University of Toronto Press p.223 
143 Ibid. p.224 
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generalisation allowed of plenty of exceptions. It simply does not appear empirically true that 
people always do know their own interest best, or necessarily always act on that knowledge 
when they have it. The second argument is a similar generalisation, and capable of exception. 
Perhaps we do not always need direct knowledge of an individual. Mill tells us that we 
cannot rightfully compel a person ‘to do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, 
because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, 
or even right.’150 But this is a softer rejection of paternalism. We may not compel when in 
our opinion that would have the best consequences: but what if we actually know? Know, not 
because we know this individual personality (though we may) but because we know more 
about the certain consequences of some actions today than we did in the nineteenth century. 
Would Mill allow a paternalistic act where we are certain of superior consequences, however 
unusual that epistemic situation might be? Perhaps not, because the emphasis Mill gives to 
each person having to learn for themselves in order to fuel their own self-development, and 
possibly also because their personal (even if wrong-headed) experiment in living adds to the 
utility of us all by enabling us to see the success and failure of other attempts at life.151 Still, 
the point implicit here that it is not just whether in our opinion the consequences of 
intervention will be better for an agent or not, but the degree of confidence we can have in 
that view, is important and will be returned to. 
The third argument also does not seem quite right. Exercising paternalism may fail to show 
respect for individuals: but it can also actually demonstrate that respect. Where we paternalise 
an agent who has only partial autonomy, we may respect her more by recognising the 
vulnerability and adjusting to it, than by ignoring it and neglecting the fact that impairment to 
autonomy requires special treatment, even if in some degree paternal. When we act paternally 
towards children and teenagers, we do not (necessarily!) lack respect for them as individuals, 
but rather attempt to find the furthest reaches of their autonomy with which we can let them 
exercise it safely. If instead we treated a child as having the full decision-making powers of 
an adult, this callous disregard of her actual state of development shows less respect for her 
than a careful contemplation of the boundaries of it. 
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Young has most sympathy for Mill’s fourth argument, and given the emphasis in this thesis 
on placing value on autonomy in order to achieve our self-development, this view is shared: 
but as Young observes, the fact that individuals need to be able to err to self-develop, and that 
great happiness lies in self-development, does not show that the cost to liberty will always 
outweigh the harm avoided. 
So on closer inspection, it is not clear that Mill’s arguments for his strong antipaternalism are 
fully convincing: and of course even he allowed the exceptions we have seen, where 
autonomy is only partial, and indeed, where an agreement or contract was proposed that 
would permanently and irrevocably renounce the liberty necessary for self-development: 
paradigmatically, slavery, but also all perpetual contracts. 
 
It has thus been difficult to draw a hard line between soft and hard paternalism using either 
Feinberg’s boundary of what is voluntary, or Mill’s restriction on interference with liberty to 
only when harm to others is at stake. 
The consequentialist defence of when paternalism can be justified allows that, at the extreme, 
soft paternalism can merge in to hard paternalism: it is a continuum with no sharp dividing 
line. Nonetheless, there is an important theme throughout Mill that should be applied to any 
consequentialist justification of hard and soft paternalism, which is the concern with regard to 
the state of our knowledge. We cannot ignore the fact that our calculus should be adjusted to 
reflect the certainty we are entitled to have in our judgement. Individuals do generally know 
their own interest best: so the consequential justification of some paternalism should not be 
Significance of harm avoided/benefit gained (A) x Infringement to Autonomy (B) 
but 
Significance of harm avoided/benefit gained (A) x Infringement to Autonomy (B) x Certainty 
of A  
Although this position, then, rejects a principled antipaternalism, by the time all the factors in 
the calculus given above are taken fully into account, there may not be so much practical 
difference between what this account and that of Mill might allow.  
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A second clarification of this justification of paternalism is needed. Autonomy has been 
argued to be held in degrees, and we of course have not only different levels of autonomy, 
but have it to different degrees in different areas of our lives. It has also been argued that it is 
the aspect of autonomy that is represented by our projects of self-development, of trying to 
determine the sort of people we become (and do not become) that is the most valuable. So in 
this calculus, some infringements to autonomy weigh rather more heavily than others. The 
severity of consequence needed to overcome infringing on my autonomy to act in some 
relatively trivial matter is at one level: that for overcoming an infringement to my ability to 
use my rational agency to help bring about becoming the person I want to be, much heavier. 
To summarise, I argue that the value we are compounding by the harm/benefit is not the 
degree of voluntariness, but the degree to which the imposition infringes upon an agent’s 
autonomy, and especially his ability to determine his own life, his project of self-
development. This will overlap with Feinberg’s (and Mill’s) limits to a very great extent but 
not wholly. A fully voluntary decision could reasonably be overridden where the potential 
harm was extremely great and the autonomy infringed minor: the making compulsory of the 
wearing of seat belts is thus allowed as straightforward justified paternalism, rather than, as 
with Feinberg, a sort of prevention of harm to others through avoiding their pain at observing 
the injured person’s condition. Using autonomous agency rather than voluntariness will see 
substantial overlap with Feinberg’s soft paternalism, but it will justify hard paternalism in 
some cases. 
Some examples of how these different approaches might play out might help. I shall consider 
the following: the choice of a Jehovah’s witness to die rather than undergo a blood 
transfusion: and whether we would allow the suicides of various different categories of 
person. 
 
Questions of Choosing Death 
Jehovah’s Witness’s religious beliefs hold against allowing followers of the religion blood 
transfusions, with fatal results on those occasions when one is necessary. Must an 
autonomous decision not to have a medical intervention that would save one’s life be 
respected? Feinberg says yes152  and one imagines that Mill would. On the calculus that the 
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consequentialist giving heavy weight to autonomy uses, the harm prevented by paternalistic 
intervention is of course extremely great: but so here is the infringement to autonomy. The 
Jehovah Witness’s beliefs are a key part of his self-conception and who he wants to be. On 
those grounds, even the consequentialist calculus will find this finely balanced. There is a 
great temptation to override the Jehovah Witness’s autonomy in this case, where we know 
with great certainty the great harm that will come to him if we do not intervene. Great harm x 
certainty of it weighs heavily: but so too does the Jehovah Witness’s views on who he wants 
to be and his knowing, voluntary choice to die rather than live in contravention of his beliefs. 
I conclude that in this instance paternalism would not be justifiable, but perhaps only just. 
This example presents a problem for the consequentialist calculus: if minimal autonomy is 
defined as rational agency and self-reflection (as it has been), why should we give that 
autonomy weight when the beliefs that are held appear to be irrational, if not downright 
delusional? Here, we need to distinguish between apparently false, irrational beliefs that are 
symptomatic of a psychiatric condition, and those which are perhaps extremely poorly based 
in terms of evidence, but are still the product of a rational thought process. The former type – 
the schizophrenic with delusions that there is a global conspiracy to persecute him – cannot 
be argued with: there are no arguments that we can present to him that he will not twist in to a 
further complication of his view. The latter we can engage in reasoned argument, even if our 
chance of success is poor if an individual has been indoctrinated with a particular religious or 
political view from an early age and given no exposure to other beliefs or views. But the 
rational agency is there, if buried beneath a weight of false beliefs: the unfortunate 
schizophrenic can be treated (if we can find a way) but not persuaded. 
To take some other cases, here of actively sought suicide. Arneson153 postulates Tom, the 
Pouting Young Adult, whose distress at some disappointment he has suffered (losing out in 
the race for a job he wanted, being dumped by his girlfriend) is so extreme, he wants to 
commit suicide. He knows that if he lives, time will heal and he will want to live on and 
resume his life, but he has unusually self-indulgent and immature preferences, and wants to 
die. Arneson also imagines a terminally ill cancer patient who has little time left to live, can 
only suffer horribly, and wants to die. Let us also add to our suicide line up Juliet, awaking in 
the mausoleum to the devastating sight of her dead ancestors, the freshly killed Paris and of 
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course worst of all, Romeo dead by his own hand, falsely believing her dead rather than 
drugged. 
There are three competing approaches. The Kantian approach is commonly taken to rule out 
all suicides on the grounds that what is of value in us is our capacity for rational agency, and  
no act that destroys the possibility of the future exercise of that rational agency can ever be 
right.154 This approach would disallow all three suicides (cancer patient, Pouting Young 
Adult and Juliet.)155 Arneson argues that Feinberg would find paternalistically interfering to 
prevent the suicide of both the terminally ill cancer patient and the Pouting Young Adult 
unjustifiable. We can imagine though that he would prevent Juliet’s suicide on grounds of it 
being sufficiently involuntary, given her age (13) and the circumstances of having just 
awoken from a powerful drug and then being immediately presented with the catastrophe 
around her. Yet not preventing the Pouting Young Adult from committing suicide, at least for 
a time, given that we postulate that he will come to see value in life again, may seem 
excessively liberal.  Arneson’s approach would allow the cancer patient to end his suffering, 
but prevent Pouting Young Adult from carrying out his suicide on the grounds that the agent 
is not deceived about his situation, and chooses voluntarily enough, but does so ‘to satisfy 
basic desires that strike many of us as bad, perverse or distorted.’156 Arneson would 
presumably also preserve Juliet, at least for the time being, until we can see if in a future 
period she can conceive of a life without Romeo – at the time of her suicide, we do not know 
this.  
Of these approaches, I would argue that Arneson’s does the best job of picking out those we 
feel intuitively should be allowed to commit suicide, and those not (or, at least, not now.) 
This is because, if we use the above approach of treating as all-important the kernel of 
autonomy, the rational agency required, as Arneson puts it, ‘to make something worthwhile 
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of our life’,157 to conceive of our lives as something of value because of our self-construction, 
then where a self-constructed worthwhile life is no longer to be had, the importance of the 
rational agency necessary to pursue it shrinks accordingly.  
Arneson saves Tom the Pouting Youth because he considers that Tom’s desires are bad, and 
that Tom has a duty to make something of his life. I do not wish to argue the case that we all 
do have such a duty to make something of our lives (duty to whom?) although I do not need 
to deny the possibility of this. But if I do not follow Arneson in arguing that we have such 
duty, then I need to offer an alternative argument for why we might save Tom. This is that 
Tom is suffering from a temporary irrationality (Juliet certainly is.) Tom does recognise that 
he will feel differently in the future: he just does not, at present, care – he gives a wholly 
irrational weighting to his current preferences and a false discount rate to his future ones 
(Tom is not alone amongst humanity in doing this, but a form of irrationality, even if as 
widespread as a low ability to discount future pleasures and pains effectively, is still a form 
of irrationality.) Tom just takes it to an extreme. His inability to discount the future anything 
close to adequately is a form of irrationality, which thus undermines his autonomous agency 
and justifies our paternalistic interference. 
I am arguing, then, that Tom may be preserved because he holds a desire to die that is in part 
the result of his (all too human) inability to discount his future preferences adequately, a 
failure of his rationality which thus produces an irrational desire to die now. It is also 
important in the example as Arneson postulates it, that Tom does know that he will feel 
differently in the future, he is just unable to act on that now. If he knows that, we may be 
assumed to as well (his evidence being the best), which relieves the epistemic issue in the 
example. I am not left, as Arneson is, with the need to adjudicate on good, bad or perverse 
desires.158  
It might be that Mill would also save Tom, because of the irreversibility of Tom’s decision, 
and his youth and lack of experience in making it. In writing of when exceptions to his 
normal ban on paternalism are possible, Mill notes: 
A second exception to the doctrine that individuals are the best judges of their own best interest, is when an 
individual attempts to decide irrevocably now, what will be best for his interest at some future and distant 
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on the grounds that the irrationality makes his decision less than fully voluntary. 
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time. The presumption in favour of individual judgement is grounded on actual, and especially on recent, 
personal experience: not where it is formed antecedently to experience, and not suffered to be reversed even 
after experience has condemned it.159   
These examples show that autonomy weighs very heavily in the consequentialist calculus 
presented here. It outweighs even a choice that results in death, as with the Jehovah’s Witness 
refusing a blood transfusion or the cancer patient. It does paternalistically save Tom, but not 
the cancer patient or the Jehovah’s Witness, because we know – indeed Arneson’s example 
stipulates that Tom knows, but that that does not motivate him to care – that his views will 
change in the future. The cancer patient is very unlikely to have such a change in view, 
because his painful condition will not change and any future project of self-development is 
not available to him. The Jehovah’s Witness is taken to be mature and his religious beliefs 
central to his own conception of himself, so again it is unlikely (though less so than with the 
terminally ill cancer patient) to change. Still, this remains a finely balanced decision. The 
younger the Witness (certainly a child) and the more subject to familial religious influence, 
either factor casting in doubt the fullness of the autonomous decision, the more it would be 
likely to be swung the other way. 
It is the notion of autonomy to create ourselves, the people we want to be, that is carrying the 
weight here. When we consider merely autonomy to act freely in a particular way that is not 
crucial to our self-conception, this is an infringement to autonomy, but one easier to outweigh 
if the consequences are severe enough. So we need to distinguish our ability to act 
autonomously in a particular case, which can be outweighed, from our autonomous setting of 
our life’s projects, infringing which is much harder to justify, at least when set fully 
rationally. 
This is to give our autonomous self-development a very high value and weighting in the 
calculus such that it will seldom be the case that overriding it can be justified: but the 
theoretical possibility remains. The principle of consequentialism is the prior principle, but 
our self-development looms a large factor in achieving the best consequences for ourselves. 
Mill placed his importance on self-development even more closely to his utilitarianism when 
he wrote: ‘I regard utility as the ultimate appeal to all ethical questions; but it must be utility 
grounded on the permanent interests of man as a progressive being’,160 with the permanent 
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interests of man as a progressive being here being our potential for self-development. But in 
his absolute condemning of paternalism other than when the subject is ignorant or immature, 
Mill treats autonomy, or liberty as he describes it in On Liberty, as inviolable in the same way 
as Feinberg treats personal sovereignty: that all incursions upon it are equally grave. The 
view defended here is that they are not: those relating to our self-development are much more 
serious than those only relating to autonomy to act, which can be outweighed. 
To summarise, then: paternalism is prima facie wrongful, but can be justified. Not by when 
an agent’s act is sufficiently involuntary, compounded by the harm/benefit being great 
enough, as per Feinberg: but when it is only a part of an agent’s autonomy that is not critical 
in his self-determination, in his choosing the life he wants to lead for himself, compounded 
by the harm/benefit involved, and by a high degree of certainty on the part of those being 
paternal of the harm avoided/benefit gained in the outcome. 
This latter approach will overlap with that of Feinberg much of the way, but will also justify 
some instances of paternalism such as the wearing of seat-belts where Feinberg has to go to 
extraordinary lengths to find non-paternalistic reasons to justify the same policy, dwelling on 
the disutility of externalities, rather than the fact that the policy impinges only lightly on the 
area of autonomy that most concerns us, and prevents the most serious consequences for the 
agent. 
Before taking this autonomy approach to paternalism, and using it in considering the daily 
practices of microcredit, it remains to also consider the theoretical possibility that paternalism 
may sometimes not only be justified, but may also in fact be required. 
 
III. When Paternalism is not merely justified, but required. 
Section II has argued for when paternalism, though prima facie wrongful, can be justified. 
There is very little discussion, with the exception of some of Arneson’s work, on when 
paternalism might not only be justified, but required. Arneson argues that it can be required, 
in some circumstances, as a matter of social justice. I shall argue that there are circumstances 
in which one party in a transaction owes a duty of care to another, and can only exercise that 





The Duty of Care 
It would be best to begin by defining what I mean here by a duty of care, and who owes it to 
whom, because as a term it is well defined and understood in UK and US law, but has latterly 
been used to suggest a wider, more extensive set of obligations in medical, virtue and care 
ethics. When I refer to a duty of care, specifically in this thesis as applying to microfinance, I 
refer to the established, legal duty of care that is the cornerstone of the law of tort in the UK. 
This comes with fewer obligations than when the term is sometimes used in medical and 
virtue ethics; but has the advantage of these obligations being better defined, clearer to 
ground in moral principle and of wider application (to any profession or transaction, 
including finance), when it is applied. 
The obligation that the legal duty of care imposes, is that one party may not cause harm to 
another when providing a good or service to him where the supplier of the good or service 
can foresee, or can reasonably be expected to foresee, that the recipient cannot judge for 
himself whether or not the good or service is harmful to him. If the duty of care is breached, 
the party owing the duty of care becomes liable for paying damages to the party to whom the 
duty was owed. As Raz puts it:161‘Morally speaking we have two (kinds of) duties: a duty of 
care and a duty not to harm by negligent breach of duties of care. In other words, there is a 
moral duty whose point, and therefore whose content, is to protect people from negligent 
harm.’ 
The phrase ‘duty of care’ in medical ethics, or sometimes ‘duty to care’, is used of a doctor’s 
duty to his or her patients, and goes well beyond a duty to do no reasonably foreseeable harm. 
It is closer to a fiduciary duty: the International Code of Medical Ethics162 states that ‘a 
physician shall owe his patients complete loyalty’ and the debates of the boundaries of a 
doctor’s duty of care focus around how far he has a positive duty of beneficence, even at the 
cost of self sacrifice, to serve his patients’ best interests, rather than merely an essentially 
negative duty to do no harm. 
In care ethics, (and virtue ethics to the extent that care is seen as a virtue and subsumed 
within it), care (for ourselves, the environment, each other) becomes central, the basic feature 
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of a moral theory. Again, this is a very different interpretation of a duty of care than the older, 
simple and more restricted principle of doing no (foreseeable) harm that is used here. The 
duty of care as used here is the legal use. This is distinct from a more extensive duty of care 
in medical ethics, which has wider boundaries and has its moral grounding in trust and 
loyalty, or from that of care ethics, where as Tronto puts it, ‘the ethic of care is a practice, 
rather than a set of principles.’163 But to be quite clear, the legal definition of when a duty of 
care applies is used here not because it derives ethical status from being part of the law per 
se, but because it best describes the narrower circle of circumstances in which a requirement 
for hard paternalism could arise. 
The legal position on who owes whom a duty of care was reshaped in English and Scots law 
in the seminal decision by the House of Lords in the case of Donoghue v Stevenson, 1932. In 
his leading judgement (which allowed the appeal of Donoghue to claim for suffering caused 
to her by ingesting parts of a decomposing snail in a ginger beer bottle manufactured by 
Stevenson), Lord Atkin expounded his ‘neighbour’ principle which, though he derives it from 
Christian principles, seems to owe as much to Mill’s harm principle. He wrote: 
The rule that you are to love your neighbour becomes in law you must not injure your neighbour; and the 
lawyer’s question: Who is my neighbour? receives a restricted reply. You must take reasonable care to avoid 
acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in 
law, is my neighbour? The answer seems to be – persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act 
that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to 
the acts or omissions that are called in question….A man has a Duty of Care to conduct himself in such a 
way as to avoid harm to others, where a reasonable man would have seen that such harm would occur. 
The Lords found that when a manufacturer sells a bottle of beer in darkened glass, so that the 
ultimate consumer has no possibility of inspecting it before opening and drinking it, then the 
manufacturer has a duty of care to the consumer to be absolutely sure that no noxious 
substances can get in to what he sells between the product leaving him, and reaching the 
consumer. This landmark decision opened up modern negligence law, such that a provider of 
services or goods has to ensure they are fit for the purpose intended, whoever ultimately uses 
them, regardless of whether there is a contract between the ultimate consumer and original 
provider or not.  
Of course, it was understood at the time that enshrining a principle of doing no (foreseeable) 
harm to those one interacts with would open up the law of negligence dramatically, as it did, 
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so that the original constructors of bridges and buildings, or polluters of land, can now be 
held liable for negligence to those using the construction many years, and owners, after it was 
first built. And it was always understood that there would be particular difficulties with 
inherently dangerous products – kitchen knives were cited – where it was argued that to allow 
sale, overall benefits had to outweigh the risks. 
The duties of the seller to the buyer appear to ratchet up in line with the state of the equality 
of power and autonomous agency between the two parties. Caveat emptor, let buyer beware, 
is less common today as a governing rule of transactions than it used to be, but is still 
regarded as appropriate where both buyer and seller are equally matched, understand what 
they are doing and the product is not potentially harmful to the buyer. 
A duty of care begins to apply where both parties are not equal with regard to a transaction; 
where the buyer of a good or service is in some respects the non-expert to the selling expert; 
where the buyer’s ability to act autonomously with regard to the purchase is restricted by his 
relative ignorance; and the product is potentially harmful. It was important in Donaghue v 
Stevenson that the ginger beer was sold in darkened glass: Donaghue’s ability to act to 
inspect it herself first before committing to opening it was impaired. 
Frequently, the impairment to the purchaser’s autonomy that prevents her from being able to 
truly assess whether a product is appropriate for her or not, will come about from her 
ignorance of the technical detail she might need to know in order to make a decision. The 
ordinary passenger in an aircraft cannot be expected to be an expert in metal fatigue and 
capable of judging if the wings are about to fall off. Medicine, of course, is a common area 
where a duty of care is required, and indeed where that duty of care may sometimes only be 
exercised paternalistically.  
A seriously ill patient may demand drugs he has heard will help him but which his doctor 
believes will in fact further harm him. Whilst the doctor will do his best to get a genuinely 
‘informed consent’ to his recommended treatment, in this situation a life-time’s experience in 
understanding the complexities of the condition can only occasionally be condensed in to a 
similar level of understanding in the zero-experienced patient. Where one party has all the 
expertise and is recommending (or, here, refusing to recommend) a potentially dangerous 
product to the uninformed, the duty of care apples. The doctor may sometimes be forced to 
choose between his duty not to harm and his preference to respect the patient’s autonomy. 
Here, because the decision not to give the drugs is required by the duty of care, and goes 
108 
 
against the very clearly formed will of the patient, it is not only a case of justifiable 
paternalism, but one of required paternalism. 
Note, though, that whilst the duty of care is being applied here in a medical context as on 
occasion not only justifying but requiring paternalism, the fuller duties sometimes held by 
medical ethicists to be part of a doctor’s duty of care are not here being appealed to. This is 
not to deny that a doctor has the fuller obligation not only not to harm his patient, but to act in 
his best interest: but it may be better to think of this as part of a doctor’s fiduciary duty to his 
patient, rather than extending the ‘no-harm’ duty of care principle to cover these fiduciary 
duties as well. The fiduciary duty to act in a patient’s best interests may well encompass the 
‘no-harm’ duty of care, but the no-harm duty of care does not encompass further fiduciary 
obligations. The legally-scoped duty of care is narrower in scope, covering only a duty not to 
harm, but wider in application, to transactions and professions well beyond those involving 
fiduciary obligations.  
The reason for distinguishing the doctor’s more positive duty to act in her patient’s best 
interest (or a teacher’s to her class, or a lawyer to his client perhaps) is that these more 
fiduciary type of obligations are both more extensive than the (no-harm) duty of care, and 
more restricted in the number of transacting relationships (in principle, all) where a no-harm 
duty of care could apply. The risk of using the term ‘duty of care’ in the wider, fiduciary 
sense might be that we then deny it applies to certain transactional relationships where 
whereas in fact the more limited ‘no-harm’ duty of care still does apply, and can still do 
useful work. A limited paternalism from the expert is demanded in many exchanges.164 A 
limited paternalism may thus not only be justifiable, but on occasion, required, where the 
duty of care holds. 
And it is indeed not only in the practice of medicine that we expect a limited paternalism on 
the part of the expert seller to the non-expert buyer. In developed countries (at least) financial 
transactions are regulated differently according to whether they are expert-expert or expert-
non-expert. In the former – transactions between qualified professionals essentially – caveat 
emptor (broadly) applies. Caveat emptor works best where there is roughly equal knowledge 
between buyer and seller. Thus for qualified, authorized traders in securities markets, there is 
a much more lax set of protections for buyers than, for example, for the general public trading 
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with professional stockbroking firms (although misrepresentation would not be allowed in 
either case.)  
It may seem that what generates the duty of care is the fact that the transaction is between 
expert and non-expert, rather than because what is transacted is potentially harmful to the 
purchaser. This is probably not so. A non-expert selling a potentially seriously harmful 
product to another non-expert would still have this duty (though his sale would probably be 
illegal, as unregulated.) And there are plenty of expert to non-expert transactions where a 
duty of care is not taken to hold: it was not required of digital TV salesmen in the UK that 
they ensure the potential purchaser could actually receive the digital signal before making the 
sale. What rules apply to the transactional relationship between expert and non-expert can 
simply be cultural, the place at which a particular society has chosen to draw its own lines, 
involving no duty of care. The Cambridge economist Ha-Joon Chang expresses his surprise 
on arriving in the UK in the 1980s that ‘one could demand a full refund for a product, even if 
it wasn’t faulty. At the time, you just couldn’t do that in Korea, except in the most exclusive 
department stores. In Britain, the consumer’s right to change her mind was considered more 
important than the right of the seller to avoid the cost involved in returning unwanted (yet 
functional) products to the manufacturer.’165 
But what links all cases where a selling expert has a duty of care to a buying non-expert is 
where the product can harm him: where the seller, in selling it, would either breach the 
principle of doing no harm to others, or, perhaps, take a very serious risk of doing so. This 
applies as much to the stockbroker selling his client a product promising a certain yield and 
capital security when in fact its structure is such that it is likely to wipe out the client’s life 
savings, as it does to the doctor and surgeon. 
It might be asked here, that if a duty of care exists in financial services as much is in 
medicine, at least in some transactions, how come so many leveraged, risky, complex 
derivative products were sold to uncomprehending European regional local authorities and 
banks by Wall Street in the run up to the 2008 financial crisis: and especially, how come so 
much sub-prime mortgage was lent to the over-borrowed American consumer? 
The answer to that is that the regional European banks and local authorities at least purported 
to be professional. They signed away rights to protection in their transactions with Wall 
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Street firms on the grounds that they were qualified to do their own analysis and get the better 
size and price of transaction as a result of being allowed to do so. They held themselves out 
as experts in expert-expert transactions. Perhaps they deluded themselves, but this is not an 
exception to the duty of care principle applying when a potentially harmful product is sold, 
but unfortunate case of the buyer deliberately opting out of protection that was available to 
non-experts. 
The case of sub-prime is an exception, and in many cases was a case of a breach of a duty of 
care from seller to buyer that the sellers simply did not choose to recognise. What was 
extraordinary was that the sale of mortgages by mortgage brokers should have been 
unregulated: in developed countries it is hard to think of any financial transaction that touches 
the consumer that is not regulated, and yet this exception became a trillion dollar market. Too 
late, that has changed now: and the underlying moral principle is perhaps quietly recognised 
in the US government’s encouragement of lenders to use some forbearance from foreclosing 
on these borrowers.  
In financial transactions, as with medical ones, there are many layers of relationships. A retail 
bank may  be regarded as having a duty of care when selling a complex insurance product to 
a customer; a private client manager, an Independent Financial Advisor (IFA), or perhaps a 
pension fund manager, may be seen to have more of a fiduciary-based duty of care to his 
client; an investment banker may have neither a fiduciary-based duty, nor a no-harm duty of 
care to a client who holds himself to be professional and capable of understanding all the 
risks of a particular product for himself. One needs to take care before generalizing about a 
duty of care between all ‘bankers’ and all ‘clients’: one would not wish, perhaps in denying 
that a duty of care is owed by an investment banker to a pension fund manager, to be thought 
to consider that there was no duty of care owed by a retail bank to its ordinary customers. In 
Section II of the following chapter, whilst I do not argue for a fiduciary-style duty of care 
between an MFI and its borrowers, I shall argue for a ‘no harm’ duty of care to exist: and that 
the requirements of this obligation, which when it goes against the preferences of the 
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I. Application of The Concept of Paternalism to the Practical Rules of Microcredit 
(a) The State and Intervention in Borrowing 
Most of this section will look at how MFIs’ practices relate to their borrowers, and whether 
or not those practices are paternalistic, or justified paternalism if they are. But there is a long 
history of a prior question: whether the state may act with justified paternalism in banning 
lending money at interest at all, or, perhaps, banning the lending of money to certain classes 
of people and, where it deems it may not, whether it can yet consider using interest rate caps 
to limit the price at which that money is lent. I shall consider these potential cases of state 




(i) Usury laws: Hard Paternalism? 
Usury originally meant the charging of interest at any rate, and so usury laws that forbade it, 
at a time when Christian churches banned it, banned any lending that was not simply repaid 
at the original face value of the loan. The term ‘usury’ now more commonly means lending 
of money at exorbitant or illegal rates. The original theological opposition to usury seems not 
to be paternalistic as such, but based on religious text, and on the nature of what the essence 
of money is. Aquinas seems to have regarded money as purely a medium of exchange and 
therefore improper to draw a time value from, as time belongs to no man, but to God. He 
argued that charging interest was morally wrong as it represented ‘double charging’: charging 
both for the thing and the use of a thing. His analogy was that it would be wrong to charge for 
a bottle of wine and then again for drinking the wine. There was also concern as to the 
damage to the moral character of the lender the charging of interest might bring: lending 
should be philanthropic only. 
Laws banning usury today (outside of Islam) seldom do so on the basis that it is immoral per 
se to lend money, but on the basis that the rate is exorbitant, and likely to end up harming the 
borrower: thus such laws today are generally paternalistic. They are based on the assumption 
that, overall, borrowing at these rates will do more harm than good to the borrowers. 
Bentham objected strongly to such laws, sounding very much Mill’s predecessor: ‘no man of 
ripe years and of sound mind, acting freely, and with his eyes open, ought to be hindered, 
with a view to his advantage, from making such a bargain, in the way of obtaining money, as 
he thinks fit; nor (what is a necessary consequence) anybody hindered from supplying him, 
upon any terms he thinks proper to accede to.’166  
If there were clear evidence that borrowing at high rates always does more harm than good to 
most people, then the case for regarding this as justified paternalism might begin to be made. 
But, to anticipate the evidence in Chapter 8, there is not clear evidence that this is always 
true, though that may partly be lack of measurement; and it is certainly equally unclear that it 
does much good. If it were the case that many benefit from borrowing at high rates and only a 
few are harmed, then banning microfinance for all would be unjustified paternalism – for the 
ability to borrow to extend or found a business, or to meet some urgent short-term need, or to 
invest in one’s child’s education, might very well form a part of the core of how one 
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conceives of how one wants to live one’s own life. It certainly might be a core part of one’s 
hope for a better life. 
Of course, the caveat to this – even for Bentham, above – is that the vulnerable – the young, 
those of unsound mind – should be protected from themselves in the use of borrowing at 
interest. Here, usury is not banned for all, but for those particularly vulnerable to being 
harmed by it, and this would be justified paternalism, because we are building into our 
assumptions a lack of knowledge on the part of the agent as to the risk of the harm he incurs, 
an autonomy that is not (yet) fully competent. 
Wholesale banning of individuals’ freedom to borrow (outside, technically at least, of sharia 
law) is rare today. Advocates of free markets in money lending, based on the contribution this 
makes overall to innovation and economic growth, and critics of the alternative as unjustified 
paternalism, have held the day, with the exception of not allowing particularly vulnerable 
groups to borrow, such as those under 16. What is rather more common than banning credit, 
is restricting the price that can be charged for that credit: interest rate caps.  
 
 
(ii) Interest Rate Caps: Impure Paternalism 
When a state introduces interest rate caps on the rates at which MFIs or banks lend to 
borrowers, I shall argue that this is instance of impure paternalism. A state’s motivation in 
introducing an interest rate cap is generally taken to be that it is paternalistically seeking to 
prevent borrowers borrowing at a rate they will be unable to repay, thus preventing them 
falling further into debt. A problem for the state is when it knows that some people will be 
able to borrow at this rate and make successful use of the credit: but does not believe a 
sufficient majority of potential borrowers are capable of working out where this is for 
themselves. The state may be right in thinking this: if it has a very poor population constantly 
on the edge of food insecurity, fear of famine the following year may drive many to borrow at 
any rate necessary to secure a loan to buy fertiliser or seed.  
The state’s only way of protecting the majority from rates it regards as too high (other than 
banning money lending and microfinance altogether), is to impose an interest rate cap for all. 
It is paternal because it is driven by the government’s belief that whilst desperation for credit 
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drives demand for it at these prices and so it, the state, acts against many peoples’ will, 
nonetheless this is the best way to prevent a harm to many. It is soft paternalism for the 
majority of those protected if the government assumes that their desperation for credit to 
avoid future hunger has undermined their ability to make a rational decision as to whether 
borrowing at this rate will not in fact leave them even worse off than they were before. It is 
hard paternalism if the state believes their desire for credit is formed autonomously, but is 
simply too optimistic about the prospect of repayment. Could it also be a mixed policy, of 
soft paternalism towards those who benefit from not being allowed to borrow at rates that it is 
assumed will harm them, and hard paternalism towards those who would be able to use 
credit, even at this price, successfully if allowed?  
In fact not, because the policy for those who are prevented from borrowing when they could 
have done so successfully, is not paternalistic at all. To be paternalistic it has to be both for 
their benefit and in some way an infringement of their autonomy. In this last rationale, the 
state does not pretend that stopping the few potentially successful borrowers is for their 
benefit. It is simply that this the cost of having a policy to protect those who it is believed 
would be harmed. It may or may not be justifiable, but it is not paternalistic. The situation is 
the inverse of one Feinberg discusses (in response to Dworkin): laws compelling savings 
towards retirement. As Feinberg puts it, the compulsion on those who do not want to save 
here, but who are obliged to because the system can only run at all if it has blanket 
participation (it is assumed that is necessary to generate the economies of scale necessary for 
it to run efficiently): ‘The unwilling are told in effect: “You must participate even if you think 
it is not in your interest to do so, because it is manifestly in the interests of all the others, and 
the public interest too, that you do so. The compulsion is for their sakes, not yours.”’167 
Interest rate caps, then, are an example of Dworkin’s ‘impure paternalism’, discussed earlier:  
paternalism for the majority is sought for their protection and a direct, non-paternalistic 
imposition made on the remainder, for the sake of the public good. (I state majority, but there 
is no theoretical reason why this must be a majority/minority situation. We can at least 
imagine barring a majority from a practice harmless to them, for the sake of the minority it 
might be very harmful to). 
Where imposed for a segment of the population’s own good, are interest rate caps a case of 
justifiable paternalism? They could be, where the justification of partial autonomy is applied 
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on the grounds that the ability to rationally decide what rate is truly repayable has been 
undermined by desperation for credit now to avoid future hunger. And there would be at least 
a case for hard paternalism here if the state thought it impossible such rates could be repaid 
and the borrower rationally preferred risking the inability to repay to risking the inability to 
eat in the future. But this case would likely fail the test of the borrower knowing better for 
himself here than the state is likely to, not justifying the cap. This would be hard to argue if 
borrowing at very high rates were central to the core autonomy of agents. And here, whilst 
the goal behind the desire to borrow at these rates – say, to buy fertiliser – is hugely 
important to the agent and his survival, that doesn’t make the method by which he might do 
so – borrowing at high rates – central to his self-determination.  
It is then a further question, even if interest rate caps are found to be justifiable paternalism, 
whether they actually succeed in their paternalistic intention. It can be argued that all interest 
rate caps really do is ration credit to the best credit risks, depriving the very poorest of access, 
who may have the greatest need. For if a lender is restricted in what he may lend at, he will 
lend only to those who offer him the greatest chance of repayment, and not lend at all to those 
whose risk of failure to repay is higher. This is so because where he can charge a high rate, 
some of the profit that comes from doing so will cover the losses that come from the 
occasional default: where that marginal income from the highest rate is not available, the 
willingness to take the marginal risk with riskier borrowers disappears. 
Thus the impact of interest rate caps can be to restrict the supply of credit, and to restrict it to 
the very best credits with the lowest risk of default. Paternalistic legislation introduced to 
protect small borrowers and the poorest can thus have the effect of excluding them from the 
market altogether. Whether interest rates caps are a case of justified paternalism or not, they 
can be ineffective, even perverse, in their result.168  
The state’s aim in introducing interest rate caps may be well-motivated, but frustrated in the 
reality. It might do better if, rather than limiting what a financial institution can lend at to 
everyone, it limited through regulation those to whom the financial institution can lend at 
given rates. In other words, it might look to the MFI, via regulation, to achieve its 
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paternalistic aims for it. Whether that could be a realistic hope or not can be examined by 
looking at how paternalistically or otherwise MFIs interact with their clients at present. 
 
(b) MFI Rules in the Interests of Borrowers: Soft paternalism? 
(i) Compulsory Setting of Social Goals for Borrowers 
Most MFIs emphasise the importance of their social role as well as their financial one. Many 
stress how women can be empowered by group membership, and this for some is an 
important claim to make good on in order to attract donor funding. The validity of such 
claims will be considered in Chapter 9. Here, I simply consider if the requirement by MFIs 
that clients adopt these social goals is paternalistic. 
Grameen, famously, requested all borrowers to learn and practice in their daily lives, the 
‘Sixteen Decisions’. (BRAC also has its ‘Seventeen Rules’). Grameen borrowers have to be 
able to recite the Decisions in order to obtain a loan, so the Decisions were certainly imposed 
upon them. The 16 Decisions are: 
1.  The four principles of Grameen Bank - Discipline, Unity, Courage and Hard work – we shall follow in all 
walks of our lives.  
2.  Prosperity we shall bring to our families. 
3.  We shall not live in dilapidated houses. We shall repair our houses and work towards constructing new 
houses at the earliest.  
4.  We shall grow vegetables all the year round. We shall eat plenty of them and sell the surplus.  
5.  During the plantation seasons, we shall plant as many seedlings as possible.  
6.  We shall plan to keep our families small. We shall minimize our expenditures. We shall look after our 
health.  
7.  We shall educate our children and ensure that they can earn to pay for their education. 
8. We shall always keep our children and the environment clean.  
9.  We shall build and use pit-latrines.  
10.  We shall drink water from tubewells. If it is not available, we shall boil water or use alum.   
11.  We shall not take any dowry at our sons' weddings, neither shall we give any dowry at our daughters’ 
wedding. We shall keep our centre free from the curse of dowry. We shall not practice child marriage. 
12.  We shall not inflict any injustice on anyone, neither shall we allow anyone to do so. 
13.  For higher income we shall collectively undertake bigger investments. 
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14.  We shall always be ready to help each other. If anyone is in difficulty, we shall all help him. 
15.  If we come to know of any breach of discipline in any centre, we shall all go there and help restore 
discipline 
16.   We shall introduce physical exercise in all our centres. We shall take part in all social activities 
collectively.169   
The Sixteen Decisions emphasise discipline, unity of the group, hygiene, and hard work. In a 
commitment not to give or take dowry, they are quite radical. Rahman170 and Karim171 both 
argue, however, that as Grameen has evolved and grown, the 16 Decisions have become 
rhetorical. The purpose of the group centres has become wholly one of loan repayment, with 
recitation of the 16 Decisions now only taking place if there are special visitors, rather than at 
every meeting as originally required. Rahman notes that whilst Grameen reported in 1994 
that there were more than 30,000 dowry-free marriages among Grameen borrowers, there was 
no evidence of any dowry-free marriages in the village he lived and studied in. On the 
contrary, ‘all Grameen borrowers reported giving dowries for their daughters, accepting them 
for their sons, or planning to follow the practice in the future.’172 Indeed, he observes loans 
that were clearly taken out for the very purpose of paying dowry, regardless of the technical 
business purpose that the loan was said to be required for. 
The Sixteen Decisions were introduced by Grameen as a social development programme, and 
they do work towards empowerment of borrowers, but they are far short of a womens’ rights 
charter. They are more as Helen Todd describes them,173 ‘a sort of Mrs Beecham’s Better 
Housekeeping for rural Bangladesh.’ They cover health, discipline and mutual support, but 
not (for example) domestic violence, arbitrary divorce, inheritance rights or gender 
discrimination. ‘Its concern is with the women’s better functioning as mothers and household 
managers and so it reinforces the culture of maternal altruism which persuades women to sink 
their own interests in the good of the family.’174  
These social development goals would be paternalistic if they are imposed on borrowers. If, 
however, the borrowers happily sign up to them, there is no lack of voluntariness or 
infringement to autonomy and so there would be no paternalism. Todd’s study draws a 
                                                          
169 Quoted as Appendix B by Aminur Rahman, Women and microcredit in Rural Bangladesh (1999) Boulder, 
Colorado: Westview p.159 
170 Ibid. p.93 
171 Op. cit. note 131 
172 Op. cit. note 127,  p. 93 
173 Helen Todd, Women at the Center: Grameen Bank Borrowers after one Decade, (1996) Dhaka: Westview 
Press, p. 160 
174 Ibid. p223 
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picture where the Sixteen Decisions are happily embraced by the borrowers, even if not 
actually practiced. Even with regard to dowry, her study showed that women did regard the 
practice as an evil, but saw no alternative but to actually practice it. 
Todd’s study, however, was carried out in 1992, after Grameen had been present in the 
village she studied for a decade, but before the use of microcredit had exploded very much 
further in Bangladesh. Even in the first flush of enthusiasm for a new programme, if the 
borrowers did not agree with one of the Sixteen Decisions, they just ignored them. It was 
perhaps the case that if a potential borrower could not recite the Sixteen Decisions, she would 
have disbursement of her loan stopped until she had re-learnt them175, but there seems little 
evidence that loans were refused for non-compliance with the Decisions once extended, as 
the continued use of dowries and slow take-up of pit latrines showed. 
Still, to the extent that forcing borrowers to learn the decisions by rote was paternalistic, an 
argument can be made that the early results of doing so may have justified this. Todd 
surveyed the weight and height gain of children of Grameen Bank borrowers compared to a 
control group of non-borrowers, and there was a measureable difference in favour of the 
Grameen children. Interestingly, as time went on, the health advantage of Grameen 
borrowers’ children against non-borrowers diminished somewhat as good hygiene practices 
were copied in the village: essentially, if the wider community observed a social practice 
working, they were happy to follow it too when possible. But in fact even this is not true 
justified paternalism, for the beneficiaries, the children, are not those who were paternalised, 
the mothers. 
The health and lifestyle Decisions of the 16, then, were either never paternalistic because 
accepted voluntarily and thus did not impose on autonomy, or did impose on borrowers’ 
autonomy but were not paternalistic because the benefits were for others, or in just a few 
cases were examples of justified paternalism where the benefit really did go to the borrower 
herself. This is much less clear of the financial Decisions, 13 and 15. It is not obvious that 
these are in the interests of borrowers, and 15 in particular paved the way for the coercive 
loan collection practices enforced by fellow borrowers observed in chapter 5. These financial 
goals, as opposed to social goals, really fit in section (iii) below – rules that present a façade 
of justifiable paternalism, but are in fact more simply in the interests of the MFI itself. 
                                                          




(ii) Training  
Many MFIs require that a borrower have some experience of running a business before a loan 
will be extended: and even when she has, that she complete training that will cover some 
basic accounting and management tools for her business. Where the woman is already very 
experienced, this training may seem paternalistic, but in the majority of cases it will be 
welcomed by the borrower. The insistence on training is of course just as much for the sake 
of the MFI as the borrower, in order to try to prevent business failure and loss. Few instances 
of training will represent pure unjustified paternalism: they will, rather, divide into cases 
where the training is genuinely wanted, so no compromise of autonomy is involved and no 
question of paternalism arises: and cases where it is not wanted, but imposed anyway. Where 
this is only for the sake of the borrower, it is paternalistic, though perhaps justifiably so 
where the MFI has experience in observing how much worse borrowers do who undertake 
businesses without this prior training compared to those who do take it. Where the training is 
for the sake of the MFI itself, to avoid its loss, it ceases to be paternalism as such and just 
becomes routine imposition on the borrower as a cost of getting the loan. Realistically, it is 
likely to be a policy with a mixed rationale: in the interests of both borrower and lender alike. 
 
(c) MFI Rules in the Interests of MFIs (Rules Masquerading as Justified Paternalism) 
(i) Weekly and Fortnightly meetings 
In the original Grameen model and that of BRAC and their replicas, the group of borrowers 
met weekly: many, now, fortnightly. Sometimes, their doing so is presented by MFIs as 
empowerment: a rare chance (especially in Muslim countries) for women to travel outside the 
home compound, to meet other women, exchange tips and gossip. In presenting the frequent 
group meetings as being required of the women, but for their empowerment, the MFIs 
suggest that the practice is one of justifiable paternalism. This rather patronising view 
overlooks the time commitment that has to be made by the borrowers and the fact that, when 
asked, they generally would prefer to meet less frequently. The reason for the frequent 
meeting is, in reality, loan disbursement and interest repayment: and the reason the timescale 
is so frequent is to enable the MFI to stay closely in touch with the progress of borrowers and 
flag up default risk if a payment is missed. Weekly and biweekly meetings are not 
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paternalistically run as a sort of debtors’ Women’s Institute: they are for the MFI’s benefit of 
loan collection. The imposition on a woman’s autonomy exists: she may judge it worth it in 
autonomously deciding to take out the loan, and her consent would then validate the practice: 
but it remains a cost to her of taking the loan, and is not a case of justified paternalism. 
It may of course have been the case for some of the older MFIs, and this would be true of 
Grameen, that when the practice of regular weekly meetings and other practices in this 
section were begun, that the MFI’s rationale for imposing them was mixed, that there was 
indeed an element of empowerment and protection for the borrower for them as well as the 
protection of the interest of the MFI. There may have been some justified paternalism 
initially perhaps. But where the model has been adopted globally without any actual 
empowerment elements – represented by the 16 Decisions or other collective activity raising 
social issue pertinent to the borrower: or where these practices have since been dropped, as 
with the 16 Decisions only now being recited when visitors come – then it is clear that the 
original beneficial intent is essentially no longer present and what remains is mainly the 
MFI’s self-interest. 
The reader might then be curious as to why the MFIs keep up the language of these 
conditions of lending being for empowerment purposes, rather than for loan collection. The 
answer to that is that these claims are not necessarily made any longer to the borrower, but 
are necessary for the public perception of the MFI, with the impact that has on its fund-
raising. Hence these rules do in some instances masquerade as justified paternalism. No MFI 
want to be perceived as just an institutionalised moneylender. Rules that impose quite heavily 
on a borrower’s time and resources that are only for the purpose of loan collection could be 
seen in that way. Appearing paternalistic might not be ideal either, but would be preferred by 
many MFIs to the alternative. 
(ii) Compulsory Savings and Insurance 
Most MFIs insist on so-called compulsory ‘savings’ and some also on the borrower taking 
out insurance against her death. Again, these are often presented as justified paternalism, 
encouraging the excellent habit of saving in borrowers for their own good, and encouraging 
prudence with regard to unexpected death. 
In practice, both compulsory savings and insurance are enforced to protect the MFI against 
the possibility of borrower’s default. The way compulsory savings work is that the borrower 
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must deposit a sum, 10% or 20% of the value of the loan, with the MFI before the loan is 
disbursed. If she does not have this sum, it is deducted from the loan, so that she receives a 
loan of 80 instead of the requested 100 – although she is still charged full interest on the 100 
as if she had received it in full. She does not receive interest on her ‘savings’ (rather, she pays 
interest on them), nor may she have access to them during the period of her loan (Grameen 
has changed this practice to allow some access now). The ‘savings’ are pooled with those of 
all the borrowers in the group borrowing at the same time, and are held by the MFI (this is 
likely to be book accounting rather than a segregated and protected account). 
This pool of savings is then used as collateral by the MFI in the event of a borrower 
defaulting. Under the group liability model, all the borrowers in the group are jointly liable 
for the default of any one: but should they be less than forthcoming in making up her 
repayment, the group’s saving balance will be used first. 
It is not obvious what benefit the borrower derives from her ‘savings’, so the claims by MFIs 
that they are justifiable paternalism helping the borrower develop good financial habits falls 
flat. The purpose of the savings rules are for the MFI. 
This is also clear in the case of compulsory insurance. Todd176 reports that all Grameen 
members had to contribute five Taka for every 1,000 Taka received as payment in to an 
emergency fund which pays out in the event of death or other extreme disaster. She reports 
that there was one such payment to a Grameen member during the year she spent with two 
villages in Bangladesh. ‘The husband of one of our GB members, who was himself a member 
of the male center in Ratnogram, died suddenly. There was a ceremony in which the branch 
manager handed a letter of condolence and a 5,000 Taka payment from the emergency fund 
to the widow. Immediately after the ceremony, the bank worker took back the 4,984 Taka 
that the husband still owed to the Bank, leaving the widow with the letter and 16 Taka.’ 
The money is supposed to be a grant made to widows/widowers in the face of the death of a 
member (other uses were approved, but this was by far the most common). What this had 
become is a grant of 16 Taka and Grameen using the rest to recover its outstanding loan. 
Rahman177 observed similar instances in his study of Grameen. Compulsory savings and 
insurance, then, as commonly defined by MFIs, are not the cases of justifiable paternalism 
presented, but are just additional ways for the MFI to achieve greater security on its loan. 
                                                          
176 Op. cit. note 173 p. 26-7 




(iii) Loan Use 
Matters become more complex when we consider restrictions the MFI attempts to impose on 
what the loan is used for. A basic requirement of many MFIs is that the loans are used for 
productive purposes, not for consumption. Further, because interest payments become due on 
the loan almost immediately, the enterprise entered into needs to be immediately cash 
generative. Some then go on to impose further restrictions on the type of loan use: for 
example, that it only be used for legal activities, or that it explicitly may not be used for 
activities the MFI considers undesirable. Again, the MFI will claim that these are instances of 
justifiable paternalism. 
 
Production not consumption 
Like training, the insistence that the loan be used for productive, immediately income-
generating purposes only – not for investments that produced a delayed or longer term yield, 
such as agriculture or a child’s education, let alone for consumption such as paying for health 
care or even just food – this insistence would be paternalistic if it were for the borrower’s 
good. But as can be seen from what is not allowed, it is not for the borrower’s good per se, 
but to ensure the MFI begins to be repaid straight away. Investing in land, or fertiliser, or 
seed, might very well produce a better long term return (and the great prize of food security) 
than using the capital to set up a tomato-selling business: but a business model that buys 
wholesale then makes a quick turn by selling retail is strongly encouraged (and different 
models discouraged) because it is immediately cash generative, and the cash-flow of this 
model matches the loan repayment requirements of the MFI.178  
The MFI makes credit available, then, not for any business enterprise, but for enterprises that 
can repay high interest rates almost at once – the first repayment will be due just a week or 
two after the loan is disbursed. The borrower may well benefit more from investing in a 
higher return but poorer immediate cash flow business: the conditions of the loan seek to 
prevent this. This insistence on loan use for immediately productive purposes only, then, is 
                                                          
178 I do not mean to suggest here that no MFIs make agricultural loans: some do: but the standard approach is 
not to encourage borrowing for projects whose payoff is a year away and do not provide a means of servicing 
the interest in the meantime. 
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not unjustifiably paternalistic, because it is not paternalistic at all – its aim is not the good of 
the borrower. Its aim is to maximize the MFI’s chances of repayment.179  
 
Restricted ‘Productive’ Uses 
Most MFIs make it clear to borrowers that loans may not be used to pursue illegal activities, 
but where some of these illegal activities meet the cashflow requirements of the MFIs and are 
widely practised despite their illegality, a blind eye may be turned. An example of this is the 
use of loans to produce and retail ‘moonshine’, high ethanol alcohol, in Africa. (This is not 
known as an issue in Asia.) In this instance, very serious questions of harms to others are then 
raised, because of the link, especially strong in Africa, between alcohol use and the spread of 
HIV/Aids, violence and crime. This is particularly so (as with when it is sold by microcredit 
clients) where it is sold at informal gatherings and from, or from near, private homes. 
Kalichman et al180 in 2007 reviewed all the academic literature – about 80 studies – that 
examined the link between alcohol use and sexual risk behaviour in southern Africa. They 
observe that research has ‘repeatedly shown that alcohol use is related to sexual risks in 
several populations, especially among those with the highest rates of HIV infections.’181 As 
background, they note that two out of three people with HIV live in sub-Saharan Africa, 
where great quantities of alcohol are also consumed. They find that: ‘Like elsewhere in the 
world, alcohol use is often associated with sexual risks in southern Africa. However, unlike 
anywhere else, the implications of alcohol use on risks for HIV infection are greatest in 
southern Africa because HIV prevalence rates are highest.’182  
The studies surveyed show clearly that alcohol use is associated with STI and HIV 
prevalence. The predominant risk behaviour is amongst men who drink, who are more likely 
to have multiple sex partners, not use a condom, use prostitutes, and then transmit diseases to 
                                                          
179 In practice, of course, restrictions like this are very hard to enforce. Money being fungible, if a borrower 
engages in a mix of activities, it will be hard for the lender to ascertain exactly which (production or 
consumption, or amongst productive) his loan went to support. The lender’s inability to fully enforce his policy, 
however, does not affect the point that the policy, presented as justifiable paternalism, is in fact simply in his 
own interest. 
180 Seth Kalichman, Leickness Simbayi, Michelle Kaufman, Demetria Cain & Sean Jooste ‘Alcohol Use and 
Sexual Risks for HIV/AIDs in Sub-Saharan Africa: Systematic Review of Empirical Findings’, (2007) Society 
of Prevention Research 8 pp. 141-151. 
181 In particular they cite Lance Weinhardt  & Michael Carey (2001) ‘Does alcohol lead to sexual risk 
behaviour?’ Annual Review of Sex Research, 12, pp. 125-157 
182 Op. cit. note 180 p. 141 
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their partners at home. This is the link WHO refers to when it states: ‘Alcohol abuse 
constitutes one of the principal reasons for the propagation of AIDs especially among married 
women.’183 The Kalichman study of studies summarises: ‘people who drink alcohol in 
southern Africa are at higher risk for HIV than individuals who do not drink. The association 
between drinking and sexual risks is also observed across a wide array of populations. Any 
alcohol use at all and drinking greater quantities of alcohol are closely associated with HIV 
transmission risks in southern Africa.’184  
Having established this, Kalichman et al go on to look at factors that connect to alcohol use 
that can exacerbate its negative effects. Unfortunately, given this author’s experience in 
seeing the way in which the moonshine produced by women borrowers is sold (at shacks, or 
from near their homes), the study then finds this to be a distribution method that further 
increases the risk of spreading disease. ‘Informal alcohol serving establishments, such as 
private homes where alcoholic beverages are sold and served, are also often the same places 
where sex partners meet.’185 Research conducted in South Africa has demonstrated the close 
association between patronizing shebeens and HIV risks. Weir et al186 mapped the linkages 
among places where people meet new sex partners and places where people drink alcohol. 
The study demonstrated a remarkable overlap among these venues; ‘over 85% of the 
locations where people meet sex partners are alcohol serving establishments…As many as 
57% of men and 46% of women who drink at shebeens report having two or more sex 
partners in the past two weeks. Unfortunately, shebeens and other alcohol serving 
establishments, such as taverns and bottle stores, rarely have condoms available for their 
customers…The number of days of the week that men drink correlates with their frequency 
of engaging in unprotected sex with casual partners…Places that serve alcohol therefore 
appear uniquely linked to HIV transmission risks in southern Africa.’  
On top of the risks of HIV-AIDs transmission, Kalichman et al summarise the evidence of a 
link between alcohol use and sexual coercion. (Note that the highest incidence of new HIV 
                                                          
183 Global Status Report on Alcohol (2004), WHO 2004, see at http://www.who-
int/substance_abuse/publications/global_status_report_2004_overview.pdf, accessed 11/9/2012 
184 Op. cit. note 180 p.146 
185 Neo Morojele , Millicent Kachieng’a, Matsobane Nkoko, Kgaogelo Moshia, Evodia Mokoko, Charles Parry, 
Mwansa Nkowane & Shekhar Saxena ‘Perceived effects of alcohol use on sexual encounters among adults in 
South Africa’, (2004) African Journal of Drugs and Alcohol Studies, 3, 1-20, 
186 Sharon Weir, Charmaine Pailman, Xoli Mahlalela, Nicol Coetzee, Farshid Meidany, Ties Boerma, ‘From 
people to places: Focusing AIDS prevention efforts where it matters most’, (2003) AIDS 17 pp. 895-903 
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infections in Malawi is amongst girl adolescents (10-19), 56% of whom report forced sex.)187 
Kalichman et al summarise: ‘Sexual assault is prevalent in southern Africa and sexual 
violence is related to alcohol use and HIV transmission risks. Men who have a history of 
sexual violence are more likely to drink than men who have not been sexually assaultive. 
Likewise, alcohol use is associated with having been sexually assaulted among women…The 
association between relationship violence and HIV risk is at least partly accounted for by 
alcohol use...it is clear that alcohol consumption and sexual violence are related’ 188 
The question of whether a woman distilling and selling moonshine in southern Africa does so 
legally or not varies with each country, but usually turns on whether she has been licensed. In 
both Zambia and Malawi, for example, the production of moonshine (often called kachasu in 
Zambia, but it has a lot of nicknames in both places) for home consumption, for personal use, 
is legal. The sale of it, unless licensed, is illegal. The sale of it to under-18s is illegal, whether 
licensed or unlicensed. (This is a serious problem in Zambia). Some provinces in Zambia 
have local bye-laws regarding kachasu specifically, that make the sale of it illegal even if 
licensed.189  
The author has yet to meet a woman borrower in either of these countries who includes the 
cost of a license in her cost breakdown when asked. It is unlikely that licences are even 
applied for, as the borrowers are operating in the ‘informal’ sector and do not usually pay 
taxes. If they are not licensed, then they are selling moonshine illegally. An MFI forbidding 
the use of a loan for illegal activities may be thinking paternalistically of its borrowers, but as 
in many other cases may also have mixed motives – its reputation, and possibly its banking 
licence (where it has one) would be at severe risk if it were found funding illegal activities. 
The principle that ought to be called upon to justify the prevention of loan use for such illegal 
activities as the sale of moonshine is much more simple: that of the prevention of harm to 
others. Perhaps because giving this as a justification might expose MFIs to taking 
                                                          
187 Anne Conroy, Malcolm Blackie, Alan Whiteside, Justin Malewezi, Jeffrey Sachs,  Poverty, AIDS and 
Hunger: Breaking the Poverty Trap in Malawi (2006) Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan pp. 59-60 
188 Op. cit. note 180 p. 148 
189 The law in this area in Zambia is summarised by Alan Haworth in Moonshine Markets, ed. Alan Haworth 
and Ronald Simpson, New York: Hove: Brunner-Routledge 2004, chapter 4 pp. 41-67. The main acts are the 
Liquor Licensing Act (Chapter 167 of the Laws of Zambia), the Traditional Beer Act and the Markets Act, 
which forbids the sale of alcohol beverages within markets. In Malawi, the main act that covers moonshine is 
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enforced, although there are sporadic outburst of activity e.g. a team of 48 security officers rounded up 20 
kachasu distillers in Mazabuka in August 2009 – though it took them an hour and a half to arrest a woman in her 




responsibility for the indirect consequences of other types of loan as well, this is seldom 
done. 
It is paternalistic: it infringes on the autonomy of MFI clients and the drinkers to prevent the 
harm to them of potential jail sentences for illegal activities for the clients and catching STIs 
for the drinkers, and as such is justified paternalism. But more important is the prevention of 
harm to innocent parties, notably the wives of the drinking men who pass on STIs caught 
from prostitutes to their partners at home. This prevention of harm is not paternalistic as such 
(an MFI rule forbidding loans for the purpose of illegal activities imposes on the autonomy of 
the borrowers, not the autonomy of the wives of the borrowers’ drinking clients) but would 
be justified by the principle of prevention of harm to others. 
 
 
III.  The Dog not Barking: The Absence of Required Paternalism 
In our discussion of which of the practices of microcredit are driven by the interests of the 
borrower, or by the interests of the MFI: and which are paternalistic, and which justifiably so 
when they are, there has been one resounding absence. At no point have we seen a practice of 
microcredit institutions that ensures, as far as possible, that the MFI only make loans to 
people who are, individually, likely to be able to repay them. What such a practice would 
look like, would be a clear demonstration by the MFI to the borrower of the true interest rate 
the borrower was going to pay over the life of the loan, and a realistic assessment of the 
margin and profit the business undertaken by the borrower will generate. Together, these 
would generate an awareness that, if things go to plan, the enterprise is actually capable of 
meeting the cash flow requirements of the debt. In other words, the MFI would keep records 
of the projected cash flow and profitability of the business and the true interest rate being 
charged on the loan and only extend the loan when the former exceeded the latter. 
Having such a policy in place could easily be paternalistic when it resulted in some loan 
applications being turned down for the good of the borrower, because she was deemed 
unlikely to be able to repay without having recourse to family, sale of assets or other means 
that leave her worse off than she was to begin with. This would be an example of the MFI 
substituting its judgement for another’s, the borrower’s, to promote the borrower’s benefit.  
127 
 
Feinberg’s soft paternalism-only approach would be unlikely to find this practice acceptable. 
One part of it might be – the clarification of the true interest rate the business is going to have 
to cover – because without this, the borrower will be acting in ignorance, substantially 
involuntarily, in reaching her decision that she can take on this rate. But beyond this the 
Feinberg approach will be unable to go. 
A broadly consequentialist approach will more easily justify the paternalism involved in 
declining to extend loans to those very unlikely to be able to repay, but who yet want them.  
The imposition on the ability to act autonomously by taking the loan is not insignificant, but 
the harm avoided in terms of the dangers of over-indebtedness may justify this. At the least, a 
borrower who fails to repay and becomes subject to the coercive pressures of her group, or 
who has to turn to a still higher rate moneylender to repay her loan, may end up with less 
autonomy than she began with. 
It is worth clarifying why an MFI turning down a potential borrower’s request for a loan, 
when it does so bearing only her and not its interest in mind, would be paternalistic. It might 
be argued that the decision not to extend a loan does not violate a borrower’s autonomy, for 
the level of the borrower’s autonomy would seem to be just the same after the loan refusal as 
before. But we should bear in mind that it is the usurpation of an agent’s decision-making 
process that is at the heart of paternalism, preventing an agent from doing what he has 
decided to do. It could be argued that it is just not usually in an agent’s gift to decide to take 
out a loan: she can choose to apply for one, and another party preventing her from applying 
would act paternalistically. (As a parent with strong views on the outlook for inflation would, 
who stopped her student son or daughter from taking out a student loan whose repayment was 
linked to a future inflation rate.) But the lender merely not approving the loan application 
would not usually be regarded as paternalistic.  
But this is to overlook that in the case of microfinance, the decision to apply for a loan is the 
same as the decision to take a loan out. The MFI does not have an individual loan approval 
process. Its requirement is that borrowers form groups, decide amongst themselves who will 
be allowed to join the group and then guarantee each other’s loans. The group then applies 
together and loans are granted en masse. Thus were the MFI to individuate at this stage, and 
decide to decline a loan to a borrower for her sake, to prevent her running the risk of coercive 




Some will be surprised that such fairly simple record keeping as recording the true rate of 
interest on a loan, the proposed margin on the business of a borrower, or her cash flow, is not 
already carried out by MFIs in their own interest, to maximize the chances of being repaid, as 
would be the case if a small business loan were extended in developed countries. But this is 
to forget that, although the MFI may have been set up with the noble aim of alleviating 
poverty through the extension of credit, as we have seen earlier, the use of group liability 
creates perverse incentives for loan officers. Group liability, to recall, means that if one 
borrower in a group cannot make her repayments, others in the group have to do so for her. 
This means that the MFI is incentivised, not to ensure that every individual it lends to is 
capable of repaying her loan through generating a sufficient margin on the business she 
undertakes, but rather to ensure that there are enough (it need only be one or two) borrowers 
in the group who are doing so well that they can cover the payments of the struggling 
borrowers as well. Thus the MFI’s purported interest in each individual borrower’s ability to 
repay becomes subverted to an interest that just enough in the group can cover the 
repayments of all: which may leave some individuals seriously losing out from their 
microcredit experience, since as we have seen, those losses are not covered by other 
borrowers without cost to the original borrower. 
A practice, then, of MFIs keeping records demonstrating that, at least on the researched, 
projected business plan, the borrower looks likely to benefit from using microcredit, would 
be a good practice to implement, even if (justifiably) paternalistic. But is the case stronger 
than this? Does the lender have a duty to the borrower, first, to make transparent the real rate 
of interest he is charging, and second, to paternalistically refuse to extend the loan if that rate 
exceeds the margin available from the business she intends to set up? 
I would argue to the first that he does: firstly, because if this rate is not transparent, then he 
misleads the borrower: and secondly, because the extension of credit, especially to the poor, 
is an application of the principle of a duty of care between expert seller and non-expert buyer 
when the good provided can be harmful to the purchaser, as laid out in section III of the 
previous chapter. The borrower’s poverty matters here: clearly, an extension of credit to one 
who would have to sell her last assets, even the roof off her home, if the business failed, has a 
great deal more potential for having harm done her than the extension of credit to one who 
would only have to forgo some marginal consumption if the business failed. 
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On the first point, the true rate of interest charged to the borrower is rarely as transparent as it 
should be. Typically, a ‘flat rate’ of interest is charged, quoted monthly: say, 5% per month 
for a four month loan. A headline rate of 5% will then be quoted, rather than 20% for the four 
months, or 60% if it were rolled for a year; or 73% if the 20% every four month rate is 
compounded (i.e. interest is paid on interest.) This is how the rate would have to be quoted in 
the UK.190 Indeed, matters are much worse than this: a full calculation of the interest paid, 
allowing for the capital sum paid off each month, fees etc., could be well over 200%.191  
There are arguments for not including every step in the interest calculation above for figuring 
out the true rate of a microcredit loan: the client may not renew it every four months, though 
they are encouraged to and most do. The point, however, is that the author would have 
struggled to compute these rates without a scientific calculator, and there are plenty of loan 
officers and fundraisers in the microcredit industry who simply do not understand the true 
interest rate they are themselves charging, so one can imagine the difficulty for a compound-
interest-calculator-free borrower base to do so. Innocently or otherwise, for an MFI to quote a 
5% flat monthly rate, or 60% flat annual rate for its loans when it is actually charging a fully-
costed 200% or higher, is grotesque. There are, indeed, some significant margins available to 
some borrowers finding wholesale suppliers and selling retail. But, perhaps, not all that many 
exceed these rates. There is a strong case that the MFI who quotes the low rates here and 
hides the true cost behind a lack of transparency to the borrower, misleads her. 
For those who insist that it is caveat emptor, and the frequently illiterate borrowers should be 
able to work out all this for themselves, we should note that this is not a standard we demand 
for considerably less vulnerable borrowers in developed countries, where, as noted, in the UK 
the disclosure of the APR rate is compulsory before any loan agreement is finally signed.192 
                                                          
190 The standard rate that any UK financial firm must quote in addition to any other rate it uses is the Annualised 
Percentage Rate (APR) which is 1+({interest rate/100}/number of compounding periods)) raised to the power of 
number of compounding periods.  
191 The 5% rate will be quoted on a flat-line basis: interest is charged on the full sum initially borrowed in each 
month, rather than on a declining balance basis, i.e. only on the remaining sum of the loan outstanding (on a 
four month loan, a quarter of the principal will be paid off each month, as well as the interest due.) A loan of 
100 for four months, with 25% paid back each month, is an average balance over the four months of only 62.5, 
not 100, but interest is charged on the full 100. The ‘simple interest’ of a flat 20% over four months is 32% on a 
declining balance basis, which compounds not to the 73% annual rate above, but 229%. Worse is to come. On 
top of all of this, if 20% of the original loan extended (100) is held back as ‘savings’, so that the borrower 
actually only receives 80, but pays interest as if it were 100, then the final annual percentage rate she pays, 
compounded, on the money actually received, rises to 274%. (Some MFIs also deduct fees from the loan 
amount before extending it, and most frequency of repayment periods are much shorter than monthly, usually, 
weekly or biweekly; both factors will raise the true cost of interest still higher. But perhaps enough already.) 
192 As it is in the EU and US, albeit the method of calculating APR is a little different in the US compared to the 
UK and EU. 
130 
 
But does the MFI have a further duty, not only to provide a fully transparent interest rate, but 
to keep records to ensure that at least the projected margins of the business the borrower 
proposes to undertake exceed it? And to refuse to extend a loan unless it does? 
In the context of microcredit, despite the seeming contradiction given the importance given 
here to autonomy, I argue that such a practice – of ensuring projected margins do exceed the 
interest charged – is required if the extension of microcredit is to be carried out ethically. The 
risks to the borrower when this is not done are just too great: we are considering indebting the 
poorest, whose ability to withstand a failure is the least. If one stands back and imagines an 
MFI that made these calculations and understood which of its borrowers were most likely to 
fail – and then went ahead and lent to them anyway, because provided it gets repaid by the 
others in the group, it is in its financial interest to do so – we might more quickly see that 
what the MFI does here is wrong. If that is conceded, then a requirement not to make that 
loan when that information is available: and the prior requirement to garner that information, 
surely follows. 
What I am arguing for here is the recognition of a duty of care between the MFI lender and 
the borrower. To the extent that the exercise of that duty of care (when refusing loans to those 
wanting them but very likely to have to struggle hard to repay them without severe sacrifice) 
is paternalistic, that is not only justified by the harm avoided, but the duty of care requires it. 
We saw in section III in the previous chapter that a duty of care between seller/provider of a 
good and its purchaser exists when the product is potentially harmful and the purchaser’s 
ability to assess its appropriateness for herself is foreseeably impaired (whether through her 
relative ignorance, or the product being sold in such a way as to prevent this).  
The application of this to microfinance would be as follows. A loan carrying an interest 
charge, especially a very high one, is a potentially dangerous product for the borrower. It may 
facilitate some profitable transaction whose profit margin more than covers the interest rate 
cost: but as we have seen in previous chapters, it may also lead the borrower into a downward 
spiral of debt from which she cannot extricate herself, which in the poverty-ridden world of 
microfinance, may see her bullied, coerced and even driven to suicide. The product of debt is, 
clearly, potentially dangerous, as with Stevenson’s snail-infested ginger beer. There is also 
the required limitation on the borrower’s ability to assess if the product is suitable for her or 
not: the woeful lack of transparency as to the true interest rate on most microfinance loans 
operates like the darkened glass on the ginger beer. Without knowing the true rate, the 
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borrower cannot properly assess if the product is suitable for her, if the true cost of the loan 
exceeds the margin she can make using the loan, or if her cashflow from other sources of 
income can make up the loan repayments. Finally there will be occasions where the borrower 
demands the loan despite these problems, and exercising the duty of care then is paternalistic, 
but not only justifiably so, but is required of the MFI. 
A duty of care in lending has not, hitherto, been clearly established. That may partly have 
been because in the past, a financial institution may often have acted in the same way as it 
would have done had one been recognised, from its own self-interest in maximising the 
chances of getting the loan repaid. In developed countries, analysis of a borrower’s cash flow 
or business prospects for a business loan is standard practice before extending a loan: not 
from paternalistic motives of preventing over-indebtedness in the borrower, but to protect the 
profitability of the financial institution, which would suffer severely if more than a few are 
unable to repay loans. A duty of care may always have existed, but been subsumed from our 
notice by the institution’s own self-interest in acting in the same way as if it had been. It has 
been the advance of securitisation in developed markets, and the group liability model in 
microfinance, that has divorced the interest of the lending institution from that of the 
borrower with regard to repayment. In the US housing market, once the original, long-
practiced ‘originate-to-hold’ method of making housing loans (old-fashioned savings and 
loans and banks making mortgage loans directly to known clients of the institution and then 
holding them until repaid many years later) gave way to the ‘originate-to-distribute’ 
methodology that securitisation made possible in the 90s and 00s. Once that occurred, the 
commonality of repayment interest between borrower and lender ceased to hold, and the sub-
prime mortgage crisis of the mid 2000s became possible. In the world of microfinance, as we 
have seen, the group liability model means that the lender does not require that any particular 
borrower be able to repay her loan, only that some or all of the group are capable of doing so 
on her behalf if she fails to. 
So the old-fashioned prudence in lending, which masked and made unnecessary a duty of 
care to the poorest borrowers (who are more vulnerable to harm in the event of failure to 
repay), ceased to be applied. But that, of course, hardly means that the moral duty of care 
ceased to apply. Rather, that duty now needs enunciating since changes in financial practice 
have left its assumed absence exposed. But if we accept a duty of care in construction, in 
medicine – in, in fact, the manufacture and sale of all products – there is no reason not to 
accept it in lending as well, just because we once had no apparent need to. It was always 
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there: it was subsumed by good practice: and it now stands clear again in times of bad 
practice.193  
And does a duty of care imply a limited, but required, paternalism? In medicine we think so. 
Where the product is potentially harmful and the patient unable to assess its advantages and 
disadvantages to him, but believes he wants it, we expect the doctor to override the patient’s 
autonomy and refuse to prescribe where he believes it will do more harm than good. Ditto 
financial services: the borrower may want a loan, but if considering his business prospects or 
overall cashflow, the lender perceives it to be more likely to harm than benefit him (even 
though not necessarily harm the lender where group liability exists), then the lender has a 
duty to the borrower, paternalistically, not to make that loan. The harm principle requires it. 
 
To summarise this and the preceding chapter, then, paternalism is prima facie wrongful, but 
may be justifiable where either autonomy is partial, or the imposition on autonomy is trivial, 
and the benefit accruing to/harm avoided by the subject of the paternalism great. In the 
practices of microcredit, most state intervention in the sector through banning it, or through 
the use of interest rate caps, is judged to be unjustifiable paternalism, or simply just 
ineffective. With regard to the practices of microcredit lenders themselves, a case was found 
for viewing the paternalistic imposition of social goals and financial training on borrowers as 
justifiable: but the imposition of many standard practices often presented as justified 
paternalism – weekly meetings, compulsory savings and insurance, the use of loans for 
productive purposes only – were not found to be justifiable paternalism at all, as not even 
being paternalistic, but simply in the interest of the lender. Some practices of banning 
particular types of loan use were found not to be paternalistic, but justified by the prevention 
of harm to others.  
                                                          
193 There are other reasons why a duty of care in finance is harder to establish legally (as opposed to morally). 
Peter Cane notes in his entry ‘Negligence in Civil Law’ in ‘The New Oxford Companion to Law’ (2008)  
Oxford: Oxford University Press p. 828) that ‘foreseeability is normally a sufficient condition of the existence of 
a duty to take care not to harm another’s body or physical property (cars, houses, and so on); but it may not be 
sufficient in relation to mental harm or financial loss. This is partly because it is considered not as important for 
the law to protect people from mental harm and financial loss as from bodily injury and property damage.’ But 
of course, the fact that a duty of care is harder to establish in the case of financial loss than in the case of 
physical loss does not mean it cannot be established at all: especially where here, in microfinance, the group 
liability structure for repayment means that it is foreseeable to the MFI that a financial loss may easily translate 
into physical loss (to person or property) as the group tries to recover what it can. 
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Most challengingly, it has been argued that there is a duty of care on microcredit lenders to 
their borrowers which, in some instances, not only justifies but requires paternalism in the 
form of refusing to extend loans to those demanding them who are very unlikely to be able to 
repay them, and who may incur great harm when others covering their missed payment exert 
potentially severe coercive pressure on them. This application of a duty of care is held to hold 
in microfinance as it does in other areas where a product is potentially harmful and the 
purchaser’s ability to judge its suitability for himself is foreseeably impaired, but he yet still 
desires it. Of course, that duty of care may go beyond microcredit to the provision of 
financial services generally where lending to the poorest (and thus most vulnerable to harm if 
unable to repay) and where the rate lent at is equally obscure, be that subprime or payday 


















Chapter 8: Does Microfinance Work Towards Alleviating Poverty? 
Throughout this thesis, we have seen that, on occasion, microfinance institutions exploit and 
coerce their borrowers, claim to justifiably paternalise when simply following their own 
interest and fail to paternalise where it might be thought a duty of care was owed by the 
microfinance institution to the borrower in particular instances to do so. Throughout this 
thesis, the question has had to keep being deferred: all these things could yet be worth it (at 
least for a consequentialist) if microfinance succeeds in its claims of empowering and raising 
its borrowers out of poverty. The next two chapters finally address that issue. Does 
microfinance succeed in making good on its claims? This chapter examines the evidence at 
the micro and macro level that microfinance reduces poverty, Chapter 9 whether it empowers 
its borrowers. 
The claims of poverty reduction and empowerment that the industry has made have been 
large. Leading MFIs would advertise themselves as offering a solution to global poverty. One 
of the strongest claims came from Muhammad Yunus: ‘58% of the poor who borrowed from 
Grameen are now out of poverty. There are over 100 million people now involved in 
microcredit schemes. At the rate we’re heading, we’ll halve total poverty by 2015. We’ll 
create a poverty museum in 2030.’ 194 
Claims for empowerment have hardly been less demanding. ACCION, FINCA, The Grameen 
Foundation, Opportunity International, Unitus and Women’s World Banking, all leading 
players in global microfinance, put out a common  statement195 in September 2010 stating 
that ‘microfinance is particularly able to empower women, giving them access to the 
material, human and social resources necessary to make strategic choices in their lives: 
establishing or strengthening financial independence; transforming power relationships; 
improving stability and family prospects by directing more income towards families; and, 
particularly, engendering dignity and pride.’ 
Whilst less certain of itself today, the hype promoting microfinance is still active: on January 
27, 2011, the Microcredit Summit Campaign issued a press release beginning: ‘Nearly 2 
million Bangladeshi households involved in microfinance – including almost 10 million 
family members, net – rose above the US$1.25 a day threshold between 1990 and 2008.’  The 
                                                          
194 Interview with Ishaan Tharoor, Time Magazine ‘Paving the Way out of Poverty’, Oct 13 2006, available at 
www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1546100,00.html 




report does go on to say that there is no proof of causality here, but the bold linking of the 
numbers moving out of poverty with the numbers receiving microfinance is evidently 
intended to be suggestive. 
This chapter examines the evidence for poverty alleviation. In Section I,  the problem of what 
is to count as evidence is examined: until recently, there had been no randomised control 
trials (RCTs) of microfinance, and there are problems of methodological weaknesses in the 
anecdotal, before-and-after and ‘impact’ studies that we had, most especially their lack of 
measuring drop-outs from microfinance programs. We do now have a few RCTs, however, 
and these will be examined in Section II  – and the absence of much positive evidence that 
microfinance does lift its borrowers out of poverty observed. 
The examination of the evidence of the impact of microfinance thus far will have been at the 
micro level: the impact on microfinance’s borrowers. If we are looking at the overall impact 
of microfinance in terms of numbers net raised out of poverty, we should not, perhaps, just be 
looking at MFIs’ own borrowers. We should also consider the impact on non-borrowers: if 
microfinance brought about growth and its borrowers then started employing others in their 
community as their business grew, the overall impact of microfinance on its community 
could still be positive, even if it was only marginal at best for the microentrepeneurs. In 
Section III, these issues are considered: unfortunately, the evidence (such as it is) is the other 
way: it can be argued that the displacement effects of microfinance just reduce margins for all 
and drives others out of business. There is little evidence of microfinance businesses growing 
and providing employment other than for the self-employed borrower. There is also 
potentially a high opportunity cost here if subsidy that has gone in to microfinance could 
instead have gone in to developing a country’s small and medium enterprise (SME) sector 
that might actually have increased productivity and created growth, thus ultimately reducing 
poverty, but this is hard to measure. 
In the process of examining all this evidence, and establishing what we do know about the net 
overall impact of microfinance, we also learn how little we know about the distribution of 
returns from microfinance to its borrowers. Concluding that there is net zero impact, after all, 
is not at all the same as concluding that there is no impact: we still need to know how many 
are made worse off (and by how much) and how many are made better off (and by how 
much.) For every one that does escape from poverty, how many (if any) fall back in to a more 
extreme form of it? There is some evidence that the very poorest do the worst from 
136 
 
microfinance, and that some of the industry’s well-meaning attempts to extend it to them, are 
badly misplaced and backfire. The philosophical stance one takes towards questions of 
distribution of benefits and harms – whether all count equally, whether some form of priority 
should apply, whether large harms cannot be justified by offsetting even larger gains – will 
thus affect whether one thus sees microfinance as ‘working’ or not. These problems are 
discussed in Chapter 10, after Chapter 9 explicitly considers the issue of empowerment. 
 
I. What Counts as Evidence 
Over the past thirty years, there have been many studies by microfinanciers and academics to 
demonstrate the positive impact of microfinance: but the vast majority have been beset with  
methodological flaws that have rendered their findings of little applicability to the question of 
the overall impact of microfinance. In a recent systematic review of publications on the 
impact of microfinance,196 Durendock et al surveyed 2643 publications, but found only 58 
worth studying in depth, observing ‘our report shows that almost all impact evaluations of 
microfinance suffer from weak methodologies and inadequate data…thus the reliability of 
impact estimates are adversely affected.’ 
Beyond the fundraising and marketing story-telling, where an MFI selects a borrower with a 
particularly moving story to tell of how access to credit has transformed her life (with no 
counterfactuals or suggestion of representativeness), the early studies of microfinance were 
‘before-and-after’ studies, which compared a group of borrowers on various measures of 
health, childrens’ education and income at the onset of taking out a microloan, and then a 
year or some years later. The problem with these studies is that although they can give a rich 
detail of a borrower’s life, there is no counterfactual – there is no control group of similarly-
placed non-borrowers against which to begin to judge whether any improvements seen were 
simply due to growth in the local economy, or changed governmental welfare distribution 
policies, rather than the microloan. Worst of all, ‘drop-outs’ are seldom included in these 
studies. Thus Helen Todd’s study of Grameen borrowers, discussed earlier197, studies only 
borrowers of many years standing, and does not look at how life fared for those who took 
loans, ceased repayment and left the group. Todd’s insights into group dynamics remain very 
                                                          
196 Maren Duvendock, Richard Palmer-Jones, James Copestake, Lee Hooper, Yoon Loke, Nitya Rao, ‘What is 
the Evidence of the Impact of Microfinance on the well-being of Poor People?’ (2011) London: EPPI-Centre, 
Social Science Research Unit, Institute of Education, University of London 
197 Op. cit. note 173 
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helpful, but as an assessment of net positive impact of credit on borrowers (which she 
observes) the study tells us nothing, as any negative impact on those ceasing borrowing is not 
measured. With regard to how far the loan can be measured as the cause of any impact, in a 
recent study using data from a microfinance programme in Nepal, Rajbanski, Huang and 
Wydick198 find that ‘just over two thirds (68.3%) of the significant apparent impact observed 
by practitioners based on ‘before-and-after observations of microfinance borrowers is 
illusory.’ 
It is not surprising, perhaps, that not measuring impacts on drop outs seriously skews results; 
after all, if it is largely unsuccessful clients who drop out, not measuring them amounts to 
simply not measuring one’s failures and only measuring one’s successes. Alexander-Tedeschi 
and Karlan199 also found that failing to include dropouts biases estimates of impact. 
Criticising the Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise Services (AIMS) methodology used 
by USAID to asses impact (which recommends excluding programme dropouts in 
calculations), they find that including dropouts changes the measures of impact dramatically: 
‘Where the AIMS cross-sectional methodology showed an increase of US $1200 in annual 
microenterprise profit, including dropouts caused the estimate to fall to a decrease of about 
$170.’ 
Most of the 2643 studies Dupendock et al discount are more sophisticated than before and 
after studies; they are ‘impact studies’ that do use a control group to attempt to measure the 
counterfactual, although many still have a problem with not tracing dropouts from the target 
group. There have also been other problems associated with these too, as Mosley lays out in 
his working paper ‘The use of control groups in impact assessments for microfinance.’200 The 
main biases that can enter impact studies using control groups are sample selection bias, 
misspecification of underlying causal relationships, and motivational problems. Sample 
selection bias is perhaps the most major of these. 
Mosley notes that there is a significant risk that the comparison between the control group 
and the target group may become contaminated by factors that prevent the control group 
effectively simulating the without-project situation. The target group – the borrowers – may 
                                                          
198 Ram Rajbanski, Meng Huang and Bruce Wydick ‘Measuring Microfinance: - Cognitive and Experimental 
Bias – with new Evidence from Nepal’ (2012) Working Paper 
199 Gwendolyn Alexander-Tedeschi and Dean Karlan ‘Microfinance Impact: Bias from Drop-Outs’ (2006) 
Financial Access Initiative and Innovations For Poverty Action, see www.financialaccess.org 
200 Paul Mosley ‘The use of control groups in impact assessments for microfinance’ (1998) Working Paper no. 
19, International Labour Office, Geneva 
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possess qualities the control group does not have, such as an entrepreneurial ability that 
drives them to become borrowers in the first place: but it is then impossible  to say if any 
subsequent success is due to the loan, or their more driven approach. Mosley also notes 
Roethlisberger and Dickson’s201 observation of ‘Hawthorne effects’, where factory workers 
who knew themselves to be the subject of an experiment simply become more productive 
than those workers not singled out as such. Sample bias can also occur because, being 
fungible, a loan is not used for the purpose intended: Goetz and Gupta202 showed that the 
proceeds of some loans awarded to women were simply passed through and used by men 
who were not necessarily in the target group against whom impact was being measured, 
meaning that here, potential impact – positive or negative – of a loan was simply not being 
recorded. Sample bias can also enter by the control group becoming contaminated by outside 
events – unless the MFI extending loans to the target group is and remains the only MFI in 
the area, members of the control group may over the course of the study get loans from 
elsewhere, thus invalidating the impact of a microloan study. 
As Armendáriz and Morduch203 observe ‘this is not an esoteric concern that practitioners and 
policymakers can safely ignore. It is not just a difference between obtaining ‘very good’ 
estimates of impacts versus ‘perfect’ estimates – the biases can be large.’ Armendáriz and 
Morduch quote McKernan’s204 study of Grameen Bank, which ‘finds that not controlling for 
selection bias can lead to overestimation of the effect of participation on profits by as much 
as 100 per cent. In other cases discussed later, controlling for biases reverses conclusions 
about impacts entirely.’ 
Careful construction of target and control groups can reduce some of these issues. Where an 
MFI is starting up, has no competitors in town, and is rolling out its program, it can use as a 
control group for new borrowers those identified as borrowers-in-waiting (those who want to 
borrow, perhaps in a year’s time when funds to the MFI became available). Hidden factors 
such as entrepreneurial ability can also be controlled for. The number of studies reaching this 
criteria is of course much fewer than the whole: and amongst these, the problem of tracing 
                                                          
201 Fritz Roethlisberger and William Dickson, Management and the Worker (1939)  Cambridge Mass: Harvard 
University Press 
202 Anne  Marie Goetz and Rina Sen Gupta, ‘Who Takes the Credit? Gender, power and control over loan use in 
rural credit programs in Bangladesh’ (1996) World Development no 24 pp. 45-63 
203 Beatriz Armendáriz and Jonathan Morduch The Economics of Microfinance (2007) Cambridge. Mass.; 
London: MIT Press p. 201 
204 Signe-Mary McKernan ‘The Impact of Microcredit programs on self-employment profits: Do non-credit 
program aspects matter?’ (2002) Review of Economics and Statistics 84 (1) pp. 93-115 
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and measuring impact on those who drop out of the program remains, and is a large issue. 
Graham Wright205 finds dropout rates as high as 25-60 per cent per year in East Africa, and 
Hulme and Mosley found dropout rates of 15% in Bangladesh.206   
In 1998 Pitt and Khandler207 published a study that promised to get beyond the problems of 
before and after studies and impact studies using control groups by taking a quasi-
experimental approach. This became the most influential study of microcredit’s impact until 
the very recent development of randomised control trials. It studied 1798 households who 
were members and non-members of three Bangladeshi MFIs, Grameen Bank, BRAC and 
RD-12. This used the fact that all three MFIs limited membership to those who had less than 
half an acre of land, with the idea that there was actually little difference in the poverty level 
of those just below and just above the half acre cut-off point, so this could be used to measure 
the difference between those in poverty receiving a microloan and those in similar poverty 
not doing so in otherwise extremely similar circumstances. Pitt and Khandker’s principle 
finding was that 100 taka lent to a female borrower increased household consumption by 18 
taka (increases in household consumption when the loan was made to a male were lower.) 
However, its own soundness was challenged by Morduch208 and later also Roodman and 
Morduch209, in an academic debate that had econometricians gripped and non-
mathematicians struggling to keep up210.  Eventually, Pitt made his own computer code 
available to Roodman and Morduch: their running of this did cancel the negative result they 
had originally found instead of Pitt & Khandker’s positive one, but still left Roodman 
concluding: ‘the bottom line is the same: these studies can show correlations but cannot 
credibly prove causation.’211  
What this section has done, then, is to explain the methodological weaknesses of the vast 
majority of impact studies carried out in microfinance up until the last few years. In the last 
                                                          
205 Graham Wright ‘Dropouts and graduates: Lessons from Bangladesh’ (2001) Microbanking Bulletin 6 pp14-
16 
206 David Hulme and Paul Mosley, Finance Against Poverty: Effective Institutions for Lending to Small Farmers 
and Microenterprises in Developing Countries (1996)  London: Routledge 
207 Mark Pitt and Shahidur Khandker ‘The Impact of Group-Based Credit Programs on Poor Households in 
Bangladesh: Does the Gender of Participants Matter?’ (1998) The Journal of Political Economy 106 (5) pp. 958-
996 
208 Jonathan Morduch ‘The Role of Subsidies in Microfinance: Evidence from Grameen bank’, (1999) Journal 
of Development Economics 60 (1) pp. 229-248 
209 David Roodman and Jonathan Morduch ‘The Impact of Microcredit on the Poor in Bangladesh: Revisiting 
the Evidence’, Working Paper 174, Centre for Global Development 
210 The mathematical technique employed by the original Pitt & Khandker study is called the ‘Weighted 
Exogenous Sampling Maximum-Likelihood-Limited Information Maximum Likelihood-Fixed Effects.’ 
211 David Roodman, Due Diligence: An Impertinent Inquiry into Microfinance (2011) Washington D.C.: Center 
for Global Development  p.165 
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few years, a very few genuine randomised control studies, the recognised gold standard for 
studies in medicine, have been carried out in microfinance. The next section examines them, 
and uses them as the basis for concluding that there is no clear evidence of impact of 
microcredit on borrowers. It is, admittedly, a very slim number of studies on which to do so: 
but it is perhaps better to rely on a methodologically sound few, than the methodologically 
flawed many.212   
 
II. Randomised Control Trials: Evidence for the Micro Impact of Microcredit on Borrowers 
As of April 2012, there are now nine RCTs published altogether, six examining the impact of 
microcredit, and three the impact of microsavings. RCTs are widely used in medical trials 
(especially drug trials) because, unlike qualitative studies and quantitative quasi-experiments 
such as that of Pitt and Khandker discussed above, they can prove causality. Of course, they 
have their weaknesses too: they may only provide a limited understanding of context and 
process. And depending on the method of randomization, they may or may not capture the 
effects of microfinance on others in the community who do not take it up. But for the 
question at issue here – the impact of the provision of microcredit on levels of poverty – they 
are largely what we do want. All the studies are important, but the largest and most resonant 
was the ‘Spandata’ study, which was carried out in the heart of Indian microcredit, 
Hyderabad in Andhra Pradesh. 
The Spandata213 study was the first randomised evaluation of the impact of introducing 
microcredit in a new market. Spandata, a fast-growing MFI, was expanding in to Hyderabad 
and chose 104 areas of the city as it planned new target markets. It then randomly chose 52 of 
these to begin lending in to in 2006 and 2007. All 104 districts (6,000 households) were then 
surveyed around eighteen months after lending had begun. In the areas Spandata had 
targeted, twenty seven per cent of households took a microloan, two-thirds from Spandata: in 
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alleviate, do nothing for, or exacerbate their poverty. 
213 Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, Rachel Glennerster and Cynthia Kinnan, ‘The Miracle of Microfinance? 




the control areas this was just under nineteen per cent (obviously, none from Spandata.) The 
difference in usage of microcredit overall between the two groups was the basis for assessing 
the impact of microcredit. The fact that both groups were so large should mean that any 
biases arising would be present in both control and target groups in equal measure: all shared 
the same slum background, and an approximate US $3 a day to live on. 
Banerjee et al summarise their results as follows: ‘Fifteen to eighteen months after lending 
began in treated areas, there was no effect of access to microcredit on average monthly 
expenditure per capita, but expenditure on durable goods increased in treated areas and the 
number of new businesses increased by one third.’214No impact on average consumption was 
found, then: or, for that matter, on the empowerment issues the subject of chapter 10: ‘We 
find no impact on measures of health, education or women’s decision-making.’215 What they 
did find was an increase in the purchase of durables, especially business durables. The loans 
seem to have been used largely for capital investment in existing small-scale businesses. This 
has not, in the time frame measured, fed through either positively or negatively to the poverty 
levels of those who received the loans. One possibility is that the time needed for a return on 
capital is simply longer (although this would be a stronger argument if the capital investment 
was into wholly new businesses that needed time to get established: as they were in to 
existing businesses, looking for a clear return within eighteen months seems not 
unreasonable.) It may be that measuring again after two or three years would show clearer 
impacts on poverty one way or the other, but unfortunately we may never know. A second 
survey was reported as planned for late 2009 – early 2010, but through the period of 
Bannerjee et al’s study, an enormous bubble in the provision of microcredit in Andhar 
Pradesh developed, with many providers and multiple loans becoming available to borrowers, 
such that the control group would have been seriously contaminated. The bubble burst in 
2010, with widespread over-indebtedness, mass default, possibly hundreds of borrower 
suicides, some of which will have been related to inability to repay, and the future of the 
microfinance industry in India at stake. 
These developments have nothing to do with this study, however. The findings of the study 
are simply that where there was an existing business, loans were used to expand it: where 
there was not a pre-existing business, loans were used to increase nondurable consumption 
(food, or possibly paying down more expensive debt.) As the authors suggest, the different 
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uses for the loan make the long run impact of the programme hard to assess. ‘For example, it 
is possible that in the longer run those people who are currently cutting back on consumption 
to enable greater investment will become significantly richer and increase their consumption. 
On the other hand, the segment of the population that increased its consumption when it got 
the loan without starting a business may eventually become poorer because it is borrowing 
against its future, though it is also possible that they are just enjoying the “income effect” of 
having paid down their debt to the money-lender (in which case they are richer now and 
perhaps will continue to be richer in the future.’216 Overall, on the substantial evidence it 
gathered then, the study found no clear impact of the provision of microcredit on poverty. 
Given the size and methodological solidity of this study, and the fact that it was aimed at the 
profile of borrower who many have most sought to help, this was a sadly disappointing 
outcome for the proponents of microcredit. 
The second significant study published in 2009 was a randomized study of microfinance 
carried out in South Africa in 2005 by Karlan and Zinman.217 The group they observed was 
very different from the classic ‘Grameen’ type of borrower of the Spandata study. Karlan and 
Zinman asked a South African lender to relax its risk assessment criteria by encouraging its 
loan officers to approve randomly selected applications for credit which had previously been 
marginally rejected. With a starting sample of 3,000 loan applicants, half were originally 
rejected as uncreditworthy by the lender, and half accepted. Of the half rejected, these were 
split between those who failed the credit scoring by some distance, and those who did so only 
marginally. The 750 marginal rejections were then randomly split and half accepted and 
became the target group for the impact of microcredit: the other half were the control group. 
Two years later, both groups were re-measured for the impact. Note this study randomises the 
individuals chosen in to target/control group: the Spandata study randomised by slum. That 
means the Spandata study includes any ‘spillover’ effects of microfinance in the whole 
community, borrower and non-borrower alike: the Kinman and Zinman studies do not. 
The target and loan group had incomes of around US$ 6.50 a day: this is not a group as poor 
as that of the Spandata study (all figures are PPP adjusted). Nor were the loans to be used to 
set up businesses: they were consumer loans with no restrictions on loan use. They were very 
expensive loans: around a real rate of 200% APR. Frequently, the borrower was in some form 
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of employment already: these loans operated very much like pay-day loans in the US and 
UK. 
Karlan and Zinman found that the increased access to credit, even at these rates, improved 
average outcomes. Over the 6 to 12 month horizon, those in the treatment group were 11% 
more likely to retain their job, and their incomes were significantly higher.218 Treated 
households were also less likely to experience hunger, and had more positive outlooks on 
their prospects and position. Karlan and Zinman did also find significant and negative impact 
in terms of borrowers suffering increased depression and stress. But the overall conclusion 
was definitively positive, despite the number of factors conventionally thought likely to make 
it negative – the lender being for-profit, the sheer cost of the credit and the loans being for 
consumption not production.  
The key finding of this study, then, was that a microloan somehow helped borrowers keep 
their jobs, which had a knock-on positive impact on their level of poverty, compared to those 
who had not had access to a loan – even at these rates. This is not direct proof that 
microcredit alleviates poverty – it is staying in steady employment that is doing that here – 
but that the loan is somehow facilitating the keeping of that job. It is acting as a shock 
absorber to prevent something that might otherwise cause a borrower to lose his job, or not 
get another one if he has lost it. The importance of access to finance as a shock absorber will 
be discussed in more detail in the following chapter, but Karlan suggests that how this might 
have worked is that loans may have been used to ‘buy required uniforms, or sample sets for 
sales work, or fix and buy a vehicle to get to the job.’219  
If the Spandata study showed no impact of microcredit in reducing poverty then, the Karlan 
and Zinman study showed a significant, but indirect impact – in enabling borrowers to keep 
or renew jobs, more got above the poverty line. This was an encouraging outcome, if not the 
type of group most microcredit has classically been aimed at. 
Karlan and Zinman repeated the structure of this study with a study in Manila with First 
Macro Bank, where 1601 individuals were randomly ‘unrejected’, using the same 
methodology as in South Africa. Re-measured after between eleven and twenty-two months, 
however, it was found that ‘the number of business activities and employees in the treatment 
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group decreased relative to controls, and subjective well-being declined slightly. However, 
we did find that microloans increase ability to deal with risk, strengthen community ties, and 
increase access to informal capital. Thus, microcredit here may work, but through channels 
different from those often hypothesized by its proponents.’220 
The subjects of this study were not largely already employed, as in South Africa, but small 
scale entrepreneurs running small businesses such as corner shops, and on an average income 
of around US$ 8 a day (PPP-adjusted as before: so, again, well above the poverty levels of 
the Spandata study.) 
What Karlan and Zinman found particularly surprising in the results of this study was less 
that the subjective well-being did not improve, but that those randomly receiving loans in fact 
shrank their businesses. They observe: ‘Our findings add to a very muddled picture on the 
impacts (or lack thereof) of microcredit.’221 They conclude that: ‘the theory and practice of 
microcredit remain far ahead of the evidentiary base needed to make good policy and to 
improve the delivery of financial intermediation. Our findings here are surprising and 
provocative: microcredit in this context does not generate bigger businesses, higher income 
and subjective well-being, but rather led to stronger risk management, fewer businesses and 
lower subjective well-being. The current literature, and popular rhetoric from policymakers 
and microcredit institutions, puts forward a relatively simple story about microcredit working 
through business investment and female empowerment. In contrast, our findings suggest that 
microcredit works through more complex and disparate mechanisms that start with the 
household rather than the business.’222  
Three more RCTs have since been carried out, in Morocco,223 Mongolia,224 and Bosnia.225 
These varied from Banerjee et al’s Spandata study in not being carried out in densely 
populated urban areas, and the precise method of randomisation used. But overall conclusions 
were consistent. Where there was an existing business, the loan was used to put more money 
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in to it, but after two years there was little or no effect on average consumption, health or 
education, or indeed on female empowerment where this was measured. The Mongolian 
study saw a small, positive increase in the proportion of borrowers’ children going to school: 
but the opposite effect was found in the Bosnian study, where teenage (16-19) children of 
borrowers were 19% less likely to attend school than those in the control group. The only 
clear conclusions from these studies were that microcredit facilitated an increase in business 
investment and activity: but not necessarily a profitable one, nor one that had an impact in 
reducing borrowers’ poverty. 
To summarise, then, of these five RCTs examining the impact of microcredit on poverty, four 
find no positive impact, and the fifth, Karlan & Zinman’s study in South Africa, does find a 
positive impact but not through the classic lending to very poor microentrepeneurs, but 
through the mechanism of payday loans to the less poor working in the formal sector, which 
enabled them to hang on to, or find, jobs. 
There have now also been three studies published that look at the impact of providing 
microsavings as opposed to microcredit.226 In Dupas and Robinson’s study in Kenya, free 
savings accounts were offered to existing small scale microentrepeneurs. The accounts paid 
no interest, and charged for withdrawls, but offered a safe place to save and with the 
withdrawl charge, a discipline to encourage saving. Note that the take-up of the savings 
accounts offered was 87%, in contrast to the 27% and 16% take-up rates in the Spandata and 
Morocco RCTs quoted earlier. 
Over the following six months, there were significant differences between female (who were 
mostly market vendors) and male savers (who were mostly bicycle-taxi drivers.) The market 
women used their bank accounts quite actively, and increased their savings. The men used the 
accounts less and did not increase savings. Women invested more in their businesses and 
increased both personal spending and spending on food. Unlike the RCTs for credit, where 
results are mixed at best, there was a clear increase in savings for women offered accounts, 
which did not come at the cost of accounts elsewhere. This positive result was not shared by 
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(2011), unpublished paper. 
146 
 
the men. Roodman227 speculates that ‘The accounts may have helped primarily by giving 
women more control over their own impulses to spend in the moment or by giving them a 
way to deflect family requests for money. Especially if the latter, the women’s gains may 
have come partly at the expense of relatives outside the control group.’ The authors too 
suggest that savings may not have increased for men because they already had secure 
domestic access to savings and so did not need the account, whereas the women were in a 
less controlling position.  
Brune et al’s study of savings in Malawi was a little different, but also showed a positive 
impact from the offer of savings. In conjunction with Opportunity International in Malawi, 
smallholder tobacco farmers were offered an ‘ordinary’ savings account, a ‘commitment 
account’ or (the control group) neither. The commitment group agreed to have money 
released from sale of one year’s harvest transferred directly in to a commitment account 
which could not be touched until a few weeks before the next planting season, when it 
contents were released to buy the necessary agricultural inputs. Take up of both types of 
account was high. 
Those savers who chose commitment accounts had significantly better outcomes than the 
control group. They were able to buy 48% more agricultural input for the next planting 
season compared to the control group mean, their crop sales from the subsequent harvest 
were 27% higher and household expenditure was 27% higher after the harvest. Note, unlike 
the Kenya studies, the group studied here were over 90% male farmers: the authors did not 
note if there were any differences in outcome by gender. 
The authors do note that positive as this study is for the recipients of savings accounts, ‘the 
overall impact on the community at large of commitment accounts is likely less positive. This 
is because of our preferred interpretation that the commitment accounts helped with input 
utilization precisely by helping farmers withhold resources from others in the community. It 
is possible, for example, that others in the social network were less able to deal with 
unexpected shocks (e.g., health shocks) due to reduced assistance from neighbours or 
relatives who had commitment accounts. While we believe it is unlikely that the net impact of 
the commitment treatment on communities would be negative overall, we do not shed any 
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light on this issue in the current paper.’228  
 
The final savings study was carried out by Abraham et al in Chile. The authors worked with 
Fondo Esperanza (FE), a Chilean MFI, and Banco Credichile (BC), a large commercial bank. 
FE’s members are self-employed micro-entrepreneurs, 90% women, living and working in 
urban areas in the informal sector. The credit disbursement and repayment of their microloans 
is on a classic, rigid three month loan basis with weekly or biweekly repayment (at group 
meetings) with little scope to be used as self-insurance for emergencies or shocks. The 
savings account thus provided this buffer. 4175 members of FE were surveyed, and two-
thirds randomly selected to be offered a savings account (by group). Take up was 
approximately 50%. Follow up was around fifteen months after the savings accounts were 
opened. The conclusions were very positive: savers were less likely to owe money to 
relatives, friends or institutions than the control group, and also less likely to have had to 
reduce consumption due to economic difficulties. The authors did not find those with 
accounts less likely to lend to others, so did not find evidence that access to a savings account 
crowds out lending to others. Rather, savings worked as a means of consumption smoothing 
when other forms of insurance were unavailable. 
So what do we conclude from the nine RCTs carried out now on the impact of microfinance 
on poverty? 
There is no indication that microcredit has a positive impact in lifting borrowers out of 
poverty. There is some evidence that it enables existing micro-entrepreneurs to invest more in 
their businesses, but no evidence that they do so sufficiently profitably as to have a positive 
impact on reducing their poverty. Several of the studies did randomise at the community 
level, so displacement effects are covered, but those in Bosnia and the Philippines did not, 
and so overall outcomes for the community from the offer of microcredit may have been 
more negative that these studies are able to suggest. The most positive RCT microcredit study 
for microcredit was Karlan and Zinman’s in South Africa, but these high cost payday lending 
equivalent loans more show that occasional, short term access to finance at any cost can help 
prevent a worse problem (such as losing one’s formal job) than that microcredit to the classic 
micro-entrepreneur is a useful intervention. 
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The results – admittedly, not all that many yet – for microsavings are more positive. Savers 
seem to be able to smooth income, use savings as self-insurance and see higher incomes 
down the line. There is an absence of potential negative effects, but exactly how these 
accounts help is perhaps not yet fully appreciated. To the extent these accounts help female 
savers resist demands from friends and family for cash that males have little difficulty 
resisting, they may empower: but at what cost to those relationships, and whether that is 
ultimately positive or negative across the community, is not known. 
On the best evidence we have, then, that of randomised control studies, there is no clear, 
direct evidence of positive impact of microcredit on reducing poverty levels. There is some 
evidence of positive indirect impact through enabling borrowers to manage unexpected 
demands on income which might otherwise hurt their ability to retain employment in the 
formal sector: but that is of little relevance to the target client typically aimed at by MFIs, the 
small scale entrepreneur in the informal sector. The evidence from the RCTs on offering 
microsavings is more positive. Without suggesting dramatic impact in reducing poverty, it 
does suggest a positive smoothing effect, a protection against shocks and as a result an 
improvement in income. 
Whilst, for all the reasons outlined in this and the previous section, RCTs remain the gold 
standard, it is worth noting that in 2010 the UK’s Department for International Development 
funded two systematic reviews of microcredit: that of Duvendock et al,229 quoted earlier, 
which whittled 2643 studies of microcredit globally down to 58 considered sufficiently free 
of methodological flaws to study in depth; and that of Stewart et al230 which searched three 
specialist systematic review libraries, 18 electronic online databases, 24 MFI websites and an 
online directory of books to identify 35 studies of the impact of microcredit or savings in sub-
Saharan Africa, of which 20 were excluded due to poor reporting, methodology or both, and 
15 were then studied in depth. Stewart et al concluded ‘that microcredit and micro-savings 
have mixed impacts on the poor in sub-Saharan Africa, with both positive and negative 
impacts on their wealth and their livelihoods..micro-savings appears to be the more 
successful intervention, both in theory and practice.’231  
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Duvendock et al’s conclusions, as noted earlier, are, if anything, even bleaker: ‘our report 
shows that almost all impact evaluations of microfinance suffer from weak methodologies 
and inadequate data…thus the reliability of impact estimates are adversely affected. This can 
lead to misconceptions about the actual effects of microfinance programmes, thereby 
diverting attention from the search for perhaps more pro-poor interventions.’232 In their 
concluding section233, they find that most of the effects they assessed were both positive and 
negative; the bulk were statistically insignificant and a significant number did suggest 
negative outcomes. They did not feel able to reach a conclusion about the impact of the 
microfinance sector as a whole; ‘we can neither support nor deny the notion that 
microfinance is pro-poor and pro-women’. This causes them to question whether there might 
not have been better interventions that did better benefit poor people/empower women over 
the past decade or so. They note: ‘There are many other candidate sectors for development 
activity which may have been relatively disadvantaged by ill-founded enthusiasm for 
microfinance.’234 They note that even within microfinance, the ‘putative success of basic 
models of lending such as the Grameen Bank and related models’ may have diverted 
attention from potentially better models such as savings and insurance. 
Duvendock et al’s call is then for more and better research, to obtain ‘a clearer picture on the 
impacts of microfinance, on whom, where, and when (e.g. under what circumstances), and 
the mechanisms which account for these effects.’ 
That is hard to argue with; the conclusion of this chapter on the micro effects of microcredit 
on borrowers in reducing poverty is that the case is that there is a lack of evidence to this 
effect (though Roodman and Morduch’s point that absence of evidence is not evidence of 
absence is also true). RCTs and Strategic Reviews alike find no positive impact of 
microcredit reducing poverty. What then of macro effects? 
 
III. Evidence for the Macro Effects of Microfinance/The Wider Impacts of Microfinance 
Section II examined the impact of microfinance on poverty levels of those who take 
advantage of its offer. No clear evidence of positive impact was found. But when considering 
whether to support microfinance as a public policy, whether public and private donors do 
                                                          
232 Op. cit. note 196 p. 4 
233 Op. cit. note 196 p. 74 
234 Op. cit. note 196 p. 75 
150 
 
well to provide at least initial subsidy, we want to know more than just the impact of 
microfinance on those to whom it lends: we want to know the impact, positive or negative, on 
the wider community as well. This section addresses the possible impact on the poverty 
levels of the wider community in which microfinance is offered: the next Chapter will 
attempt to do the same with regard to empowerment issues. 
The case for how microfinance could have a positive impact in reducing poverty in the wider 
community in which it operates is straightforward to make. The provision of capital to small-
scale entrepreneurs provides the tool that has been the only thing preventing poor would-be 
entrepreneurs founding their own business. They now start these businesses: grow them: have 
more income to spend from the profits, employ more staff which in turn stimulates the local 
economy and reduces the poverty of the people now employed. 
Unfortunately, after thirty or forty years of established microfinance, there is a lack of 
evidence of any very much of this happening. The vast majority of micro-enterprises never 
go beyond employing the micro-entrepreneur herself and sometimes members of her family. 
Where these other members of the family are children who might otherwise be in school, 
especially in countries with universal free education, it is hard to believe that the wider 
impact of microfinance for them is a positive. One might have thought that with the billions 
of dollars of subsidy microfinance has received from international donors and the amount of 
academic effort that has gone into it over the past thirty years, that there would be some 
evidence of a positive macro effect. But, in fact, we have a limited body of recent, fairly 
sceptical work that examines the evidence and finds only negative effects at the macro level 
from microfinance. The arguments are threefold: that microcredit simply displaces economic 
activity with no net gain; that it lacks scale and as a result entrepreneurs seldom develop in to 
small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) which are the true engine of development; and 
that it has diverted developmental aid that could otherwise have gone productively in to 
developing SME sectors in impoverished countries.  
Looking at the historical evidence of how countries have in fact developed, Bateman and 
Chang argue:  
exhaustive analysis of these countries that reached development status in the 1800s and early part of the last 
century (the USA, Western Europe and Japan) as well as the fastest growing countries of the last thirty years 
or so (China, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, India, Malaysia and most recently Vietnam), show that the 
microfinance model has played no role whatsoever. To the contrary, these countries have very successfully 
reduced poverty and grown rich(er) overwhelmingly by using a range of state co-ordinated policy 
interventions, financial institutions and investment strategies that are not only the complete opposite of 
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today’s ‘new wave’ microfinance model, but also….very likely to be undermined by the proliferation of 
microfinance and its prior claim over savings and other important financial resources. 235 
Displacement effects are the jobs and incomes lost by existing microentrepeneurs as a result 
of the new entry or expansion of microenterprises that have been facilitated by the provision 
of microfinance. There is demand for only so many tomatoes, and hence only so many 
tomato-sellers. A new entrant may simply just reduce the margins of all by increasing supply 
when there is no increase in demand, so driving down the price, or may push an existing 
tomato seller out of business. Increases in supply of petty trading businesses may have the 
positive impact for consumers that prices fall absent an increase in demand, but without that 
increase in demand there is no reason to suppose that microfinance creates additional jobs 
and incomes in a community. That it does so for one client microenterprise does not mean it 
does so for the whole community: that is the ‘fallacy of composition’. Just occasionally, a 
new technology or innovation will create a source of new demand, but even then these effects 
eventually come in to play. Chang describes the following example: 
When a microfinance institution first starts its operation in a locality, the first posse of its clients may see 
their income rising – sometimes quite dramatically. For example, when in 1997 the Grameen Bank teamed 
up with Telenor, the Norwegian phone company, and gave out microloans to women to buy a mobile phone 
and rent it out to villagers, these ‘telephone ladies’ made handsome profits - $750 - $1200 in a country 
whose annual average per capita income was around $300. However, over time, the businesses financed by 
microcredit become crowded and their earnings fall…by 2005 there were so many telephone ladies that their 
income was estimated to be only $70 per year, though the national average income had gone up to $450. 236 
Most micro-financed enterprises do not even have this advantage of launching in to an area of 
unsatisfied demand. The range of businesses open to the poor on developing countries is 
limited by their skills, the narrow range of technologies available, the loan size they can raise, 
and the cash flow demands of their lender. Hence the emphasis on market stalls and petty 
trading. Pessimistically, we might note that whereas Roodman and Banerjee et al may hope 
that a re-measurement of those clients and non-clients covered in the Spandata study might 
show more positive impact of microcredit after three years than was observable after eighteen 
months, with such a high failure rate of businesses and displacement effects also taking time 
to come through, a study three years on might very well show a much more negative impact 
than at eighteen months. 
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Displacement issues aside, why do so few microenterprises go on to become SMEs, 
increasing employment and becoming the growth engines for the future? The short answer is 
that they are just not profitable enough to retain any earnings with which to grow. Why they 
are not sufficiently profitable to grow will be discussed, but considering overall profitability 
first, Karnani237 quotes a study by the George Foundation (an NGO targeting poverty 
alleviation in India) of 50 microcredit programs in 17 villages in South India where less than 
2% of the microenterprises continue past the first three years. Emran and Stiglitz238 explain 
that most microenterprises financed by microfinance only seem profitable at all because they 
do not value the time and labour of the microentrepeneur. Hence a poor microentrepeneur can 
use a loan to buy a goat and sell the milk, but she can never grow because as soon as she 
takes on the cost of hiring someone at a market wage to do so, it becomes unprofitable to 
expand. 
Why are most microenterprises barely profitable? Clearly the high interest rates they pay for 
capital must be part of it. It is also somewhat chicken-and-egg: their lack of scale is an 
important negative driver. Enterprises need scale to achieve low cost operations, increase 
productivity and thus profitability for reinvestment and expansion. For almost any activity, 
there is a minimum efficient scale of production. An overemphasis on microfinance may 
mean that these are rarely achieved. Karnani239 observes that the average firm size in India is 
less than one tenth the comparable size in other emerging economies. He observes: ‘Rather 
than lending $200 to 500 women so that each can set up a microenterprise manufacturing 
garments, it is much better to lend $100,000 to an entrepreneur with managerial capabilities 
and business acumen and help her to set up a garment manufacturing business employing 500 
people. Now the business can exploit economies of scale, deploy specialized assets, and use 
modern business processes to generate value for its owners and employees.’ 
The wider impacts of microfinance on its communities look most damning when 
development of countries that have relied on it more or less exclusively are compared to 
those which have chosen other routes. Bateman and Chang surveyed countries reaching 
development status in the 1800s through to the early 1900s as well as over those that have 
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grown fastest over the past thirty years or so and found that the microfinance model paid no 
role at all240. Bateman observes: 
 Crucially, Bangladesh as a whole stands out as having been almost entirely left behind by its rapidly 
growing East Asia ‘tiger’ economy neighbours. This is not a coincidence, but a result of policy choice. By 
and large, the successful ‘tiger’ economies all opted to deploy a pro-active, subsidised, policy-based but 
nevertheless well-managed local financial model radically different to the Grameen Bank microfinance 
model that today dominates in Bangladesh…Simplifying, the heterodox East Asian local financial model is 
marked out by the provision of affordable financial support for scaled-up formal sector small businesses and 
family firms that can efficiently link up with other sectors of the economy (i.e. with state companies, larger 
private businesses, marketing co-operatives…Turning to the very many developing countries, regions and 
localities that have also deployed the Grameen Bank microfinance model, they appear to have fared no better 
than Bangladesh. Effectively diverting their scarce financial resources into the tiniest of informal 
microenterprises, these countries have generally seen little economic or social benefit over the longer term 
and, indeed, most eventually ended up having to deal with a destructive sub-prime-style ‘microfinance 
meltdown’ scenario. Bolivia, Mexico, Cambodia, Nicaragua, Morocco and, most stunning of all, the Indian 
state of Andhra Pradesh in late 2010, all are now viewed as how microfinance can seriously destabilise and 
undermine the local economic and social structures of most benefit to the poor, not strengthen them. 241 
The bleakest assessment of the macro impact of microfinance comers from the Inter-
American Development Bank242, which assessed the role of microfinance in Latin America, 
particularly Mexico. As Harper243 reports: ‘Arguing that the root cause of poverty and 
underdevelopment in Latin America is the growing tendency of largely unproductive 
microenterprises and the self-employed to absorb the country’s scarce financial resources, 
while the far more productive small and medium enterprise sector goes without, the IDB 
effectively pulled the rug from under the microfinance industry. For the first time, a 
mainstream international development agency was arguing that a major misallocation of 
capital has taken place in Latin America these last two to three decades, and the situation 
needed correcting fast.’ 
We have seen little positive evidence of microcredit raising borrowers out of poverty, either 
at a micro or macroeconomic level. Given equal importance in its early claims, as we saw 
earlier, is the claim of microfinance that it empowers its borrowers, especially its female 
borrowers. The two RCTs that have examined this claim have broadly found no positive 
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impact on issues of empowerment, either. The next chapter considers all the evidence for 
























Chapter 9: Does Microfinance Work as a Tool of Empowerment? 
What does the microfinance industry mean when it claims to empower women? The World 
Bank defines empowerment as ‘the process of increasing the assets and capabilities of 
individuals or groups to make purposive choices and to transform those choices into desired 
actions and outcomes…Empowered people have freedom of choice and action. This in turn 
enables them to better influence the course of their lives and the decisions which affect them.’ 
Acknowledging that perceptions of being empowered vary across time, culture and domains 
of a person’s life, the World Bank summarize: ‘In essence empowerment speaks to self-
determined change.’244 In defining empowerment in this way, the World Bank draws on the 
academic literature where, classically, empowering a woman is defined by Kabeer245 as the 
process by which those who were denied the ability to make strategic life choices, acquire 
this ability; empowerment is the ability to make choices and it entails a process of social 
change. In the language of Nussbaum, it is adding to a woman’s capabilities, which she may 
or may not turn in to functionings.  
Where Kabeer and the World Bank speak of empowering, this thesis has spoken of 
possessing and enhancing or diminishing autonomous agency, and enhancing or diminishing 
the scope of autonomous action available to an agent. Recall that the autonomous person was 
defined early on in this thesis as one who is competent (at a threshold level defined by 
possessing a minimal rationality and an ability for self-reflection) to be self-determining, and 
has freedom to act as she chooses, although the latter component of autonomy will be held to 
different degrees by different people at different times in life. Autonomy was defined in 
terms of an agent’s self-determination: the more able she was to set her direction and choose 
her own goals from her own values, the greater the level of autonomy she had. The academic 
and World Bank’s definition of empowerment is the process of going about developing this. 
Empowerment, it seems, is the process by which an agent increases the level of her global 
autonomy.   
The claim that microfinance can empower, or ultimately lead to an increase in the 
autonomous agency of a woman is no small one. Yet we have seen throughout this thesis that 
some of microfinance’s current practices can in fact exploit, coerce and sometimes 
paternalise, all of which can be seen as forms of disempowerment. The previous chapter has 
                                                          
244 ‘What is Empowerment?’ The World Bank, 2011, available at http://go.worldbank.org/V45HD4P100 
245 Naila Kabeer ‘Resources, Agency, Achievements: Reflections on the Measurement of Women’s 
Empowerment’ (1999) Development and Change vol. 30 (3) pp. 435-464 
156 
 
found this not to be justified by the alleviation of poverty, because of the lack of positive 
evidence that poverty is, overall, alleviated by microfinance. What is the evidence, then, of a 
strong empowering effect that would compensate for the undermining of autonomy that has 
been observed? 
The focus here is on social empowerment. The microfinance industry embraces two different 
conceptions of empowerment. The ‘financial inclusion’ model focuses on how access to 
credit can open up possibilities for a borrower of control over her own financial life. It refers 
simply to economic empowerment: a borrower is empowered simply by generating wealth, 
which increases her choices in life and her independence. Since, as we saw in the previous 
chapter, there is no clear evidence that credit does in fact generate net wealth, this form of 
empowerment overall is not to be found, although of course some individuals will enjoy it. 
The second, and original, use of empowerment, used by the developers of microfinance in 
Bangladesh, encompassed this economic version of empowerment in their definition of 
empowerment, but also saw a much more radical impact on the social structure within which 
the borrowers lived.  They saw microfinance, through its group lending structure, 
empowering women not just to increase their realm of autonomous action within society, but 
empowering them to challenge the social norms of that society itself. Roy246 calls this the 
‘Bangladeshi’ model. In a society generally accepted as being repressive to women, 
Bangladesh microfinance firms wanted to use the group lending model (hierarchical as it 
itself was) to challenge and indeed change some of these norms: the intention was to create a 
sense of solidarity through the groups that would allow other services to be delivered 
including a commitment to political participation. Hence Grameen’s ‘16 Rules’ which, as we 
saw in Chapter 7 did have a positive role in encouraging some forms of empowerment: but in 
fact made little headway against the most ingrained issues of caste and dowry. 
Empirical studies measuring overall empowerment are even thinner on the ground than those 
measuring poverty. A notable study by Hashemi, Schuler and Riley247 in Bangladesh tried to 
do so, using eight different indicators by which to measure empowerment248.  Measuring 
these before and after credit was extended, they did find an empowering effect; but 
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unfortunately there was no control group of potential, would-be borrowers, so we do not 
know whether or not it was just more empowered women who signed up for microfinance in 
the first place, a potential selection bias the authors acknowledge. 
A lot of early research studies claimed that microcredit increased mobility and strengthened 
networks among women who were previously confined to their homes.249 But the position is 
complex. In Asia at least, it is not uncommon for women to hand over control of the loan to 
their spouse, or invest it in a family enterprise.250 Goetz and Sen Gupta argue that what is 
really happening is that ‘the household is internalizing the high transaction costs of lending to 
men…These costs are primarily those of monitoring men’s loan use and enforcing regular 
repayment. Women in effect offset these costs by using intrahousehold gender relations of 
obligation or persuasion to recover weekly loan repayments.’251 Women can fulfil this role of 
internalising the costs of lending to men within the household because they ‘are easy to 
locate, being much less able than men to leave a locality temporarily to evade field workers, 
and they are easier to intimidate into repayment than men, who can always threaten 
violence.’252 
It was perhaps always unlikely that access for women to credit by itself would overturn 
entrenched patriarchal systems of control where these existed. In societies where women’s 
secondary status has many causes – lack of access to financial services being only one 
amongst many such as lack of property rights, lack of power over divorce procedures and 
settlements, lack of control over custody of children in the event of divorce – just tweaking 
one of these issues may not be enough to change the overall social norm. 
Matters are complicated further by the fact for some women, empowerment came when they 
had enough extra income to restrict mobility and choices by opting for some form of purdah, 
the concealment of a woman’s form and restrictions on contact with males from outside the 
kinship group, which could not be observed if one was working in the field all day. Kabeer 
notes ‘If empowerment entails the extended capacity for making choices then…the paradox is 
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that in many cases, this leads women to opt for some form of purdah if they can afford to, 
both to signal their social standing within the community and to differentiate themselves from 
those women who do not have this choice.’253  
These women, in an impact study measuring mobility, one of Hashemi et al’s criteria, would 
count as less empowered, implicitly leading to less autonomy. But they are the real life 
examples of Oshana’s Taliban woman in Chapter 1; they are exercising their rational agency, 
now they have greater scope of autonomous action in which to do so, to limit their own 
freedoms. It may seem paradoxical, but it is an autonomous choice. 
A recent study has shown the picture to be even more complex than this presentation of it has 
been so far, however. A study of two villages in Bangladesh254 repeated the finding that the 
husbands usually took control of the loan, but went further: men used their patriarchal 
authority to compel women (wives, mothers, sisters) to get the loan as the NGOs (BRAC and 
Grameen) would not lend to them as men. Intimidation was used if the woman refused. There 
usually was a temporary improvement after taking the loan in the family’s economic position, 
and this was then used by the men to buy their wives burkhas or hijabs to wear as a symbol 
of their new-found wealth and prestige. It was entirely unclear that the women in this study 
themselves wanted to adopt this dress. The authors reflected that ‘we could not find any hard 
evidence to support the view that microcredit empowers women or promotes their 
liberation…The microcredit programme does not directly challenge any official views that 
subjugate women.’255 Where they did find economic empowerment – they cite a case of a 
woman who successfully sets up a hand-rolled cigarette business, unfortunately using cheap 
child labour as the only way of making it profitable – they did not find social empowerment 
followed. The profits were used by this woman to pay increased dowry for her daughter. 
An interesting (and also somewhat paradoxical) example of the original, positive use of the 
group lending mechanism to deliver empowerment is Maddocks’256 study of the Small 
Enterprise Foundation (SEF)’s efforts to increase awareness of HIV/AIDS among its staff 
and clients in the Limpopo province where it operated, in 2001. Here, 24% of all deaths were 
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as a result of AIDS, or 28% amongst women. SEF linked their microfinance operation to the 
health education work of The Rural AIDS and Development Action Research program 
(RADAR). SEF loan group members were met with every two weeks to discuss gender 
inequality, partner violence and how AIDS was typically spread. SEF director John DeWit 
reports: ‘what we found was during the first four sessions of SFL training, people really hated 
it; they really strongly opposed it because of the sensitive issues it was raising, such as “Do 
you have a son who is a migrant worker who has a girlfriend in Joburg who, when he comes 
home, might be infected.”’ Members were compelled to stay, however, to get their loans, and 
over time came to value the training and even pass it on: client retention rates amongst those 
who had received the training rose. The study looked at the impact of microfinance on 
poverty and empowerment by taking one group that had received the training and one that 
had not, as well as a control group, and showed that only those who had had the training 
demonstrated increased empowerment. (This study did include drop-outs as well.) 
Specifically:  
participation…was associated with increased ‘power within; measured by greater self-confidence, financial 
confidence, as well as more progressive attitudes to gender norms. Women with an intimate partner reported 
an increase in ‘power to’ measured by higher levels of autonomy in decision making, greater valuation of 
their household contribution by their partners, improved household communication and better relationships 
with partners…Over a two year period, levels of intimate partner violence were reduced by 55% in women 
in the intervention group relative to those in the comparison group.257 
Those aged 14-35 years became less likely to have unprotected sex. Despite the initial 
resistance, one woman commented: ‘These things were secret. I never used to talk to my 
daughter about using condoms or prevention. I am grateful of health talks because they have 
helped me. My children are listening to me. Such knowledge makes any parent to be brave in 
facing their children.’ 
These are powerful results: the irony is, of course, that the increase in empowerment 
observed in the treatment group to talk more freely about sexual and violent matters, had to 
be coerced on to them through refusing to continue with microfinance lending unless they 
had the initially hated training. Perhaps a more perfect example of justified hard paternalism 
could hardly be found than this, where partner violence fell by 50% for those paternalised. 
Note though that this is only partially a victory for the concept of microfinance as 
empowerment. It is the knowledge these women gained that empowered them: microfinance 
was merely the mechanism for forcing them to acquire it. 
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A recent study from India258 provided another example of a microcredit program being used 
to empower women in fields beyond simply finance. Chakravarty and Chaudhuri show how 
nongovernmental activists were able to encourage microcredit groups to look beyond their 
pure credit function and mobilize against domestic abuse, alcoholism and the practice of 
witch hunts which were not uncommon in the area studied (the tea plantations of Jalpaiguri). 
Tribal workers’ belief in the existence of witches and willingness to kill the ‘witch’ (often 
blamed for diseases in villages with no doctors or medical facilities), especially when fuelled 
by alcohol, were easier to counter and stop when the microcredit group banded together to 
resist the tradition. 
The problem with the group lending model being used to coercively empower its members, to 
their benefit in cases where the programme bolted on to the offer of credit was designed to 
empower, is that of course that same group lending model can be coercively used to 
disempower. 
Where a borrower has fallen behind on payments, loan collection methods used by an MFI 
may be coercive and shaming, as was seen in Chapter 5. Arunachalum259, quotes the extreme 
case of an eight year old girl kidnapped by a moneylender260 operating as an agent for an 
Indian MFI and held as collateral until her parents made the due payment on a debt (he notes 
that the local microfinance bank then, and still months later, listed women’s rights and 
‘empowering the girl child’ as its key priorities). But, because the group liability model 
requires a struggling borrower’s peers to cover her payments and they are often around the 
poverty line themselves, the group peers’ methods of loan collection may be even worse than 
the MFI’s. Karim261 and Rahman262 both describe cases of ostracization, housebreaking, 
violence and asset removal being used by peers to make good some of their loss. The female 
empowerment narrative runs that in the group lending model, borrowers support each other 
and willingly help each other out in time of need. And of course perfectly genuine examples 
of this are true.  But when times are tough – and we are discussing the poorest here, so that is 
not rare – powerful incentives work the other way. 
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Conceptually, it is perhaps not surprising that there is so much ambiguity over whether 
microcredit empowers, overall, or not. The offer of credit can empower a poor woman by 
enabling her to start an activity that generates income for herself and over which she has 
control (although it can of course also over-indebt her and she may not in fact have control 
over the income produced). But even on the best case, assuming the offer of microcredit itself 
empowers, the form through which it is (mostly) offered, group lending, is inherently 
disempowering. Even where there is individual lending rather than group liability, the fact 
that it is still (largely) done in groups places heavy burdens on the borrower. It may start off 
by empowering borrowers against poverty and indeed culture, by challenging social norms, 
but end up reinforcing patriarchal norms to ensure repayment. Repayment has to be ensured 
somehow, or the MFI will become bankrupt: coercive peer and loan officer pressure replaces 
collateral. The traditional set up of a group of poor women gathering weekly to have their 
loan repayments paid over to a (usually male) loan officer who may berate and enforce 
sanctions such as not allowing anyone to go home until the last payment is made, and most of 
all, to take on personal liability for the repayments of others in their group, is inherently 
disempowering. As a USAID consultant reflected to Roy:263 ‘Do you and I, as women 
borrowing from a bank, have to do this when we take out a loan from the Bank of 
America?..Why do poor women?..And how can this pass as women’s empowerment? True 
empowerment is to have a choice; to be able to purchase a service without all these 
conditions and rituals.’ 
Mayoux et al summarise the two sides of this as follows:  
Many programmes are group based. Group formation can reinforce the development contribution of 
microfinance through providing an organisational base for non-financial services and information in areas 
like enterprise development, health, literacy and gender equality. Likewise, the groups can provide a base for 
collective community action, networking and advocacy, and strengthening of civil society and democracy. 
Examples exist of microfinance programmes which have made all of these potential contributions to 
development. However an increasing body of evidence shows that badly designed microfinance programmes 
may increase rather than reduce poverty through creating a downward spiral of debt. Thus, female-targeted 
microfinance may disempower women through shifting on to them the full burden of family savings and 
debt. Women may not control their own incomes and men may divert more of their incomes to their own 
personal expenditure. 264 
It is of course possible to advocate microfinance without the group lending model. But we 
have largely yet to get beyond it as way for MFIs to secure repayment. But as Mayoux puts it 
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‘Unless micro-finance programmes move beyond complacent assumptions about automatic 
contributions of group formations to women’s empowerment, they risk becoming little more 
than another cynical self-help means of shifting the costs of development onto poor 
women.’265 
Attempting to sum up a net, overall, level of empowerment or otherwise is impossible, in part 
because we do not have adequate data, and in part because each study that has been done is 
so locally economically and socially specific, generalisations seem to make little sense. 
However, a recent study by Kabeer et al266 returns to the widespread study of the impact of 
work, including that financed by microfinance, on the empowerment of thousands of 
Bangladeshi women. 
Kabeer et al observe the revolutions that have taken place in life for women since 
Bangladeshi independence. She cites three major changes: a massive effort on the part of the 
government to reduce fertility rates, which has indeed brought fertility down from around 7 
in the late 70s to around 3 now, in the process opening up a sector of employment for 
women; the microcredit revolution, leading to a significant increase in women’s economic 
activity, though largely in the informal sector; and the adoption of the New Industrial Policy 
in the 1980s, emphasising export-orientated industrialisation and labour-intensive garment 
manufacture in particular. 
As Kabeer et al observe, women’s economic activity rates have increased, but have stayed 
within a very narrow range of occupations, largely compatible with their domestic roles and 
in the informal sector. She sets out to examine if this has transformed power relations 
between men and women, or whether a woman remains at ‘patriarchal risk’ throughout her 
life – at risk of a collapse in social status and material wealth if deprived of the protection of 
first father, then husband, then son. Kabeer et al note that most studies on the effect of 
women’s empowerment of paid work have focused only on microfinance and the export 
garment industry, and limited their notion of empowerment to a woman’s role in decision 
making and mobility in the public domain. Kabeer et al aimed to use measures of 
empowerment, by contrast, that captured ‘women’s sense of self-worth and identity, their 
willingness to question their own subordinate status, their control over their own lives, and 
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their voice and influence within the family’267 as well as ‘women’s political consciousness 
and agency...awareness of their rights, their agency as citizens and…their willingness to take 
collective action against social injustice.’268  
Kabeer et al interviewed a sample of 5198 women aged over 15 from locations spread over 
eight districts in Bangladesh, chosen to represent different socio-economic conditions. They 
were then divided by primary occupations into those who did paid work outside the home 
(13%), subdivided in to work in the formal (4%) and informal economy (9%), paid work 
within the home (46%), unpaid subsistence production (15%) and economic inactivity (22%). 
Within these groupings, it should be noted, informal work outside the home would be largely 
represented by those working through microfinance loans: many of those working informally 
inside the home would also be taking microfinance loans (to rear cows, for example.) 
Each group was then measured for control over income; mobility in the public domain 
participation in public life, and attitudes and perceptions. 
With regard to control of income, most women across all groups retained some income for 
their own use, but there was a significant difference between those in paid, formal work and 
the rest. Almost all of this group did so, and a much higher proportion of this group (90%) 
could choose their own clothes and had a savings or insurance account (24%) against around 
80% and 8% for those working in the informal sector and 42% and 10% for those in 
subsistence production. In terms of control over income, then, there was a significant 
(positive) difference in empowerment for women in the informal sector dominated by 
microfinance borrowers, but a more significant difference again between them and those in 
the paid formal sector. 
With regard to mobility in the public domain, women were asked if they were comfortable 
going unaccompanied to a health clinic (public space associated with their reproductive role 
in the family); the market (representing their role in as producers and consumers) and 
whether they were able to visit their natal family (women in Bangladesh typically leave their 
own family for that of their husband on marriage, who is not usually from the same village, 
so the woman is classically cut off from her own birth family’s support.) 
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Overall, only 24% of women were comfortable visiting their families after marriage; and only 
18% visiting a health facility and 11% the market. In all cases, higher percentages of those in 
paid formal work were comfortable doing these activities (32%, 50%, 36%), with those 
working in the informal sector outside their home not too far behind. Looking at this from the 
perspective of microfinance borrowers, it is suggestive that if the trade chosen by the 
microfinance borrower pushed her out of the home in to the market, she then felt much more 
empowered to visit health facilities or the natal family than a borrower working inside the 
home. This suggests that a rise in empowerment for microfinance borrowers here reflects not 
exactly the extension of credit as such, but whether the borrower employs it in or outside the 
home, the latter creating an empowering effect. 
With regard to participation in public life, measured by knowledge of labour laws, 
consultation by others, voting and own decision in voting, attendance at rural committee 
meetings unaccompanied and even participating in protests, there was a gulf between those in 
the formal sector and the others: 48% of those in paid labour knew labour laws, only 11 – 
14% of the other economically active groups. Similarly, 52% of formal workers might be 
consulted by others, only 27-33% of the economically active rest: in the last two categories, 
the economically inactive outscored them. Most voted, and most took their own decision in 
voting. 17% of formal sector workers would attend a committee meeting unaccompanied as 
would 13% of those working informally outside the home, but only 4 – 7% of the rest, 
suggesting again that working outside the home encouraged a willingness to take part in other 
activities outside it as well. Almost no one (0-0.4%) had participated in a protest, bar the 
formal workers (largely garment workers), 4% of whom had, those most likely to have had 
contact with trade unions and womens’ rights organisations. 
In terms of beliefs and perceptions, almost all agreed that a woman’s own income was 
important for her self-reliance, and that husbands should help working wives with housework 
and childcare, whether they actually received it or not. Whilst 28% of formal workers thought 
their income had increased respect for them in the community, only 20% of those working 
outside the home in the formal sector thought this and just 14% working in the informal 
sector inside the home. Asked what was the most significant new resource in women’s lives 
in general and for themselves, an overwhelming 80% considered this to be access to 
education; only 10% thought access to credit. This was higher amongst those actually 
working in the informal sector outside the home, but still hardly a ringing endorsement of 
women’s belief in the power of microcredit to empower. 
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Kabeer et al conclude that ‘it is the nature of the women’s paid work, rather than the simple 
fact of earning money, that has the potential to bring about shifts in gender relations in terms 
of how women view themselves and how they are viewed by others, as well as in their 
capacity for voice and agency.’ 
Kabeer et al’s next stage of analysis was to use multiple regression techniques to control for 
relevant differences in individual, household and location-specific characteristics. They 
included a number of variables strongly correlated with their indicators of womens’ 
empowerment: but access to loans did not prove significant, and was dropped. Given the 
claims of MFIs to empower their borrowers, this absence of correlation between access to 
loans and empowerment indicators is startling. There was high correlation between NGO 
membership and greater mobility in the public domain, autonomy in voting, optimism about 
the future and capacity to deal with difficult circumstances. In Bangladesh, of course, the 
largest NGO, BRAC, as well as Grameen, operates as both an NGO and an MFI. The social 
side of their activities may, then, very well empower women, so their claims are not baseless 
– but it is not the credit doing this, but the social support, the collective endeavour, at least 
originally. 
Education was what in fact had the highest correlation with empowerment, especially at 
secondary and higher levels. One surprising correlation not usually measured in the academic 
literature was watching TV (often done collectively), in broadening women’s horizons. 
Kabeer at al. were unable to differentiate between the different NGOs in their sample. NGO 
membership clearly increased mobility in the public domain. They observe that other 
studies269 suggest that the purer the focus on microcredit (as opposed to the other social 
aspects), the more impact was limited to purely economic impact and was not otherwise 
empowering. A subsequent study by Kabeer, Mahmud and Castro270 has followed this up. 
Studying a range of NGOs in Bangladesh that covered a spread from microcredit only (ASA) 
to social mobilisation and awareness training only, with BRAC and Grameen in the middle, it 
was found that the pure offer of microcredit led to no increase in empowerment: offering 
social programmes only added the most, and mixed programmes hovered between the two. 
Access to credit, then, did not empower: NGO’s specialised training did.  
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Kabeer et al.’s work suggests that formal paid work has empowering effects on women 
beyond just the increased income: but this was much less clear of those working in the 
informal sector. There were some empowering effects on those working outside the home, far 
fewer on those using their microfinance loans to work inside the home. For both formal and 
informal workers, it was the nature of the work done (whether it was outside the home, its 
status in society) that correlated to empowerment, not the extension of credit as such (which 
was not correlated to empowerment at all.) The empowerment MFIs believe they have seen 
coming to women borrowers, then, would seem to come from the extent to which the MFI 
has worked with its borrowers outside the field of pure credit - to educate, to train, to provide 
solidarity, as with the sexual health education in South Africa and the fight against witch 
hunts in India. Women’s solidarity and interest groups empower. Credit per se does not. 
Credit can disempower if it becomes a debt spiral, so whether microcredit overall empowers 
will never have a clear answer: it will depend in how and to whom and with what solidarity-
building it is offered. The irony is that if the aim is to maximise empowerment, the best 
vehicle might seem to be microfinance without the credit! 
The narrative for microcredit empowering women runs that to access credit, especially in 
groups, enables women not only to start their own businesses, but to meet outside the home, 
build some collective solidarity, have money of their own to control, increasing their status in 
the household and then use the profits to enhance the health and education of the whole 
family. There are anecdotes and case studies to demonstrate all of these in particular 
instances, at least in microcredit’s early days. Perhaps when microcredit was more novel, 
these positives had few negatives to offset them and microcredit could indeed be held to 
empower, even if it never did much to reduce poverty. 
Now microcredit is more developed and we have reached saturation point in a number of 
markets, with ensuing repayment crisis, we have an equal number of anecdotes and studies 
that show the disempowering effects of credit when a borrower is unable to repay – from 
reduced income, reduced status, shame, isolation from the community and ultimately, in 
extreme cases, suicide. It is no longer possible to be confident that microcredit, overall, net 
empowers. In the absence of much hard evidence that can quantify the empowering gains and 
losses, it is hard to say much either way: other than that the empowering gains, whilst 
worthwhile, seem fairly modest outside of where microcredit is used as a mechanism (a 
coercive mechanism in the case of the South African health study) to introduce a separate 
route to empowerment, such as health education. Where microcredit has led to 
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disempowerment, however, it has been of catastrophic scale. It can only be observed that, just 
as the last chapter was unable to show a clear positive impact of microcredit in reducing 
poverty, this is unable to show a clear, positive impact in empowering its borrowers. 
Kabeer sums it up as follows: 
And finally, to return to the question with which we started the paper, it is clear that while access to financial 
services can and does make important contributions to the economic productivity and social well-being of 
poor women and their households, it does not “automatically” empower women – any more than do 
education, political quotas, access to waged work or any other interventions that feature in the literature on 
women’s empowerment. There are no magic bullets, no panaceas, no blueprints, no readymade formulas 
which bring about the radical structural transformation that the empowerment of the poor, and of poor 
women, implies. These various interventions are simply different entry points into this larger project, each 
with the potential for social transformation, but each contingent on context, commitment and capacity if this 
potential is to be realised. 271  
We saw in the previous chapter, however, some evidence that access to savings, as opposed 
to credit, can raise income and indeed empower. The work of Rutherford272 and more 
recently Collins et al273 has used financial diary keeping274 with the impoverished in a 
number of different countries to get at, firstly, just how complex the financial life of the poor 
is, and how this can be alleviated not (or not only) with the simple, blunt instrument of a loan, 
but with access to a suite of financial services – savings, insurance, flexible loans 
(moneylenders may be much more flexible with regard to repayment than MFIs), short term 
loans from kin. The central observation of Portfolios of the Poor is that the poor do not live 
on $2 a day: they live on $3 one day, 50c the next, nothing for a while, etc.: income comes 
from a variety of sources, is not reliable, and is barely able to cope with emergencies when 
they come along. With little access to secure savings accounts, a small surplus one month 
may simply be spent, leaving nothing to fall back on when a large lump sum need arises such 
as health costs or funeral expenses. A microloan may be taken out to pay for these (probably 
with another, ‘business’ purpose for the loan given to the MFI) and then the cycle of 
indebtedness can begin. The idea in propounding the virtues of access to a range of financial 
services is that the poor can manage their uncertain income streams so as to avoid the large 
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item expense disasters that seem to freshly impoverish just when a household begins to claw 
its way out of extreme poverty. 
Of course, the fact that it makes a lot of economic theoretical sense to think that providing 
financial access would enable poor households to smooth consumption and manage 
unanticipated disasters does not mean that we have empirical evidence that this is so. We no 
more have a randomised control trial to show that access to a suite of financial services leaves 
the poorest better off than those without, than we have proof of empowerment. It will be 
recalled that the two RCTs that have looked for evidence of empowerment as well as poverty 
alleviation, were unable to establish it. The case for financial access is an argument in logic 
rather than empirical fact thus far. Still, it is a good logic with limited downside: if the issue 
of security of savings can be resolved, access to a mix of savings, insurance and credit 
threatens to do much less harm than the sole use of credit to attempt to meet each of these 
needs. 
Whether, at the macroeconomic level, it is the best use of the development dollar is a quite 
different question. Of course it would be a good thing for the poor to have access to financial 
services: it might be an even better thing for them to have access to free healthcare, clean 
water or a quality free education. No attempt is made here to judge the relative merits of each 
of these. 
If this ‘access to financial services works, even if microcredit alone has failed to’ turns out to 
be true, then there is a role for microcredit as a part of that suite, even if rather a more modest 
one than its adherents had claimed for it. Its role may be made the greater if it is the part of 
that suite that is helping to pay for the rest: if it is hard to profitably/sustainably serve the 
poor with credit when high levels of interest are being charged, it is still harder with products 
such as insurance or savings where the immediate return on the product to the provider is 
much lower and greater volume (and a much longer timescales and higher client retention 
levels) would be necessary for the product to be profitably or sustainably offered. 
Even if microcredit is justified, to some extent, as the bill-payer for a wider, more useful 
range of services (and this is not where the industry is yet) –  even if this does end up on the 
‘plus’ column for microfinance, we still need to weigh up, as far as we can, all the other pros 
and cons. It may be that even if microfinance did facilitate the provision of a broader suite of 
financial services, and even if that suite were effective in alleviating poverty and the worst 
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downsides from the poors’ lives, that the costs of microfinance were still too high to justify 
this.  
In a recent interview with Tim Ogden, Banerjee and Duflo were blunt about the failures of 
microfinance in development.275 Of the microenterprises themselves, Duflo comments: ‘It’s 
been obvious for a long time that these businesses are not growing. Grameen Bank has been 
around for many many years and their loans are still very very small. Just forget about subtle 
impact evaluation or whatever: it’s been staring us in the face that these businesses are not 
growing, and the vast majority of people are not growing out of poverty or anything like that. 
If we had not been obsessed with the romantic idea of microcredit then maybe there would 
have been an earlier realizing of what microcredit does and what it can’t do.’  
Banerjee chimes in: ‘The crisis in microfinance is a result of the 3 C’s: Credulity, cupidity 
and corruption. The politicians were corrupt, we were all credulous, and the microfinance 
people were greedy. Put them together and you get the crisis. Our credulity was significant. 
Somehow we believed that all repayment happens in microfinance due to some magic which 
made no economic sense. We knew it didn’t make economic sense…You don’t need to do an 
evaluation to start asking questions. You just need to think about it for ten minutes. These are 
desperate people with lots of financial demands. People in the family are sick, people lose 
jobs, the daughter needs to be married…But 90 per cent repay. What is going on? How could 
we believe that this was because of some tweaking of economic incentives? As economists I 
think we were basically inept in thinking about it or we would not have believed it. The core 
fact [of coercive repayment loan enforcement] was staring us in the face…they come to your 
house, they call up your friends…And we didn’t look at this, we evaded the gaze of these 
facts that were looking back at us.’ 
We can evade the gaze of these facts no longer. Chapter 10 discusses how we should respond 
to an intervention that has no proven positive impact on poverty overall, offers some 
evidence of empowerment, but also of disempowerment through the group liability model 
and has some, possibly significant gains for the few who make it, and some, utterly tragic 
consequences for some who do not. 
 
                                                          
275 See http://www.philanthropyaction.com/articles/an_interview_with_banerjee_and_duflo_part_2 
170 
 
Chapter 10: The Distribution of Benefits and Burdens in Microfinance and What Can 
be Justified 
 
Microfinance, then, has not been shown to have the clear positive impact on reducing poverty 
and empowering its borrowers that its proponents have claimed for it. But to conclude, of 
course, that it does not have net positive impact is not to conclude that it has no impact at all. 
On the contrary: we have seen that microfinance does enrich some, some of the time: but that 
it also has very negative impact when a borrower becomes overindebted, has a business 
failure or otherwise finds herself unable to repay.  
This chapter asks: what type of distribution of these benefits and burdens is acceptable? And 
then it will attempt to quantify what the distribution of benefits and burdens actually is. But it 
is conceded at once that the answer to this second question is going to be sketchy at best. 
Because, by and large, the industry does not count its dropouts or measure what happens to 
them when or after they do dropout, the information on which to judge the negative burden is 
hardly there. If microfinance were a medical intervention, such a lack of knowledge of impact 
on the ‘losers’ from the intervention would be universally condemned. The microfinance 
world greets it largely in silence.  However, what we do know will be drawn upon. First, 
however, it is possible to contemplate the type of distribution that we might find, 
theoretically, morally acceptable: and then consider, with the limited knowledge we do have, 
whether we are likely to be within the range of that. 
An absolutist might take the position that a distribution of benefits and burdens resulting in 
net zero impact overall, but which includes severe losses, even suicides at the worst end, is 
straightforwardly unacceptable. Regardless of how the distribution falls between small scale 
negatives and small scale positives, with perhaps a few extreme winners, there should be no 
losses so bad borrowers are driven to suicide. As Harper276 puts it, ‘it is surely unacceptable 
that an intervention that is intended to help the poor should injure any of them.’  
The approach taken here to weighing up the distribution of the benefits and burdens of 
microfinance is a consequentialist one. The problem for a consequentialist approach is that, in 
theory, if the totality of consequences are all that matter, then it would allow for some very 
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severe losses to a few if there were very many indeed who made some small, relatively trivial 
gain. There would be a distribution set – one suicide against ten million borrowers now able 
to afford tea daily for breakfast? or, less trivially, a million now able to send a child to 
school? – that the consequentialist has to accept weighs in favour of the small gains to the 
very many at the terrible cost to the very few. At this point the consequentialist starts to envy 
the certainties of an absolutist approach, which would not allow us to sacrifice even one for 
the small gains of millions. 
There is a step some consequentialists take here to minimise the chances of endorsing the 
sacrifice of the few for a small gain of the very many, and that is to build in a weighting that 
favours the worst off: the prioritarian view.277 Arneson278 summarises this as ‘according to 
prioritarianism, the moral value of gaining a benefit (avoiding a loss) of a given size for a 
person is greater, the lower the person’s level of benefits (measured on an absolute rather 
than comparative scale) prior to the receipt of the benefit (avoidance of loss).’ 
By assigning an extra weight to losses taken by those below the poverty line, then, without 
altering the weighting given to the gains achieved by those who do gain from microfinance, 
the prioritarian consequentialist can argue that some distributions are unacceptable that the 
straight consequentialist would have to accept. But note that this has not really solved the 
problem. The prioritarian can reject the distribution that accepts one suicide for a million now 
having tea for breakfast: but whatever weight he has given the ‘losers’ here, unless it is 
infinite (in which case his position becomes that of the absolutist) then there will be a 
distribution (two hundred million having tea for breakfast?) that he will have to accept, unless 
he arbitrarily readjusts his weightings. 
We need some guide as to how to weight. Parfit gives an example of two Hells.279 In Hell 
One, 15 people suffer 100 years of agony, in Hell Two a billion people suffer one minute of 
agony. Total years of agony are higher in Hell Two than Hell One (1902 v 1500), but Parfit is 
clear that Hell One is worse because each of the 15 people suffer over fifty million times 
longer than those in Hell Two. So 15 x 50 million units of suffering is regarded as worse than 
one billion x one unit of suffering (even though in units it isn’t) because we weight the fact 
that the 15 are so very much worse off. But by how much? Is 15 x 30 million units of 
suffering still worse than one billion x one unit of suffering? This is now less than half the 
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total suffering in Hell Two, but 15 people are still getting 30 million more times of it than any 
one of the billion in Hell Two. It is not clear where the lines get drawn. 
The prioritarian position has a great intuitive appeal, but it is unclear how to assign the 
weights, and there will always be a further distribution set possibility that will produce the 
outcome the prioritarian seeks to avoid. However, it seems likely that once we calculate 
carefully for the actual utility gained and lost for the gain or loss of a given amount of income 
for those around and below the poverty line, the straightforwardly calculating 
consequentialist may well achieve the same result as the prioritarian without the need for 
arbitrariness in weighting. That a gain or loss of a given amount of income can have a very 
different impact on utility depending on the circumstances in which it arises was pointed out 
by Bentham in his original description of utilitarianism. He  notes280 ‘it is manifest, that there 
are occasions on which a given sum will be worth infinitely more to a man than the same sum 
would be at another time: where, for example, in a case of extremity, a man stands in need of 
extraordinary medical assistance: or wants money to carry on a lawsuit, on which his all 
depends…In such cases, any piece of good or ill fortune, in the pecuniary way, might have a 
very different effect from what it would at any other time.’ 
What is argued here is that a key ‘circumstance’ that affects the utility of a gain or loss of a 
given sum to a person is the level of poverty from which that person starts. Whilst the overall 
impact of microfinance as poverty alleviator and empowerer appears (at best) balanced, with 
total income gained being roughly matched by total income lost, the total consequences are 
not measured solely and only by a household income measure. For a population hovering 
around and below the poverty line, the consequences of a gain or loss of, on average, say 30c 
a day are not equal. The gain is certainly a positive, and at this level of income the problem of 
running in to the law of diminishing marginal returns is perhaps still some distance away: but 
the consequences of losing 30c a day are disproportionately higher than the positives of the 
gain. This is because at this level, not very many steps down in income will lead to a lack of 
ability to survive at all. The gain may mean a household can move from eating twice a day to 
perhaps eating three times a day; or perhaps from having no breakfast to having tea in the 
mornings. Worthwhile gains enough: but the equivalent loss of 30c a day may mean actual 
starvation. 
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In other words, at and below the poverty line, and increasingly the further below it is gone, 
the disutility of a loss of a given sum is much greater than is the utility value of a gain of the 
same sum. This is clear when we think of what that sum could buy or no longer buy if lost. 
Going from two to three meals a day is an important benefit and could add some years to a 
person’s life. But going from two meals a day to one will lead to serious malnourishment if 
not starvation and the loss of many years, perhaps all, of expected life.  
Including the utility function and disutility function, expressed in welfarist terms of those in 
poverty effectively weighs the consequences in the way the prioritarian would want to. In 
Parfit’s original discussion of prioritarianism,281 each unit of benefit is equal: if someone 
rises from 99 to 100, he benefits as much as someone who rises from 9 to 10. In the case of 
microfinance, and the provision of it to those in poverty, we are making the opposite 
assumption: that (a) the law of diminishing marginal returns means that someone who rises 
from 99 to 100 does indeed get less benefit than someone who rises from 9 to 10; and that, 
more importantly, for the opposite burden, falling from 10 to 9 when 10 is already survival-
critical, has much higher disutility than falling from 100 to 99: and that when 10 is the 
poverty line, the disutility of a fall from 10 to 9 is greater than the utility of a gain from 10 to 
11.  
The welfare consequentialist would take the measures of the impact of microfinance in terms 
of household income (which combine to a net zero impact) and translate these gains and 
losses in income into the impact on the welfare of the borrowers.282 At this level of poverty, 
the negative impact on welfare of the loss of even a relatively small sum of income is greater 
than the positive impact on welfare of the same sum gained, leaving the consequentialist also 
rejecting a distribution of the benefits and burdens of microfinance that includes significant 
losses as well as significant gains. 
So what do we know about the actual distribution of benefits and burdens? 
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One study indicates that the burdens are relatively more likely to fall on those least able to 
bear them. Hulme and Mosley283 drew on a study of thirteen financial institutions in seven 
countries, in Asia, Africa and South America. They analysed the impact of a loan on the 
income of a borrower and charted that against her starting level of poverty, that is, where she 
was relative to the poverty line at the point of taking out the loan. They found that the benefit 
of credit was greatest to those just above the poverty line (100 – 150% of it), who saw 
improvements to income of around 10%. Borrowers who were ‘upper poor’, with starting 
incomes 200% of the poverty line, saw much lesser gains. Most problematically, those who 
when they borrowed were below the poverty line saw their income reduce, and the poorer 
they were, the worse this was. The business failures (estimated at 15%) were 
disproportionately amongst those who were poorest to begin with, and suffer the greatest 
disutility from any given loss. 
We need to understand just how many ‘losers’ from microfinance there are, and by how 
much they lose, both financially and in terms of disempowerment. Unfortunately, this is 
where we run into the paucity of studies that follow up dropouts to measure what the eventual 
impact on them of having engaged in microfinance was. 
There is no clear single number we can point to, to measure the ‘losers’ from those who take 
up microcredit. Candidates are the repayment rate; the different number of those who do, 
individually, in fact default; the numbers who drop out; and the numbers who (if we could 
only measure it accurately) become over-indebted and choose or are forced to make serious 
sacrifices to repay their loans. 
The repayment rate we know not to be an accurate measure of ‘losers’, because we know that 
a greater number in fact default, but their group then makes the sum up (even if it is 
sometimes coercively reclaimed from the borrower’s assets). A better number would be the 
ratio who do in fact default on their loan, whether made up by the group or not, but even that 
is not a pure measure (it may potentially overstate), because some borrowers may choose to 
default when in fact they could comfortably continue to pay. There are also some who may 
‘strategically’ default – they are able to repay their loans, but can see one or more members 
of their group who are struggling badly and will be obliged to default, leading the MFI to call 
upon the savings of the successful borrowers to make good the missed payments. If enough in 
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the group are struggling, and it is early enough on in a repayment cycle that the sum of the 
non-struggling borrowers’ balances outweigh the savings they stand to lose, then a mass 
default by the whole group is a rational response by the non-struggling borrowers to limit the 
damage to them personally. Such instances are rare, but can be expected to occur when there 
is a general repayment crisis, caused either by local events such as economic downturn, 
famine, failure of crops or even government advice that it is not necessary to repay loans, as 
happened in Andhra Pradesh in 2010. 
However this may be, individual default ratios are not released by MFIs, so we cannot 
measure the number of ‘losers’ this way. The next-best option is the number who drop out: 
the proportion of borrowers who decide not to carry on borrowing with an MFI. 
Although MFIs do not regularly disclose dropout numbers, some studies have been done, and 
as we saw earlier, ratios of 25-60% were found in East Africa and around 15% in 
Bangladesh284. The drop out number then needs further modification before it can be our 
‘losers’ number however. In theory, some borrowers will drop out because the MFI has 
served its purpose and the business has been so successful the borrower graduates on to a full 
banking relationship with a bank. One rarely sees this great success however, and it would 
surely be trumpeted by the MFIs whenever it did occur (every other possibility of success is). 
More likely, some borrowers will drop out from an MFI’s programme because it disappoints 
in terms of its delivery, or the loan officers are not liked, or because the weekly meetings 
become too time consuming. 
Some will also leave because the MFI’s loan repayment schedule is inconvenient or they can 
get a better rate elsewhere. However, the number will also under-estimate because there may 
be many struggling borrowers who are losing money but do manage to stay within the group. 
They may sell assets or take in other borrowing just to avoid default and its consequences. 
Rosenberg and Schicks285 have recently tried to examine how many borrowers become over-
indebted by microfinance and would have been better off if they had never availed 
themselves of it, roughly what is being sought as ‘losers’. They begin by summarising the 
recent problem: ‘In a review of four countries, Chen, Rasmussen and Reille286 reported that 
delinquent loans, which averaged 2 per cent of portfolio in 2004, skyrocketed to 2009 levels 
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of 7 per cent in Bosnia-Herzogovina, 10% in Morocco, 12 per cent in Nicaragua, and 13% in 
Pakistan. In some of these countries, subsequent levels have been quite a bit higher. More 
recently, collection has collapsed in the Indian State of Andhra Pradesh.’ We can add to this 
list David Roodman’s287 recent work on Grameen Bank, which puts loans 30 days past due 
and including rescheduled loans at 9.9%. 
Rosenberg and Schicks examine this prepayment problem from the borrowers’ perspective. 
Roughly, they define borrowers as over-indebted ‘if they have serious problems repaying 
their loans’. ‘Serious’ is later fleshed out as when a borrower ‘is continuously struggling to 
meet repayment deadlines and structurally has to make unduly high sacrifices related to 
his/her loan obligations. Especially in the context of an industry that says its purpose is to 
help the poor, microborrowers who manage to repay only by sacrificing minimum nutrition 
levels or their children’s education should be counted as over-indebted.’288 They note: 
Overindebtedness often implies heightened vulnerability and further impoverishment of borrowers. Material 
effects include reduced consumption levels, late fees, asset seizures, downward spirals of ever-increasing 
debt, and eventually, a loss of creditworthiness. There are sociological effects related to peer pressure and a 
loss of social position, as well as psychological effects on mental and physical health. In extreme cases, 
borrowers’ desperation can even lead to suicide.289 
Rosenberg and Schicks are not able to quantify the actual level of over-indebtedness in most 
markets. But they are concerned because ‘Today there is less confidence in assertions that 
microcredit can raise millions of people out of poverty. The actual benefits may be 
considerably more modest. If the quantum of benefit we expect is lower, then the potential 
downsides for clients that we’re willing to tolerate should be lower.’  
Rosenberg and Schicks located six field studies that try to quantify microcredit over-
indebtedness. It is a skewed sample, because the markets studied were chosen just because 
local observers were worried about over-indebtedness problems. Even allowing for this, they 
found the results worrying. 
Gonzalez’s290 study in Bolivia – using quite a wide definition of over-indebtedness as 
drawing down on savings or working overtime at any point over a four year period – found 
                                                          
287 David Roodman ‘Grameen Bank Portfolio Keeps Deteriorating’ on David Roodman’s Microfinance Open 
Book Blog, 16 April 2012, available at http://blogs.cgdev.org/open_book/2012/04/grameen-bank-portfolio-
continues-deteriorating.php, accessed 12.09.12. 
288 Op. cit. note 285 p. 23 
289 Ibid. 
290 Adrian Gonzalez ‘Microfinance, Incentives to Repay, and Overindebtedness. Evidence from a Household 
Survey in Bolivia.’ (2008) Doctoral thesis, Ohio State University, Ohio,  p. 1 
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that 85% of people were overindebted. Grammling291 in Ghana, defining over-indebtedness 
as having to draw down on non-business assets to keep up microloan repayments, found 12% 
of borrowers to be over-indebted and 16% at serious risk of becoming so. In a restricted-
distribution study of a thousand microborrowers of half a dozen institutions in a country 
simply labelled X, over-indebtedness was defined as debt servicing costs being in excess of 
100% of net income. 17% were classified as overindebted and another 10% as at risk of 
becoming so, with the poorer clients the most at risk of becoming overindebted. 
In a peculiar study in Karnataka, India,292 there had been several mass defaults, largely by 
Muslims, in certain particular towns where local Muslim organisations banned Muslims from 
continuing contact with MFIs. Comparing the mass default towns to the non-default towns, 
21 per cent against 3 per cent said repayment was a burden; 34% against 2 per cent said they 
had skipped important expenses, such as meals. Rosenberg and Schicks can only speculate as 
to how far these defaulters were acting opportunistically in an agitated political atmosphere 
and how far this skewed the defaulters’ accounts of their sacrifices. Note, as mentioned 
earlier, these defaults may have been less opportunistic than rational if borrowers thought 
their savings were about to be called upon to make up others’ defaults. Embarrassment about 
admitting that as a motive may also have skewed the extent of the sacrifices they claimed to 
have been making.  
Finally, Guérin et al293 conducted a study in Tamil Nadu, India, that defined over-
indebtedness as a process of impoverishment through debt, distinguishing three different 
levels: 
(i) Transitional over-indebtedness: debt servicing is high enough to prevent accumulation 
of assets, but no worse; average debt levels are 1.4x annual household income. 
(ii) Pauperization: despite asset sales, debt levels continue to rise, just to service existing 
debt and ensure household survival. There is no realistic prospect of the debt being met long 
term, but for a while it is continually re-charged. Average debt levels are 3.2x household 
income. 
                                                          
291 Mattias Grammling ‘Cross-Borrowing and Over-Indebtedness in Ghana: Empirical Evidence from 
Microfinance Clientele and Small Enterprises.’ (2009) Technical draft for discussion. Frankfurt: Procredit 
Holding. 
292 Karana Krishnaswamy and Alejandro Ponce ‘A preliminary analysis of mass defaults in Karnataka, India.’ 
(2009)  Presentation slides, quoted by Rosenberg and Schicks  op.cit. note 286. 
293 Isabelle Guérin, Marc Roesch, Venkatasubramanian, Santosh Kumar, ‘The Social meaning of over-
indebtedness and credit worthiness in the context of poor rural South India households (Tamil Nadu)’ (2011) 
RUME Working Paper Serie 2011-1, Paris, IRD 
178 
 
(iii) Extreme dependence – households have no prospect of repayment, rely on kin support 
and charity for daily survival.  
Of the original sample of 344 households, Guérin et al only studied the most indebted 20 per 
cent in detail. Of these, 19 per cent were in ‘transitory over-indebtedness’. 38% were cases of 
‘pauperization’ and 43% suffered from ‘extreme dependence’. The entire worst 20 per cent 
would count as overindebted, then, and Rosenberg and Schlicks note that ‘The findings 
suggest that over-indebtedness is also prevalent among households that didn’t fall into this 
subsector. Twenty per cent is therefore the absolute minimum estimate for overall over-
indebtedness in the original sample.’294 
In the absence of hard evidence, definitive conclusions are impossible, and we must take 
what evidence we have. Taking the evidence of the early Hulme and Mosley survey, the 
indebtedness surveys (serious indebtedness of 20% and up, albeit in places known to be 
problematical), the numbers that regularly drop out (10 – 65%) and the percentage of 
Grameen Bank loans known to be past due or rescheduled (10%), it seems reasonable to 
suggest that there are at least 10%-20% of microfinance borrowers whose lives go worse 
from having borrowed, with the percentage peaking at very much higher levels when credit 
has become too easily available in a market and overborrowing has occurred. Given that the 
RCTs that have been carried out that did include drop outs (as the Spandata study did) 
showed no overall positive net impact, and that we know that most enterprises do not flourish 
much because of their failure to expand, it would follow that to offset these hidden losers, the 
few winners must be doing quite well indeed.  
The distribution of the benefits and burdens of microfinance, on the patchy evidence we have, 
appears to be that at least a significant minority, more in credit bubbles, are losing 
significantly and these are typically poorer borrowers for whom disutility from the loss is 
highest. There is a large majority to whom not much difference is made, and a small number 
of ‘winners’ who really do relatively well. 
The BBC reporter Mukul Devichand observed this rather more anecdotally when he visited a 
joint liability group of ten women in the slum of Navodhya Nagar in Hyderabad. Of these ten, 
one was in severe debt, one’s business was ‘a flop’ and two had ‘man-trouble’ – one’s 
husband had run off with her loan and another’s drank the money away. Five were not 
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observing much difference in their lives. The remaining one who was had started a sari 
trading firm and was now building a grand new home on the lake.295 
The pattern that out of a group of ten, you might have one significant winner, five 
indifferents, three losers and one very significant loser, is not a distribution that would be 
acceptable to either the absolutist or the consequentialist This is particularly so for the latter if 
household income impacts are translated into welfare impact, at which point the net zero 
income impact would likely translate into a net negative welfare impact. 
Quite clearly, empirical research on the actual distribution of microfinance’s benefits and 
burdens is badly needed. The above is only a sketch of what the distribution might be, but it 
is suggestive that most normative theories would find it unacceptable. 
The conclusion considers what changes could be made to microfinance to help ensure both 














                                                          
295 ‘The Bankers and the Bottom Billion’, broadcast on BBC Radio 4 FM at 8pm on 17/5/2011. 
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Conclusions and Recommendations – How to Practice Microfinance Ethically 
The paradox of microfinance is that it aims to increase the autonomy of its borrowers by 
empowering and enriching them: but that its practices undermine these aims, largely because 
borrowers are treated in aggregate rather than as individuals. It is ironic that an industry that 
to a considerable extent began its modern expansion with one man’s cry against an individual 
woman and her children being condemned to a lifetime of penury for the lack of twenty-two 
cents in capital, should have made its targeting of credit and measuring of success on a group, 
aggregate basis. It is particularly because microfinance measures its success in terms of 
aggregate repayment rather than through individual outcomes that it has lost sight of what 
happens to the particular people it lends to. It has been an industry blinded to some of the 
negative consequences of its practices by its certainty of its own good intentions. 
When the industry has at times acknowledged the negative consequences of its group lending 
practices, it has justified them by appealing to the consequentialist argument that, overall, 
borrowers have been made better off by their engagement with microfinance. We have seen 
from the evidence presented in Chapters 8 and 9 that this stance is not justified by the facts. 
Indeed, it seems likely that if the industry stuck to the emphasis on the individual and her 
autonomy that it has in its aims, within its practices, the consequences overall might be rather 
better. Through respecting individuals and their autonomy more completely in practice as 
well as in theory, the industry would move a long way towards cutting out the worst of what 
goes wrong. Seeking to improve individual rather than aggregate outcomes would be likely to 
improve aggregate outcomes as well by reducing the number of ‘losers’, those for whom 
borrowing makes life go very much worse, and for whom the disutility of loss is highest. 
How could this be done? 
It could be done by the industry improving its own self-regulation, or failing that, individual 
governments introducing regulation to achieve the same reforms. 
The leading players of the microfinance industry set up the Smart Campaign in 2009 to focus 
on issues of client protection. It is here, if anywhere, that we can start to find industry policies 
aimed at preventing over-indebtedness and the charging of levels of interest rates (however 
defined) that will inevitably lead a client into a spiral of debt. The Smart Campaign does put 
forward seven Client Protection Principles (CPPs) which, it is claimed, ‘address the mandate 
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of all providers to treat clients fairly, with transparent and ethical standards that avoid 
harm.’296 
The seven Client Protection Principles are: - 
1. Fair & Respectful Treatment of Clients 
2. Transparency 
3. Prevention of Over-Indebtedness 
4. Responsible Pricing 
5.  Appropriate Product Design and Delivery 
6. Privacy of Client Data 
7.  Mechanisms for Compliant Resolution 
 
The problem with these are two-fold. First, they are not specified. Just what does fair and 
respectful treatment of clients require? What level of interest rates would ‘responsible 
pricing’ disallow? Secondly, they are not enforced. Rather, an MFI can send the Smart 
Campaign a one-time signature to state that they endorse these principles, and then state on 
its publicity materials, web sites etc. that it is signed up to the Client Protection Principles of 
the Smart Campaign, and make no changes to its behaviour whatsoever. No one from the 
Smart Campaign will come to see if any of the Principles are followed, or how they are 
interpreted. If this is self-regulation, it is self-regulation with the regulation left out.297 
                                                          
296 Se www.smartcampaign.org 
297 As this thesis goes to the printers, the SMART Campaign has announced that from January 2013 it will 
introduce a certification programme for its CPPs. This will allows MFIs to apply to rating agencies, for a fee, for 
an independent certification that they do indeed comply with the CPPs. The standards that have to be met for 
each one to receive accreditation are still being agreed upon between the SMART Campaign’s ‘thought leaders’ 
and the rating agencies. 
At a meeting of the UK Microfinance Gateway Club on 27th November 2012, Beth Rhyne, who heads the 
SMART Campaign, stated that these standards would, on a scale from ‘wrong/criminal’ through ‘unsavoury’ to 
‘fit & proper’ to ‘excellent’, sit on the borderline between ‘unsavoury’ and ‘fit & proper’. The specifications are 
not yet on the website, but as an example of what would be good enough to count as ‘fair’ pricing, Ms Rhyne 
stated that it would be that an MFI charged roughly the same as others operating in that country. So if all MFIs 
in a country charged 60 – 80%, that would be ‘fair’. With regard to transparency of interest rate, she was not 
sure if there would be a requirement for APRs or EIRs or not. 
Specifying what it takes to meet the CPPS, and having independent verification of it, is progress of a sort. 
Without yet having the proposed set of specifications for the standards, it is not possible to see how far the 
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For self-regulation to have any meaning, for the CPPs to actually offer some protection to 
borrowers, the Smart Campaign needs to specify a standard for each Principle and then 
independently assess each MFI’s attainment of that. What might such a specification be? 
Some ideas follow. 
 
 
Client Protection Principle  Specification 
Fair & Respectful Treatment of Clients  Individual lending (no group liability) 
Transparency  APRs or EIRs for every loan 
Prevention of Over-Indebtedness  APRs/EIRs, compared to recorded 
margins/cash-flow of client 
Responsible Pricing  APR/EIR no more than (say)1.2x the 
Commercial/Urban/Formal rate 
Appropriate Product Design and 
Delivery 
 No hidden charges; offering of savings facility 
alongside credit offering 
Privacy of Client Data  Individually recorded 
Mechanisms for Complaint Resolution  + follow up on outcome for all clients and ex-
clients, regardless of whether they drop out. 
 
As will be seen from the above suggestions, for the industry to start taking client protection, 
its duty of care, seriously, it needs to do three things it currently regards as anathema: 
1. End the use of group liability contracts. All lending should be with individual liability 
only. If lending is still made in groups, the practice of making future loans to individuals in 
groups also dependent on the group’s repayment, must cease. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
industry has really moved in the direction of client protection: and it will be some time yet, even if it has, before 
we know how many MFIs sign up to be measured. The tenor of the discussion, however, was that the 
specifications will be pitched at the minimum possible level that could be described as an ‘adequate duty of 
care’ in order to achieve the broadest participation. 
The biggest problem for the SMART Campaign and its specifications, however, is that it does nothing to tackle 
the problem inherent in the group lending methodology. As we have seen, some of the worst problems for 
borrowers who struggle come only indirectly from the MFI, but are enforced by other members of the 
borrowing group. None of the CPPs address this and none of the specifications of them will do so, according to 
Ms Rhyne. Thus, sadly, the certification programme could exceed all its currently rather low expectations and 
set excellent standards that are followed and verified: and the problems of disempowerment of borrowers 
observed in this thesis continue by proxy. 
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2. Introduce compulsory disclosure of the Annual Percentage Rate (APR) or the US Effective 
Interest Rate (EIR), so long as all MFIs use the same one. If MFIs want to continue to use flat 
rates, so be it, but the APR/EIR must be published alongside them, both so that the borrower 
has a truer idea of the cost of her loan, and for purposes of comparison. The APR/EIR must, 
of course, contain all charges. 
3. Require record keeping from MFIs, by individual client, of the interest rate on the loan 
extended and either the margin of the proposed business, or the cash flow of the borrower if 
in fact it is to be used for consumption. 
These three measures put the individual back at the heart of microcredit. They are what is 
required, at a minimum, for microcredit to be practised ethically.  
Although the short term impact of implementing these on many MFIs’ profitability may well 
be negative, in the long run it may turn out that these measures are in the MFI’s interests as 
well. This could be so because, whilst MFIs may think that the use of group liability takes the 
debt repayment problems away from them and passes it on to the group – as in the short term 
it does – in practice there is a tipping point after which the entire group would default en 
masse and the credit problem reverts right back to the MFI. This occurs when group members 
who can make their interest payments and would lose their 20% ‘compulsory savings’ if they 
defaulted, realise that likely defaults in the rest of the group are going to exceed the 
combination of their and the other non-struggling members’ total ‘compulsory savings’. At 
this point, since they can see that they are going to lose that 20% regardless of their own 
performance, it is rational for them to cease repayment and keep the outstanding loan balance 
that they have, assuming that balance exceeds their compulsory savings. This pattern is only 
likely to occur when a serious bubble is building up in credit298, but that is exactly when the 
MFI needs to know about it (and with group liability will not until it is too late) because its 
own solvency may be at stake. 
If individual liability were implemented across the industry, as in developed countries, there 
would be an earlier, more persistent rise in loans past due payment, but as a credit bubble 
developed, this would begin to rise, acting as an early warning mechanism to the MFI and 
signalling to it to begin to curtail lending, or raise its credit standards. Doing so then would 
                                                          
298 Or where there is some general economic factor that is causing the quality of all loans to deteriorate 
simultaneously, such as a general rise in basic food prices which reduced effective demand of the purchasers of 
the borrowers’ goods, hitting all their sales. 
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serve to deflate the bubble, prevent worse over-indebtedness later on and serve both borrower 
and MFI interest. 
It is, of course, the borrowers’ interests we are most concerned to protect here, but if MFIs 
became convinced that these measures were actually in their business interest as well, that 
would certainly raise the chances of their being brought about. 
What, though, if the industry continues to take the need to protect its borrowers as lightly as it 
has in the past? Could regulation help? 
 
This thesis does not have space to discuss what regulation of microfinance there is, country 
by country. As a necessarily sweeping generalisation, if an MFI does not take deposits, it is 
not regulated at all: if it does, it will require a banking licence and will have to comply with 
local banking regulations. These largely, however, cover the level of capital and liquidity a 
bank must hold, as they are prudential regulations designed to protect depositors from losing 
their savings, not regulations aimed at protecting borrowers from predatory lending practices. 
Regulation tends to be feared by MFIs as likely to introduce more expensive bureaucracy, as 
well as higher capital requirements many can ill afford. But some simple regulatory 
principles could be established wherever microfinance is practiced without requiring higher 
capital for non-deposit taking institutions. And these would be the same principles that could 
be introduced by MFIs through self-regulation: 
1. Make group liability contracts legally unenforceable 
2. Make publication of all fee inclusive APRs or EIRs compulsory 
3. Require record-keeping of APRs/EIRs, margins and cashflows and audit them. 
Naturally, there would be some cost to the MFI being required to implement these measures. 
Exactly the same cost as if they introduced them voluntarily: but, as argued above, they 
represent the best option for returning MFIs to their original goals of empowering and 
enriching their clients: and are quite possibly in their own long term interest well. Making 
publication of all fee inclusive APRs or EIRs compulsory can in fact help some MFIs, who 
are reluctant to do so not because they in fact charge more than others, but that by being the 
first to move to this method of calculating the interest rate, they will look as if they do. 
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Forcing all to employ good practice aids those who wish to but for competitive reasons, 
delay. 
An additional idea for regulation is put forward by Hugh Sinclair,299 a practitioner and 
consultant to the industry.  This is that we consider regulating not just the MFIs, but the 
MIVs – Microfinance Investment Vehicles – which provide a large portion of their funding. 
Much simpler than assessing regulation country by country, the MIVs (firms such as Triple 
Jump, Oikokreditbank, Deutsche Bank) are concentrated in a very few countries – 
Switzerland, Holland, Germany and the US – where regulation might be thought easier to 
carry out. If, as was held in Chapter 3, those who make profit from investing in the MFIs are 
as much a part of the exploitation of the borrower as the MFI itself, then this could be a very 
effective route. 
It could be, but one wonders what the incentive is for the Swiss or Dutch financial authorities 
to regulate a Blue Orchard or a Triple Jump. Regulation usually exists to protect borrowers in 
a country because they are that country’s citizens, that government’s voters. The Swiss 
government has no motive to regulate Blue Orchard’s potential exploitation of a Zambian 
tomato seller. (It is not as if, unfortunately, the Swiss financial authorities have demonstrated 
especial alacrity in regulating the much more direct exploitation of illicit financial flows by 
Swiss banks.) Sadly, attractive though the idea is in theory, it is hard to see it being practised. 
Much improved self-regulation is the more likely route for the microfinance industry to try if 
it wishes to bring its practices back into line with its ethical objectives, if only because the 
costs to individual governments of providing regulation may look prohibitive to them. 
If the industry does decide on the improved self-regulation route, it might also consider a 
Code of Ethics that goes beyond the protection of the borrower’s autonomy, important as that 
is, and looks to some of the other agents impacted by microfinance in addition to the 
borrower herself. Such might be: 
1. No lending to business activities that are illegal. No lending for the production of 
moonshine which is then retailed on, the more especially in countries where there is a high 
correlation between drunkenness and the spread of AIDs. Money being fungible, loans should 
be made immediately repayable if a borrower is found to be undertaking such an activity, 
                                                          
299 Hugh Sinclair, Confessions of a Microfinance Heretic: How MicroLending Lost its Way and Betrayed the 
Poor (2012) San Francisco:  Berrett-Koehler  
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regardless of what she stated the purpose of the loan was for. This condition must of course 
be made known to her on taking out the loan. Another activity that might be included in this 
category is money-lending, the borrower essentially arbitraging the cheaper loan from the 
MFI to lend on at higher rates herself. 
2. Do not lend to borrowers who use child labour. 
3. Allow a grace period, and perhaps a rescheduling of the loan, in the face of the client 
facing an unexpected, but temporary, economic shock (as Grameen does). 
4. Allow clients to ‘rest’ without penalty if a predictably busy time is approaching, such as 
the harvest season in rural subsistence economies. 
5. Adopt the specification of the Client Protection Principles listed above, not just the 
Principles themselves. 
Whether through self-regulation or through regulation imposed upon the industry, then, the 
industry needs to put at its heart its duty of care to the borrowers. It needs to place respect for 
the individual and her autonomy at the centre of its procedures and practices as well as its 
objectives. It should do so in fact whether the underlying philosophy of the practitioners or 
their regulators is one that gives autonomy a high intrinsic value or simply a high 
instrumental one. For those placing an absolute value on autonomy, it is straightforward: the 
industry simply needs to practise what it preaches. This thesis has given autonomy a high 
value, but not an absolute one. But even for a pluralist or consequentialist approach, the 
practical outcome is much the same. If the industry puts respecting individual autonomy at 
the heart of its practices as well as objectives, it is likely to reduce the worst outcomes 
carrying the highest disutility for borrowers for whom microcredit exacerbates rather than 
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